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DEFINITION OF TERMS
To avoid ambiguity, and to clarify terms which are not 
familiar to the reader, some terms which appear in this 
thesis are defined here below.
Islam means: "submision to the will of GodM . Those who
make this submision to obey God's laws will live an 
internal and enjoyable life in paradise.
Qur-an: the holy book of Isalm, it is God's words
which were revealed to Muhammad (P.B.U.H) and is now 
recorded in 114 chapters (Surahs). It is the Same all 
over the world, with no difference even in any letter or 
a word (Arabic Origin).
Muslims: those who accept Islam as a religion and a way 
of life.
Muhammad (P.B.U.H): uJ&S the last of a long line of 
ft
prophets begining with Adam and including Abraham, Noah,
A
Moses and Jesus (peace be upon them).
Sharia: Islamic laws, Islam is a religion of laws so 
comprehensive that it has rules for all human activities, 
personal and interpersonal. These laws are called Sharia, 
meaning the straight paths, it derives in varying degrees 
from four sources, the primary one being the Qur-an 
recognized as supreme by all Moslems, second is Sunna, 
third Qyias, and forth Ijma.
X
Sunna: the collection of Hadith (traditions and saying
_
of prophet).
A
Qyias: determined by jurists whose decisions in various 
cases were based on analogous elements in preceeding 
cases.
Ijma: the consensus of^group of judges representing the 
community.
Riba: any interest irrespective of the level of interest 
rate and the purpose of the credit, is prohibited. Riba, 
then, is defined as a positive predetermined return on 
capital.
Zakat: "Alms giving", is the welfare tax to be collected 
from the rich people and distributed by the state to the 
needy, poor people. The individual is expected to grow 
spiritually and to simultaneously help society and gain 
merit with God. Alms giving (Zakat) calls for annual 
payment of an alms tax for the poor.
Musharekat Madani: "civil partnership", in which a bank 
and an enterprenure jointly contribute to the capital of a 
company or of a particular project, (in small scale, 
dwelling construction).
XI
GLOSSARY
Bayeer Undeveloped Land (with historical development).
Dayeer Developed Land.
Mavat Waste (Virgin), Land (with no background
of development).
MIIUD Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.
TRO Title Registeration Office.
ULL Urban Land Law.
ULO Urban Land Organization.
ULDO Urban Land Development Organization.
UWLOAL Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law.
WAQF Land stopped for God and used for religious purposes.
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ABSTRACT
Urbanisation is a major problem in Iran today which seems 
likely to increase. Most national and urban governments 
are under pressure to accept the large and growing 
proportion of the urban poor and to help them find 
affordable shelter which meets their immediate needs. 
However, in many developing countries access to land, and 
in particular urban land, poses the greatest problem to 
the l o w - i n c o m e  settler in his attem p t s  to obtain 
accommodation.
Accessibility to land is restricted as the settler does 
not have enough money to participate effectively in the 
urban land market. As such, the availability of housing to 
the urban settler depends primarily upon the ease with 
which land is released by the land owners for development. 
Private urban land ownership and management has been 
underlined as a common impediment to availability of land 
for housing the urban poor. It is also a major man-made 
constraint on land availability in the market.
Public policy approaches to residential land vary with 
the dominant political ideology of different societies. 
The Iranian government, after the revolution of 1979, 
made an attempt to solve the country's urban housing 
problem, by applying the Islamic principles of property 
ownership restricting the amount of urban land individuals 
can own, and distributing the excess land on the one hand, 
while pr o v i d i n g  access to loans and c o n s t r u c t i o n  
materials on the other. Using equity, efficiency and 
impact as criteria for measuring the success or failure of 
a given policy, the aim of the study is twofold: a)
evaluation of the recent urban land policy in Iran in 
terms of accessibility to land by low-income groups and 
efficiency of land-use; and b) to evaluate the policy 
impact on housing and associated services, using Ahwaz 
city in Iran as a case study.
The thesis postulates that the supposed potential of 
public urban land ownership and management are not 
necessarily achieved simply because land is owned or 
managed by the state. The degree of success depends 
es s e n t i a l l y  on what form the public o w n e r s h i p  and 
management take, on the nature and character of the 
society involved, and on how public authority is exercised 
in the process of implementation.
The thesis concludes that the theoretical controversy in 
which different systems of land ownership are set against 
each other, has become divorced from practical realities. 
Like other Third World countries' policies the policy in 
Iran tends to benefit the upper and middle income groups 
either deliberately or unintentionally. The Islamic
XIV
ownership of land therefore, does not automatically imply 
an urban land policy that is more productive and just than 
any other system of land management. Factors such as 
administrative efficiency of the public agency involved, 
the amount of public money made available for housing the 
poor and the socio-economic condition of the targeted 
groups are fundamental to the realisation of the potential 
benefits of any land ownership system.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The study was undertaken to evaluate the urban land 
policy in Iran, and its impact on urban housing in 
general, and low-income housing in particular. Housing 
experts in Iran have agreed that government policy should 
respond to the basic needs of the low-income families, 
especially when these needs are not being met by the 
private sector. After two decades of government failure in' 
solving the problem of low-income housing, however, there 
was a growing belief among urban policy makers that public 
land ownership and management could serve well the housing 
needs of the urban poor in Iran.
In line with such a concept, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, after the revolution of 1979, initiated an urban 
land policy in which they assumed that low-income urban 
families would have easy access to cheap land and houses 
in addition to basic services. According to Iranian urban 
land policy, individual ownership of land was restricted
o
to 1,000 m in urban area, whilst excess land was subject 
to state ownership. The Urban Land Organisation (ULO), a 
government agency, was established to carry out the 
implementation of the policy and to distribute the 
expropriated land. This situation has provided an 
opportunity to assess the direct government intervention 
(public management), in housing the urban poor under an 
Islamic state system.
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1.2 Background of the Problem
One of the most striking phenomena of our times is the 
very rapid growth of the w o r l d ’s population. United 
Nations estimates show«/ that in the 1980s and 1990s the 
world’s populationUMs expected to increase by about 2,000 
million people, almost as many as the increase in the 30 
years period, 1950-1980 (Times 16/6/80). The same report 
also estimated that about 80% of the world's population 
would be living in the Third World by the year 2,000. Also 
striking is the tendency for population to concentrate in 
particular locations. In 1950, only 17% of the Third 
World's population lived in towns and cities. By 1980,
30.7 % did so. By the year 2,000, it is estimated that
43.7 % will live in urban areas (Kitay, 1 985 ). Not 
surprisingly, more and more of the urban population is 
coming to live in relatively large cities, and the number 
of large cities is increasing. In Africa in 1950, there 
was only one city (Cairo, 2.5 million) with more than a 
million inhabitants. By 1980, there were 19 African 
'million cities". By the year 2,000, there will probably 
be more than 60. In Latin America, there are more than 25 
'million cities' compared to six in 1950, there will be 
close to 50 by the year 2,000. In Asia, there were 21 
'million cities' in 1950, 81 by 1980 and there could be 
over 160 by the year 2,000 (McAuslan, 1985).
Generally, such increases in population pose serious 
problems of human welfare and d e v e l o p m e n t  but the 
concentration of population in a few cities creates 
problems of wider dimensions. For example, at the end of
2
1970s, 10 of the 15 largest cities in the world were
located in the developing countries (Kitay, 1985). Here 
primate cities have proved highly and persistently 
attractive to rural-urban migration and are now confronted 
with a whole range of problems of increasing severity. Of 
these problems perhaps the most obvious is overcrowding - 
too many people occupying too little space and competing 
for too few houses, jobs and services. For example the 
city of Calcutta has an average residential density of 
almost 750 persons per hectare (Ahmad, 1965). The 
imposition of such high numbers of people on the limited 
resources of the urban centres creates severe shortages of 
those resources that cannot be readily increased, thus 
diminishing the standard of living of the majority of the 
urban residents. One of such resources is housing which 
city governments are hard-pressed to provide in addition 
to the basic services that residents require or expect.
It is clear that the increase in number and size of 
urban centres would similarly affect the growth in^amount 
of land required for urban purposes in general and houses 
to shelter this new urban population in particular. 
According to a group of experts, land required for urban 
needs will increase from 16.5 million acres in 1950 to 
about 41 million acres by the year 2,000 (Kitay, 1985). 
As we rapidly approach the year 2,000, the need to 
acquire urban land for the increasing urban population is 
vital for developing countries. As countries become more 
and more urbanised, however, the issue of the efficient 
management of their urban land resources becomes more 
critical. With increasing urban populations and their
3
increasing need for housing, the changing needs of 
production processes, with changes in transportation and 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and systems, the 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of m i g r a t i o n  and rapid h o u sehold 
formations, and with greater demands for higher space 
standards, cities are experiencing acute problems in 
providing adequate supplies of land to satisfy these needs 
and demands at the right places and at the right times.
While these demands for urban land continue to grow, 
however, its supply is both genuinely and artificially 
limited. This arises from the fact that supply and 
location of land is generally fixed, so that increased 
demands can in many cases only be met by intensification 
of use. Increased intensification of use often brings 
about problems of congestion which can give rise to 
serious social costs and other negative externalities that 
adversely affect the environment.
Increased demand for urban land is also often reflected 
in higher land price. Higher pricei'lead to expectations of 
co n t i n u e d  price rises, and thus to h oarding and 
speculation and further limiting the availability and 
a c c e s s i b i l i t y  of land facil i t i e s  to an incre a s i n g  
proportion of urban residents.
The provision of housing for urban population poses 
problems to g o v e r n m e n t s  in both the developed and 
developing world. In developed free market economies, 
housing provision is basically the responsibility of the 
individuals, though there is almost always an element of
4
state involvement. In centralised economies, housing is 
a basic responsibility of the State. In all of these 
countries, there is a conscious government effort to 
monitor housing provision. Government involvement in the 
housing sector operates to provide housing for government 
officials and functionaries of the ruling politicians, 
while the ordinary urban population is left to its own
devices if it is to find accommodation. The majority of
oUvelopifU) C,6 A^]rvi^ S
the urban population in thz, ^ countries have low incomes 
and cannot afford the high capital outlay inherent in 
house provision. Due to a lack of government interest in 
housing provision, there has been a proliferation of poor 
housing, variously described in the literature as slums, 
shanty towns, squatters and so on.
The high capital outlay needed in housing provision 
limits the capability of the housebuilder to acquire land, 
to purchase building materials and to employ labour to 
construct the house, among other things. Analysis of 
these prerequisites in housing construction shows that, 
whereas the others are important, accessibility to land is 
the sine q ua non of the entire project. This is because 
unless land is available to the h o u s e b uilder, 
accessibility to building materials and labour are of 
little use. Literature on urbanisation in the developing 
world abounds in examples of low-income urban settlers' 
efforts to solve their accommodation problems through the 
construction of houses on land to which they have no 
title.
Many such squatter settlements have been identified in
5
developing world. In Peru, for example, the creation of 
squatter settlements is a secret and forceful enterprise, 
which is undertaken after a series of secret nightly 
meetings of the would-be squatters, which has been 
appropriately called an "invasion" , (Lloyd, 1979). 
Pearlman (1976) describes a similar phenomenon in her 
discussion of the Fa velas of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. 
The significant thing about these squatters is the fact 
that they begin as meagre accommodation, barely sufficient 
to serve the needs of their inhabitants (Solaun e_t a_l 
1974). With time they develop into townships with 
community leaders and accommodation that serves the needs 
of their inhabitants (Lloyd, 1979: 23). This metamorphosis 
generally results from improvements in the economic status 
of their developers, but, more importantly, from 
improvements as a result of securing the title of the 
land. Such i m p r o v e m e n t s  may be real, whereby the 
g o v e r n m e n t  c o m p u l s o r i l y  acquires the site for the 
inhabitants or forces land owners to grant titles to the 
squatters (Solaun 1974); or may be merely psychological, 
in which case the squatters feel secure because of 
inactivity on the part of the government and land owners 
in ejecting them. This is what Doebele (1978) calls a 
"perception of the risk of removal". Little progress in 
housing development therefore, can be expected without a 
much deeper understanding of the possibilities for 
effective action on the land issue.
Accessibility to urban land in many developing countries 
poses the greatest problem to the low-income urban 
resident in his quest for accommodation; he lacks the
6
ultimate weapon, money, with which to participate in the 
urban land market. Grimes (1976:43) estimates that for 
middle and low-income housing in Ahmadabad, Bogota, Hong 
Kong, Madras, Mexico City, Nairobi and Seoul, land makes 
up to between 12 percent to 46 percent of the total cost 
of single family public housing units and from two percent 
to 15 percent for multi - family units. The most 
significant characteristic of housing prices is the fact 
that the prospective builder must be able to purchase an 
interest in the land before he can begin his 
housebuilding. When land prices are high, many people who 
cannot afford them are denied the opportunity of building 
their own houses. The existence of a legal possibility for 
everyone to participate in the land market thus becomes 
merely theoretical as high land prices operate as an 
effective bar to land accessibility to many would - be 
participants. The fact that a person cannot afford the 
high prices of land does not necessarily mean that he 
cannot provide himself with accommodation if land was 
available to him. This has been demonstrated in the 
philosophy behind the development of squatter settlements. 
The solution would appear to be the manipulation of the 
market in land so that prices are brought within the means 
of low-income urban residents, some influence or authority 
extraneous to the market mechanism.
The problems of Bombay, Sao Paulo, Mexico City, 
Bangkok, Manila are quite distinct, and suffer in "the 
urban land crisis" resulting from the failure of national 
governments to ensure that cities develop with enough 
legal housing plots for their poor majorities. Most
7
governments have the constitutional power to control their 
urban development. Only a few have taken some steps, while 
the majority do little or nothing (McAuslan, 1987; Menezes 
1988).
One of the most serious implications of this trend is a 
scramble for living space which is becoming more scarce 
and expensive. Although this problem has its root in the 
incomes of the urban population, it is also a problem of 
the exclusion of large number of people from the land and 
housing market. Governments of different nations have 
taken various measures to solve urban problems, mainly 
housing the low-income families. These measures include 
site and services schemes, construction of formal housing, 
land acquisition, land-use control, land taxation and 
legal restriction of land ownership. Although many of 
these measures have multiple objectives, they are all 
intended in some degree to provide land for housing, 
particularly for those excluded by the market. The 
experience of formal housing methods in Singapore, Hong
Kong and the Republic of Korea for example, show that the
cost of such housing was too high to be afforded by the
relevant income groups. Land purchase experienced in the 
R e p u b l i c  of Korea was successful in terms of land 
acquisition, but falls down in terms of the high price 
resulting in the lack of access to the poor.
The experience of many countries show that the 
problem of the shelter of low-income people is not 
necessarily solved by large scale land acquisition and 
land banking. Public agencies at times tend to behave
much like private real estate developers, creating 
monopolies and aggravating shortages.
It can be argued that low-income people, if granted 
access to land, would be able to provide themselves with 
accommodation. Such accommodation may not be up to the
y]
standards prescribed by town planning regulations, but 
would still suffice for the needs of low-income earners. 
The land market is seen as the limiting factor in the 
inefficiencies in the housing system. Landowners have 
been blamed for the high prices of land and many have 
questioned the capacity of the traditional land tenure 
system operating in a given country to provide a solution 
to the problems posed by the market mechanism.
Like other Moslem countries, Iran's tenure system was 
based on the Ottoman legislation, which divided all land 
into four main categories i.e. Mulk (private ownership), 
Miri (Khalesseh in Iran: state ownership), Waqf (saved for 
God), and Musha (collective ownership). Before the 
revolution of 1979, the pattern of land ownership in urban 
areas was following the situation prevailing in free 
market economies, exercising the liberal concept of 
individual ownership of private property including land 
ownership. This type of land ownership was justified by 
the social norms that private ownership of land in Islamic 
societies is guaranteed, and any change in this respect 
would cause social disorder or political upheaval. AsWnl\ 
be seen in chapter three, this was not the tenure pattern 
that the Islamic law of property ownership had 
recommended. It became clear that the general public,
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including government bodies believed that the land 
management practices of the private market operated to 
exclude the poor from residential urban land and sometime 
thwarted efforts by government to control urban growth and 
development.
The demand for housing has been rising steadily, 
along with the growth of population and increasing 
urbanisation. The construction of housing has not however, 
kept pace with the demand and the cost of housing has also 
risen beyond the paying capacity of the majority of the 
people. The ever widening gap between the demand and the 
supply of houses and also between the cost of housing and 
the a f f o r d a b i l i t y  of the masses has resulted in 
overcrowding and congestion in the old centres and in the 
spread of squatter settlements and shanty towns without 
basic services such as water supply, sanitation,
facilities. Housing problems could be alleviated by 
increasing the supply of houses to the majority in need. 
It is feared that the current distribution of building
middle-income can afford it. This possibly results from 
the fact that such houses have mainly been provided by 
people who seek high and quick returns on their 
investments and price tenancies in their houses at levels 
that are so high that only the rich can afford them 
(Lowder, 1986).
In view of the continuing process of urbanisation 
in developing countries including Iran, as well as the
, open space, schools and other community
plots and houses has been such that only rich and the
10
inadequate resources on the part of both the people and the 
public sector, more realistic policy is deemed to be 
necessary. In effect, the key problem concerns the access 
of people to land on which they can build their houses. 
This necessitates the formulation of a realistic land 
policy, and such a policy must deal firstly with the legal 
problem of providing security for every family in need of 
a plot to build a dwelling unit. Secondly, it must provide 
a means of regulating the physical expansion of urban 
areas and the required infrastructure services. Within 
this general framework there must be a detailed 
deliberation of policy measures to help the achievement of 
the main objectives of the policy. The policy 
deliberation must be towards the general objectives of a 
better standard of housing for every family, especially 
the lower income group. Policy formulation in regard to 
the latter group must be based upon the actual process 
involved in the development of squatter settlement. In 
other words, one must tackle the problem in the same way 
as the low-income people have dealt with it. In effect, 
this type of process is more recommended than public 
supply of serviced 'standard' units. This policy should 
stress the incorporation of the energies and savings of 
the urban poor themselves, who have the ability and 
w i l l i n g n e s s  to build their own houses through the 
promotion of a 'self-help' system. This should include a 
broad programme of housing service delivery, designed to 
facilitate, encourage and accelerate this type of self- 
help incremental housing development typical of squatter 
settlements.
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Up to the Iranian revolution of 1979, the critical 
housing conditions remained unchanged. After the shift of 
power in Iran, the new government found it was necessary 
to intervene urgently in alleviating housing problems and 
enabling low-income families to provide their own 
housing. The state consideration took different measures 
which were ultimately manifested in formulating new laws. 
These were the Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law 
(UWLOAL) followed by the Urban Land Law (ULL) . The main 
objectives of this policy, were " to provide housing land 
and services for all, especially low-income (workers and 
peasants); and curbing land speculation" (ULL, 1982). The 
means for achieving these objectives were: restricting the 
amount of land each individual can hold; banning any land 
transaction except to, or from the state; abolition of 
urban waste land ownership on the basis of Islamic 
philosophy; establishment of an independent institution 
authorised to deal with land issues throughout the country 
(institutions, organisations, ministries, banks and all 
land belonging to the state was invested in the ne w)y
established Urban Land Organisation (ULO).
It was expected that this law would release the surplus
of privately owned land for those in urgent housing 
need* and in particular the urban poor. Industry, public 
infrastructure services and housing demands all competed 
for the same limited supply of urban land. It is thus 
important to find out how the urban poor have fared in the 
competition to acquire land and meet their housing needs.
Iran's Urban Land Policy is not the first attempt to
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deal with housing and urban land problems in developing 
countries. More significantly, it is one of the first 
a t t e m p t s  at urban land reform that restricted and 
s e p a r a t e d  urban land ownership from the rights of 
developments on the basis of the Islamic concept of 
property ownership. Unlike elsewhere, Urban Land Policy 
in Iran has not embarked on simply built houses or 
upgraded squatters.
Urban land policy in Iran has changed tenure patterns to 
the extent that each individual is restricted to own only 
one thousand square meters in the urban area. This was 
carried out by the established Urban Land Organisation 
(ULO), the only national body responsible for urban land 
issues. The Iranian government has committed itself to 
full su p p o r t  of the ULO, through coordinating the 
a c t i v i t i e s  of its organisations, institutions and 
ministries by all possible means (as obliged by the 
Constitution), to achieve its proposed objectives in 
housing construction. It is because of these added 
traditional, political and administrative organisational 
factors that the success or failure of the policy assumes 
wider significance as a viable and financially feasible 
means of providing basic shelter to the poor, low and 
middle income families in developing countries.
The thesis postulates that the supposed potentials of 
public urban land ownership and management are not 
necessarily achieved simply because land is publicly owned 
or managed. The degree of success depends essentially on 
what form the public ownership and management take; on the
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nature and character of the society involved, and on the 
q u a l i t y  of the personnel involved in the public 
administration and on how public authority is exercised in 
the process of implementation.
1.3 The Objectives of the Study
It is intended in this thesis, then, to (i) identify and 
analyse the Iranian urban land policy statement; (ii) 
identify and characterise the role of the Urban Land 
Organisation (ULO); (iii) determine the effectiveness and 
consequences of such a role or policy in terms of access 
to land by low-income people; (iv) assess the desirability 
of such consequences and discuss alternative strategies 
for improved performance and (v) evaluate the impact of
the ULO on housing development. This study focuses on 
residential policy.
F u r t h e r  attempt is made to assess the policy 
d e s i r a b i l i t y  in terms of having access to housing 
components such as building materials, finance support, 
basic services (such as water supply, electricity, 
education and health services), from the ULO s land and 
housing beneficiaries' perceptions. Finally the socio­
economic impact of the new sites on their lifer One of the 
essential tasks in the evaluation of this policy was to 
assess how far this approach and the housing schemes 
g e n e r a t e d  by it, meet the needs of the people who 
attempted to get access to land and housing via this 
policy .
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1.4 The Study Area
The Islamic Republic of Iran covers an area of 1.648 
million square kilometres and has a population of almost 
50 million. Iran’s urban population accounts for more than 
50 percent of the total population. Whilst modern 
urbanisation is best understood in terms of its broad 
connection with economic growth, an important point is 
that the actual character of the urbanisation process in 
any country is strongly influenced by its specific or 
internal socio-economic conditions. For these reasons, 
Iran's rather high level of urbanisation may be seen as 
implying a set of economic conditions that have been more 
conductive to urban growth as compared with those 
e x p e r i e n c e d  in many other countries. Iran, as a 
developing country, is currently undertaking a profound 
reform of its socio-economic system on the basis of 
Islamic philosophy since 1979. In this context, 
urbanization is an important component of the process of 
development and as a subject deserves full consideration. 
Looking to the future, Iran cannot necessarily be expected 
to follow exactly the same trend of its past experience or 
as other now more urbanised countries. On the contrary, 
Iran, according to its own special conditions and new 
concept of development, may well pioneer its own 
distinctive path and style of urbanization in the light of 
Islamic concept of property ownership and its impact on 
urban land management in the future. This Islamic way of 
land management is manifested in the new urban land policy 
and forms the setting of this study.
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The i m p 1 e ine n t a t i on of the urban land policy in the
city of Ahwaz was chosen as the case study for detailed
investigation. Although it is not the only city where the
policy has been implemented, urbanization in Ahwaz is
especially important for two major reasons. First, it is
the largest urban settlement in the southwest region of
the country; its housing and planning problems are most
acute and of national concern. Ahwaz1s proportion of
urban population in the two National Censuses of 1966 and
1976 were 51.7 percent and 58.1 percent respectively,
compared to the national level of 37.9 percent and 46.7
percent respectively (Iran National Census, 1966, 1976).
In 1971 Ahwaz with a 48.9*percent deficit in housing had
the most acute housing problem in comparison with other
highly urbanised centres such as Tehran (37.5%), Esfahan
(35.6%), and Tabriz (28%) (Iran National Sample Census,
1971). Secondly, The situation in Ahwaz is likely to be
repeated in many other urban centres as urbanization
increases within the country. Hence, a study based on
Ahwaz would be of benefit in attacking the problems of
land distribution and housing provision in the other towns
before they reached the proportions stationed in Ahwaz.
Ahwaz is a major city in the southwest region of the
country (Fig. 1-1). which is at present still ahead of
other provincial centres in attracting substantial
number of migrants in addition to war refugees. The way
policies for providing housing were implemented, and the
housing problems in Ahwaz must be of value as lessons for
other Iranian urban centres and within the Middle East, to
other countries of similar culture. Besides this, Ahwaz is
the centre of the oil fields and the capital of the most 
* Crude estimation of homeless households as a percentage 
of Ahwaz's households .
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Fig. 1-1
Geographical Location of Ahwaz in Iran
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in d u s t r i a l i s e d  province of the country (Khuzistan 
province). Also Ahwaz, with a population of 620,000 is as 
a secondary urban centre being developed as a means of 
decentralising urban growth away from primate city the 
capital - Tehran.
1.5 Description of the Study Area
Ahwaz city is the capital of the Khuzistan province, and 
is located centrally at about 20 metres above sea level. 
Ahwaz spreads over both banks of the Karun river's flood 
plain.
O
Khuzistan province (64,664 km in area) is located in 
the southwestern part of Iran. This province contains 13 
townships (shahrestan), 24 cities and 30 towns (bakhsh),
and 113 villages. Decay as a result of economic neglect in 
the 20th century allowed it to revert from previous 
prosperity to a semi-desert area. Its inhabitants are 
mainly Arab. Before the exploration of oil, the province 
inhabitants were all poverty stricken, lived in villages 
of mud huts, and existed by cultivating small areas round 
their homes. Discovery and exploration of oil in the area 
at the beginning of this century and the establishment of 
oil installations, including a great refinery at Abadan 
near the Persian Gulf, brought back its former 
importance. There was drastic physical transformation of 
the area from very thinly populated villages into large 
urban centres (See Appendix I for urbanization in Iran). 
The main problems resulting from the rapid process of 
urban development in this areas, particularly Abadan
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(before the war), and Ahwaz, were insufficient
accommodation and inadequate public services.
The climate of Ahwaz like other areas of Khuzistan
province is hot which affects the organisation of economic 
and social activities. The maximum temperature in summer 
(April- October), reaches 50 degrees centigrade, while 
temperatures as low as zero degrees can be recorded in the 
winter.
1.5.1 Population Size
Many of the problems of Ahwaz stem from the speed with
which the city has grown, its present size and its likely
rapid growth in future. The city has grown from just over 
one hundred thousand in 1956 to more than 200,000 in 1966, 
300,000 in 1976 and 600,000 by 1986, increasing at a rate 
of 5.7 percent per annum between 1966 and 1976. It is thus 
one of the largest cities in the southwest region and one 
of the fastest growing in the country. The population is 
likely to be about two million in the year 2000. Nearly 
29 percent of the urban population of the province lived 
in Ahwaz in 1976. This proportion for 1986 was nearly 40 
percent. The growth rate of population in 10 years 
period (1976-1986), is 7.1 percent (Table 1.1). At this 
time the city population was almost six times that of the 
next largest urban area within the Khuzistan province- 
De zf u l .
The physical expansion of the city has been equally 
rapid. The city area expanded three times in a period of
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ten years- from 1976 to 1986. The legal limit of the city 
in 1976 was 25 km of which 63.8 percent was undeveloped 
land. This area covered some 72 km2 in 1986. This 
expansion has occurred on a site where the "serviced 
limit of the city was severely constrained. The 
inadequacy of uncontaminated water supply to meet the 
needs of the expanding large population is a continuing 
feature of Ahwaz today, and there are problems both in the 
provision of sufficient uncontaminated water and in sewage 
disposal. The demand for water has co n s i s t e n t l y  
outstripped supply, and the city has recently begun to
Table 1.1
Popul a t i o n  Growth of Ahwaz city, K h u z istan 
Province and Iran, 1956-1986
Year/ place Ahwaz City Khuzistan Province Iran
1956 120,098 1,278,000 18,954,704
1966 206,375 1,707,000 25,788,722
1976 334,399 2,187,118 33,708,744
1986 619,966 2,681 ,978 49,280,000
Source: Population and Housing Censuses, selected years.
Plan and Budget Organisation, Ahwaz, Iran.
develop an integrated sewage system. At present human 
and industrial wastes are discharged untreated into the 
Karun river ( the only source of domestic water supply), 
greatly increasing potential hazards from disease.
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1.5.2 Morphology of the Study Area
Ahwaz s size and layout have also created other 
environmental problems such as traffic congestion, air 
and noise pollution. Many government departments are 
located in the centre of the city. Government
e m p l o y e e s ’ daily movement results in extra vehicular 
movement which produces congestion.
Urban growth out from the core has been much influenced 
by e n v i r o nmental and human constraints. With the 
dissemination of Islam throughout Iran, although the 
cities of Iran were overshadowed by the Islamic 
philosophy, the structure of Ahwaz city shows less 
evidence of such influence. With the exception of the old 
restricted areas of "Ahwaz Ghadeem" (old Ahwaz), the rest 
of the city was laid out in gridiron style. In "Ahwaz 
Ghadeem" There is a main passage instead of a public road, 
while different blind alleys branched off it. There were 
several houses in each blind alley. The reason for the
creation of blind alleys was in line with the Islamic idea
0 rr 
of keeping women from the evil eyes of strangers . The
blind alley, in fact, was a human and social space, where 
the women could exchange ideas without being seen by 
strange people. Therefore, a social environment was 
brought about and family and tribal relationship was 
strengthened.
The gridiron pattern of streets however, was 
subsequently extended to the rest of the city as it grew.
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Planners pursuing the recent development of the city of 
[t
Ahwaz divided^ into four areas, constituting 12 zones. 
Each zone in turn includes neighbourhoods which are 
locally called Mahalleh . Basically zoning is used as a 
land-use control device to direct the city's development. 
These zones, however, are not strictly defined. There is 
no absolute uniformity of the pattern of houses, old and 
new houses occurring in all parts of the city. It is 
frequently possible to find large pieces of waste land in 
the neighbourhood of beautiful houses usually full of 
rubbish. There is no assurance that if one builds a very 
nice house, another person will not build a higher storey 
building and block the former house's view tomorrow. Any 
type of building could be found in any neighbourhood, 
e s p e c i a l l y  after the Islamic Revolution when no 
segregation of classes was allowed. Nevertheless, social 
and economic characteristics as well as tribal language 
and level of services have given neighbourhoods different 
features. Ahwaz is broadly structured into four areas:
1) The Central Area
This area consists mostly of re-built or old commercial 
and official buildings such as offices, banks, mosques and 
public services. The Central area is located on both the 
east and west banks of the Karun river and is 
characterised by trade, commercial and administrative 
functions, as well as residential use. The main streets 
arcades protect the shoppers from the heat in summer. 
Northward of this area in the old city, old dwellings and
narrow alleys characterise the area. The
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Central area, together with old Ahwaz, supplies the daily 
needs not only of the city population but of other 
surrounding cities as well. The lack of vacant land has 
forced buildings to grow upwards rather than outwards. 
Therefore multi- storey buildings are crowded into this 
area more than any other part of the city. This crowding, 
in addition to traffic congestion, has caused the shift 
of some business to the new developed areas such as Keyan 
Pars and Koyeh- Enghelab. Other neighbourhoods such as 
Asia Abad, Koye Company and Koyeh Karami are residential 
areas which house the majority of low-income families 
(Fig. 1-2).
2) Interior Area
Population movement and the displacement of different 
social and economic activities from centre to the 
surrounding area, have resulted in the increase of city 
organisations and institutions as well as commercial 
offices here. Unlike the central area, building in this 
area is limited physically and land subdivision is well 
organised. New streets are grid planned, and connected to 
the central and outer area. It is worth noting that the 
city is unequally developed in this area. For instance the 
minimum unit of subdivision of urban land in some areas, 
such as Keyan Pars, New site, Ziton karmandi, Shahrak Naft 
and Koye Mellat was 300 m2 , (northwest & northeast). The 
population density in these areas is much lower than in 
other residential areas. The west, southwest, and 
southeast development of the city is characterised by 
medium density which include Koye Golestan, Ziba Shahr,
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Fig. 1.2 Location of Old and New Neighbourhoods in Ahwaz City 1987.
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Padad Shahr and Koye Enghlab. The expansion to the east 
and west of the city, where land is subdivided into small 
overcrowded plots (110 m 2) is characterised by high 
population densities and a lack of infra-structure and 
public services. The majority of these neighbourhoods' 
residents (Koye Abozar, Asia Abad, Shelang Abad, Rofish 
Abad, Charsad Dastgah), are poor or low-income families. 
Most of the cheap dwellings favoured by migrants are 
located in these neighbourhoods. Many buildings have been 
adopted to fit both living and retail business functions 
at the same time. These neighbourhoods present the most 
typical pattern of low-income housing in Iran and the 
largest in Ahwaz. Such neighbourhoods steadily increase in 
number, parallelling the growth of the city.
3) Outer Areas
These areas were originally satellite settlements which 
had no direct connection to the city. Owing to the 
e x i s t e n c e  of sizable tracts of urban land, these 
neighbourhoods (Koye Sepidar, Koye Ba Honer, Koye Sanayea 
Folad, Taavonihaye Maskan Golestan, South Padad, Koye 
Karun, southwest Shahrak Naft and rural areas within the 
city limits such as Seyed Khalaf), are subject to future 
development. Most of the distributed urban land for 
residential and industrial purposes was located here. The 
majority of residents generally have urban jobs either in 
the government or in private institutions employees and
small such as gas filling, stone cutting,
transportation and the like.
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4) Marginal Areas
These areas are either on the border of the city or 
outside it. They include some rural hamlets such as 
Zergun, Kot Abdollah and industrial areas situated in the 
Bagh- Shah and Zergan. Moreover, Kot Abdollah is a 
substantial settlement which owes its origin to the oil 
exploration era. Its location has permitted the extension 
of some services to here.
1.6 Housing Condition of the Study Area
The physical expansion and the rapid rise in population 
of Ahwaz city after 1968, has increased the demand for 
urban land. Much land in and around Ahwaz city was seized 
by speculators, and enormous profits were realised as the 
land came under increasing demand. This had caused many 
people to invest their limited capital in the purchase of 
land, such land was regarded as the main source of wealth 
in Iranian society. This increased the demand and value 
for land which meant that land was not available for 
public services. The price of land was too high for not 
only the urban poor but for the state (for developing 
public installations). Big tracts of land were owned and 
hoarded by a small number of land speculators. Land 
speculation and the problem of housing were extremely 
critical by 1977. The price of land was 60% of that of a 
dwelling unit (MHUD, 1980).
There was, however, no land-use planning as such, 
though there were a number of regulations issued by the
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municipality. With a free market, the lower price of land 
at a distance from the city centre encouraged housing 
d e v e l o p m e n t  away from the built-up area, leaving 
undeveloped lands of various size to await development. 
The government’s intervention in housing was relatively 
limited, but it was confined largely to providing 
infrastructure facilities.
Up until 1956, there was no major shortage of housing 
in Ahwaz city. By 1966 however, the increase in number of 
households was not followed by the construction of 
dwellings which led to housing deficit. If it is assumed 
that the ratio of households to dwellings in Ahwaz is 1=1 
per dwelling unit, the housing deficit in 1966 was 34.5 
percent which rose in 1971, to 49.9 percent. The 
comparative figures for 1971 for Tehran were 37.5%, 
Esfahan 35.6%, and Tabrize 28% thus Ahwaz had the worst 
housing deficit^ itoth. national and provincial (Table 
1 . 2 ) .
Table 1.2
Ratio of Urban Households to Dwelling Units in 
Ahwaz, Khuzistan province and Iran 1976
households dwelling units Ratio
Iran 3,264,193 2,377,584 1.37
Khuzistan 224,384 172,036 1.30
Ahwaz 58,750 3&,/Z£- 1^ _54
Source: Based on data obtained from the National Census 
of Housing and Population of 1976.
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1.7 Economic Characteristics of the Study Area
With the increase of oil production the number of 
employees increased. More than 60% of the oil industry 
em p l o y e e s  were in K h u z i s t a n  province. In 1978 for 
instance, Iran's productive capacity had risen to 7 
million barrels per day, of which 89% was produced in the 
southern oil fields of Khuzistan. In 1976 36.9 percent
oF ftoted popiA\a-b'o*
^were e c o n o m i c a l l y  active. Ninety p e rcent of this 
population were employed. The unemployment rate in Ahwaz 
city, in 1976 and 1986 was 9.7% and 35% respectively.
Three large dams in Khuzistan (Abbaspur, Dez and 
Karkheh), are major electricity and irrigation sources, 
which gives the area a unique resource for potential
agriculture and industry which is at present not fully
exploited locally.
A number of local, regional, national and international 
development factors contribute to Ahwaz's economic 
development. Rail routes link Ahwaz to major ports of the 
country, , such as Khorramshahr, Abadan and Imam Khomainie 
Ott the Persian Gulf, to Tehran and the Caspian Sea in 
the north. The Persian Gulf is the only free water- way 
for exporting oil and importing goods. Ahwaz. also has the 
river Karun, as a main source of water for agriculture, 
and water for industrial uses, public consumption and as a 
source of fish. This city is facing a high population 
increase over the decade and now houses 39.9% of the total
population of Khuzistan province.
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As Table V shows, Ahwaz has become the largest urban 
centre of the province, displacing Abadan. Ahwaz and 
Abadan together contributed 50% of the total population 
of the province in the c o r r e s p o n d i n g  year. Of the 
intercensal increase in urban population, 32.1% was
Table 1.3
Population of Cities in Khuzistan Province 
1966 and 1986
Total population % of_ province population
City 1966 1976 1986 1976 1986
Ahwaz 206,377 329,006 593,090 26.00 39.9
*Abadan 272,962 296,081 6 24.00 0.0
*Khorramshahr 88,536 146,709 0.00 11 .59 0.0
Dezful 84,499 110,287 191 ,136 8.72 12.7
Masjed Soliman 64,488 77,161 118,914 6.10 7.9
Behbehan 39,874 49,000 142,796 4.59 9.5
And imeshk 32,085 56,288 2.80 3.7
Susangerd 14,420 32,692 1.20 2.1
Shushtar 26,173 80,786 2. 29 5.3
Izeh 10,257 56,357 0.89 3.7
Mahshahr 29,940 139,983 2.62 9.3
Ramhormoz 11,138 49,523 0.98 3.3
Shadegan 10264 37049 0.89 2.4
Total 756736 1142521 1498620 100.00 100.0
Source: National Census of population and housing in Iran 
(1966, 1976 and 1986) PBO, Ahwaz.
*These two cities have been destroyed during the Iran- 
Iraq war.
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accounted for by Ahwaz. This population growth is inflated 
owing to the repercussions of the Iran-Iraq war, for 
instance the destruction of two big cities (Khorramshahr 
and Abadan) and hundreds of villages around those cities. 
Ahwaz at present is a war ordnance headquarters for the 
southern war front lines and a haven for the war migrants. 
There are 300,000 war migrants registered in Khuzistan 
province needing state support, (housing, food, clothing 
and other requirements). Thirty percent or 81,336 of this 
population resided in Ahwaz city. This number excludes 
those migrants who were not registered and were called 
"self-sufficient migrants" (Table 1.4).
Table 1.4
Average number of registered war immigrants to Ahwaz city
over 7 months in 1985.
Months Male Female Total H.H no.
March 38,776 40,529 79,305 15,555
Apr. 39,022 40,839 79,858 14,736
May 39,505 41,187 80,692 14,822
June 39,961 41,667 81 ,627 14,956
July 42,008 40,333 82,341 15,068
Aug . 41,336 41,287 82,624 15,132
Sept. 40663 42,240 82,902 15,190
Average40,182 41,154 81,336 14,924
Source: The War Migrant Foundation,
(Ahwaz Office, 1985).
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Thirteen percent of the Ahwaz population in 1985 was 
made up of war migrants. Other migration factors are 
considerable but the war factor is the major one, (Table 
1.5).
Table 1.5 
Migration Factors 1985
Factors Percent
War 76.9
Job 15.2
Marriage 4.1
Accompany with family 3.5
Education 0.3
Other —
Total 100.0
Source: Based on survey carried out by 
Engineers Council of Research 
and Development, 1985.
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CHAPTER TWO 
URBAN LAND POLICY ALTERNATIVES: SHELTERING THE URBAN POOR
2.1 Introduction
The problem of urban land is becoming increasingly 
urgent. The condition of economic growth together with 
advance of technology has led to the unprecedented 
expansion of urban population in most of Third World 
countries. It is agreed that the cities and towns of Third 
World often double in area and population within a short 
period of time. This rapid i n c r e a s e  has led to a 
significant influence on the supply of and demand for 
urban land. Nevertheless, urban land needs to be socially 
controlled because it is a resource which exists in 
limited quantities and in unique locations. Land is both a 
factor of production and a commodity. As a factor of 
production it is regarded as a resource in the production 
process, providing space for houses, factories, offices 
and other land uses. As a commodity, it has value in its 
own right, and can be treated in the private market. It is 
also the ultimate platform for almost all of man's 
everyday activities, and as a result, he who controls 
urban land can in many ways affect the urban land use 
patterns. The role played by land in different areas of 
capitalist economy, in particular the relationship between 
land ownership, value creation and the process of capital 
accumulation, has caused the land to be treated as the 
prime source of wealth. Mountjoy (1978), claims that the 
land ownership issue is the major factor for capital
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investment in land purchasing. He clarifies the features 
of capitalists' function in developing countries, when he 
states that the maldistribution of land ownership caused 
the Third World urban poor to be excluded from the land 
market. The greater the demand for land the higher its 
value and rent become. With such assured returns there is 
great incentive for scarce capital to be invested in land
acquisition when it may be much more urgently needed in
other sectors of the economy that await development. 
Myrdal (1968) stressed that to own land is the highest 
mark of social esteem specially in more traditional
societies.
The interrelationship between urban and rural land and 
property ownership and management is evident, where rural 
land is being c o n v erted to urban use by an urban
population seeking recreation space. "It is necessary to 
place land policy within the fabric of a human settlement 
planning context" (Lichfield, 1980). For such a policy 
to be implemented, he maintains that there is the need for 
urban land policy measures which can be seen as leading to 
programmes for the implementation of policy.
Before attempting to identify and assess various 
policies which have been applied in different countries it 
is necessary to interpret the term "urban land policy" 
and to clarify the various definitions which have been 
associated with this term throughout the world.
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2.2 Definition of Urban Land Policy
The term "urban land policy" recently has attracted the 
attention of many researchers both in literature and 
practice. The term also has been subject to different 
definitions and variety of interpretations. Some have 
defined it narrowly as a means to provide land to the 
homeless, while others have conceived it broadly as a 
comprehensive programme for the transformation of the 
entire urban economic activities. To some other it is 
associated with urban land reform, a government procedure 
for controlling urban land. Warriner prefers the meaning 
of reform; to her, land reform means "distribution of 
property or rights in land in the interest of low-income 
population" (Warriner, 1969). Lichfield (1980), argues 
that none of the foregoing topics has given a definition 
of the term. He claims that the scope would be more 
extensive under 'urban land policy' while it would be of 
limited scope under different topics of land tenure; 
public land management; and land title. He stated that 
land policies are initiated and implemented by government, 
therefore land policy under this definition would cover a 
set of laws which regulate land-use, land development or 
land ownership. Lichfield (1980) refers to land policy as 
a set of instruments and mechanisms for achieving land use 
planning objectives. To Hicks (1969), "any consideration 
of a national urban land policy must take into account the 
greater synchronisation between what land is, how it is 
used and how both are being redefined." McAuslan (1975), 
defined urban land policy as government intervention on 
land. Dunkerly (1983), believes that land policy should
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have its goals and objectives to meet the increasing demand 
of rapid urban expansion. It would be of more importance 
if the ultimate objective of urban land policy is to 
influence the way in which land is used as a resource for 
economic and social activities.
Various definitions of urban land policy as given by 
different writers above indicate that urban land policy 
should be able to dictate the future development of an 
urban settlement in terms of physical planning. Urban land 
policy in this study is that part of policy which controls 
ownership of land in the urban areas, in order to curb 
land speculation; to provide poor families with access 
to building plots for dwelling construction; and to 
provide public institutions with urban land for public 
purposes.
Most of the measures on urban land policy have been 
introduced to tackle specific problems, and in turn, the 
solving of the problems will be regarded as the ultimate 
aim of the measures (Abrams, 1964). In principle, the 
objectives of urban land policy as a whole must be 
distinguished from the objectives of a single measure. In 
the event of the complete absence of overall policy 
objectives related to land, the objectives of each measure 
may in the end be regarded collectively as the government 
intention towards land in urban areas, although it is 
difficult to decide whether these fragmentary instruments 
are intended to solve problems, achieve objectives, or 
both. For example, the eradication of land hoarding may 
become the central aim of measures on urban land policy.
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Sometimes the objectives of urban land policy have been 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  stated and j u s t i f i e d ,  and s u b s e q u e n t  
enactment activities have been based on these objectives. 
Laws have been designed to facilitate the implementation 
of urban land policy, including development planning. 
This may be illustrated by referring to the British 
experience in this respect. The Labour Party made its 
intentions on land clear when it introduced the White 
Paper in 1974, which contained an explicit statement on 
the state intentions regarding land, and it aimed:
1. To enable the community to control the development of 
land in accordance with its needs and priorities.
2. To return to the community the increase in the value of 
land .
The Community Land Act of 1975 was designed specially to 
facilitate the implementation of these intentions 
(Cullingworth, 1988: 187).
Charle s Abrams (1964), listed 27 d i f f e r e n t  and 
individual aims that the land policy might seek to 
achieve. The shape of objectives and content of urban 
land policy may be in f l u e n c e d  by i d e o l o g i e s  and 
conceptions of government (Abrams, 1964: 267).
From the proposals made by an ad hoc group of experts on 
housing and urban development (Ekistics, 1967), one can 
underline several main objectives, with regard to land 
policy, these are:
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1. Provide land for housing at reasonable price.
2. Provide land for public use.
3. Prevent undesirable land speculation and hoarding.
4. Recoup increment for public benefit.
5. Recapture the rise in land value as a result of public
services and improvement.
Accordingly, several measures were proposed to achieve 
these ends. Making land available, eradicating land 
speculation and recouping the unearned increment have been 
the overriding objectives of urban land policy in many 
countries outside the communist orbit. Neutze noted 
three objectives of urban land market policy to reduce 
land and house prices, to divert additional resources into 
the public sector and to facilitate effective urban 
planning", (Neutze, 1973: 443).
For the developing countries, the UNs ’ work on urban 
land policy set out several objectives which were included 
in the report in the International Seminar on Urban Land 
Policies and Land Use Control Measures as follows: "Urban
land policies were deemed necessary to avoid segregation 
of population; to ensure an adequate supply of land for 
all future urban development needs; to capture for the 
public b enefits and values resulting from urban 
development; to reduce the cost of providing urban 
infrastructure and public facilities, especially in
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developing countries; and to protect the health and safety 
of the urban population" (UN, 1971: 56-7).
The curbing of land speculation and providing urban land 
for housing has been emphasised in literature as an 
essential step in proper urban land policy, particularly 
in development and planning. In this respect several 
measures have been introduced and implemented all over the 
world. The measures are only part of urban land policy 
i n s t r u m e n t s ,  and therefore, not all urban policy 
instruments are relevant to speculation and residential 
land problems.
Within the general spectrum of urban land policy one can 
sketch in such measures as they are directly or indirectly 
related to the control of urban land and the problems 
which hayt affected the accessibility of urban poor to 
shelter. From the overall classifications of urban land 
policy one can point out the measures relevant to the 
control of urban land for public use in general and their 
i m p l i c a t i o n s  for housing l o w-income f a m i l i e s  in 
particular.
2.3 Measures for Urban Land control
It is argued that public control of land has various 
possibilities, from total control by the state to the 
classical rights to property. Darin-Drabkin (1977) has 
identified three different categories of such measures. 
These are: urban land tenure measures; urban land
taxation; and direct government intervention in the land
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market. In each of these categories there are several
measures which have been implemented in various countries
to control urban land market*. The two most important
Hi*
measures which can control^land market and reduce or 
eliminate land speculation are: the change in the system
of land tenure and government intervention.
2.3.1 M e a s u r e s  to Change the Sys t e m  Of U rban Land 
Ownership.
Urban land ownership policies can deeply influence the 
nature and control of urbanization and the allocation of 
urban land as a resource for econ o m i c  and social 
development. While land nationalisation is peculiar to 
socialist countries, land ceilings are other approaches of 
restructuring land tenure in capitalist and mixed economy 
countries. The theory behind land ceiling legislation 
such as enacted in India, Sri Lanka, Bolivia and recently 
Iran is that no family is entitled to more land than is 
needed for its own requirements; excess land must be 
subject to State ownership.
Limiting ownership of land is thought to be a means to 
more equitable distribution of land, particularly to the 
p r o b l e m  of shelter for the l o w - i n c o m e  groups. The 
experience of Sri Lanka and India shows that the lack of 
vigorous implementation of such measures could lead to 
failure. However, the immediate implementation of the law 
has been to freeze the land market, thus pushing up prices 
without any perceptible benefits to low-income groups in 
the community .
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Land ceilings have been the basis of many agricultural 
land reforms in different parts of the world, mainly in 
Latin America. It has also been applied in cities where
owners kept large tracts of vacant urban land out of the
market so as to push up the prices of land for
developments. The urban land Ceiling Act in India for 
instance, specified a maximum of 500m  ^ of urban land for 
each nuclear family in Madras. Excess land was subject to 
public acquisition. The maximum was increased to 2,000 m^ . 
The implementation of the Act was carried out in 73 towns 
and cities without reaching its goals. This failure was 
mainly due to the lack of proper administration in 
redistributing the excess urban land, which has led to 
severe urban land shortages. The rapid increase in land
prices has defeated the purpose of the Act, and the 
dwelling construction activities have been paralysed 
(Bahragua, 1983). Bahragua (1983) believes that the 
failure in India can be related to the question of scale. 
Regulation may be more workable in smaller, less populated 
countries. The literature shows little evidence that this 
measure per se has curbed speculation even in less 
populated countries. In Sri Lanka, the Housing Ceiling 
Act bans any individual from owning more than one dwelling 
(McAuslan, 1987). Soon after the Act was enacted, all 
excess dwellings in Colombo became public property, and a 
high number of tenants were relieved of the burden of 
paying rent. According to the Nigerian Land-Use Act, any 
person holding more than 5,000 m of urban land 
automatically loses all rights to land within the urban 
areas. In Libya, individuals can own only one plot of 
urban land, surplus plots had to be turned in and owners
40
were compensated.
Several endeavours have been made in Latin America to 
limit urban land holdings. Bolivia and Cuba were the 
only two precedents in terms of urban reform. In Bolivia a 
decree was issued in 1954 permitting individuals to own 
one hectare of urban land, and excess land was subject to 
expropriation by the municipality. Subdivided expropriated 
land was sold to workers and middle - class citizens who 
did not possess sufficient urban land for dwelling 
construction. From the total population of La Paz city 
only 5-10 percent were benefited- 3- 4 thousand families. 
The law was valid only in two cities, the capital and 
Cochabamba, and its effective life was only two years. 
Thereafter the urban land market became an open and 
speculative milieu for financial and capitalist interests 
(Accosta & Hardoy 1972).
Only Cuba made a serious attempt to eliminate multiple 
ownership and land speculation. After the revolution of 
1959, in contrast to Bolivian experience Cuba has taken 
several effective measures to control the land. The first 
law limited the action of speculation and monopolisation 
of urban and sub urban lands and established the basis for 
an ordered urban growth. The price of vacant urban lots 
was frozen at $4.00 per square meter, and a new concept 
in relation to the compulsory sale of vacant land was 
introduced. The second effectively incorporated into the 
public patrimony one of the natural resources least 
utilised in spite of its recreational value (Acosta & 
Hardoy 1972). The 1960 urban reform law, outlawed private
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investment in housing for profit and put forth the goal of 
housing as a free public service rather^ a commodity. Other 
measures for the solution of housing problems included 
halting evictions, reducing rents, ending land speculation 
and initiating self - help and government construction of
housing. New measures were introduced in 1984 to respond
. . .  Oh-
to the changing realities over ipast two decades. These
feV . *
measures reached^peak in the comprehensive 1984 Housing
Law, which promotes home ownership and greater resident
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in building and m a i n t a i n i n g  housing
(Hamberg, 1986). The N i c a r a g u a n  r e v o l u t i o n  has
transformed urban land from a speculative commodity to a
//U
social resource by drawing i n s p i r a t i o n  f r o m ^ C u b a n  
experience. The Tenant law of January 1980, reduced all 
rents, most by half, and further leases set a maximum 
annual rent of 5 percent of the property's assessed value. 
Unlike the Cuban urban reform laws, the Nicaraguan 
measures do not eliminate private rental housing. Cuba's 
law transformed the monthly rent into payments toward 
purchase, effecting a forced sale of privately owned 
rental housing. The Nicaraguan rental law may be seen as 
national rent control, discouraging speculation in rental 
housing (Schuman, 1986).
In the Soviet Union, all land was confiscated, and the 
private property rights in land were abolished. Land in 
the Soviet Union, is regarded as a national asset and no 
right can be granted to individuals in land. Land in 
Soviet Union is only granted under the condition of 
utilisation and development, and there is no possession of 
land without utilisation. In principle, land is granted
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without charge, and there are no limits for the period of 
utilisation. The Republic of China appears to have levied 
a tax on vacant lands. Article 143 of the Constitution of 
The R e p u b l i c  of China states that, "just as most 
democracies in the free world, the Republic of China 
permits the existence of private land ownership, but the 
government has the power of domain over private land." 
(Lee, 1978: 2).
2.3.2 Land Taxation Measure
Tax on land is one of the oldest forms of taxation. In 
most developing countries, property tax on land and 
building has been applied as a measure of providing 
financial income for central or local government. In many 
ways, property taxes are different from land taxes. 
Nevertheless land taxes are usually based on one of the 
three criteria: the income that land would bring annually
if it were rented; the capital (as opposed to revenue) 
value of the land as an undeveloped site (unimproved site 
value); the capital value of both the land and any 
development on it (improved capital value). Site value 
taxes have been used as an instrument of urban policy, and 
the governments were advised by United Nations in 1962 to 
introduce a special tax on undeveloped land, in order to 
make land available for development. It may not be 
possible to acquire all undeveloped plots within built-up 
areas, or land on the fringe of the city, and therefore a 
special tax has been imposed to influence land owners to 
release the required land. Therefore, land taxation was 
introduced in various countries, and it was emphasised
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that: "taxation of land and improvement becomes a part of
what has been generally recognised within the field as 
land policy." (Lichfield, 1979: 111). In Grimes' (1975:
16-20) view, land taxes are e s s e n t i a l l y  aimed at 
accomplishing three objectives:
1. Provide revenues for general use by national and local 
government.
2. Underwrite the cost of specific public improvements.
3. Achieve a more suitable distribution of urban real 
resources.
Not all land taxes are relevant to land speculation and 
land hoarding. Lichfield & Drabkin (1980: 301) defined the 
tax on undeveloped plots as ” a penal tax, designed to 
force the use of vacant land in urban areas and therefore 
deter speculative holding of land from the market". Tax on 
the withholding of undeveloped land may be regarded as a 
policy tool that can be used to free the withheld land, 
and in addition the unearned increment can be recouped.
In most countries, there is no taxation on empty 
property, as it is thought unreasonable to tax property 
neither occupied nor producing revenue. Thus the system 
does not encourage the use of property or the development 
of land in accordance with urban development plans. In 
Britain, for example factories lacking roofs are not 
charged rates; so many owners of idle factories have had 
the roofs taken off (McAuslan, 1987).
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Land speculation can be minimised by direct and well- 
articulated tax on land that has been left undeveloped, 
whereas some property tax may encourage land owners to 
keep their land developed. In Britain the Conservative 
government proposed to apply such a tax in 1973. A charge 
of 30% annually would have been levied on properties still 
undeveloped three or more years after the receipt of 
planning permission. The intended impact was, of course, 
to increase the supply of serviced sites (Grimes, 1975).
In the province of Ontario in Canada and the State of 
V ermont in the U.S.A. taxation s c h emes have been 
introduced to curb speculation, and a tax is imposed on 
gains earned from the short-term holding and sale of land 
(Brown, 1981).
Taxation of land profits ’betterment levy' is another 
type of tax and covers the benefits which directly accrue 
to the property owner, as the result of public investment. 
The increased value of the p r operty g e n e r a t e d  by 
development permission is regarded as betterment. A 
betterment tax, which "is specifically related to increase 
in the value of land over a particular time" has been 
applied in Britain and Australia (Neutze, 1974:232). The 
Community Land Act of 1975, coupled with the Development 
Land Tax Act of 1976 in Britain have served to provide 
’positive planning' and of 'returning development values 
to the community' (Cul1ingworth, 198S).
Neutze (1974) identified two cases whereby this tax had 
failed to discourage land withholding one is in Britain
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and another is New South Wales. He pointed out that "the 
price of land would increase if the tax gave owners an 
incentive to hold their land vacant rather than develop 
it." He then suggested that betterment taxation must be 
deliberately formulated to avoid giving landlords an 
incentive to withhold land from development.
Cuba has applied a 3% per a year tax on undeveloped 
plots, one plot or joint plots with total area of 1,500 
were exempted for a period of five years. In Japan a 
heavy land tax was employed to check land speculation.
Taxes encouraging development as termed by Grimes 
(1975), have been implemented in various countries and the 
rate varies from country to country, d e p e n d i n g  on 
different economic, social, administrative and political 
factors. These types of land taxes have been implemented 
for example in Belgium, Chile, Spain, Syria, Iraq, Taiwan 
and France.
The acceptance of such a tax rests to a large extent on 
the conception that speculators are responsible for land 
shortage and rising land prices. Introduction of tax 
would reduce the returns from speculation. Land taxation 
has received attention but, as in the case of land-use 
control, little has been achieved (Clark, 1965; Umeh, 
1972).
Many difficulties concerning valuation methods, 
administration deficiencies and the influence of land 
owners have inhibited the implementation of such taxes.
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Not all countries, however, were successful in the use of
land taxation as an effective instrument of urban policy.
Many countries have introduced a tax to induce speeding
utilisation of urban land. The tax has not succeeded in
attaining its objectives, except in few countries, namely
UK. The tax measures were vigorously enforced in the
Republic of Korea, which resulted in reduction of land
supply to the market (Darin-Drabkin 1977). Failure to
impose effective taxes on urban fringe land in Taiwan has
contributed to the increase of land prices and created
difficulties for the appropriate use of much urban land
(McAuslan, 1987). Additionally, the inadequate collection
of tax on urban land has created problems of insufficient
public funds to meet the cost of providing new capital
So
improvements in cities anc^ contributed indirectly to
the poor physical quality of many urban environments.
Several faults in land taxation have also been reported
in the literature; these include, low rates of taxation;
lack of regular valuation of cities due to the acute
shortage of valuers; corrupt practices which have often
resulted in gross undervaluation; the surcharge on
undeveloped land in most Third World countries is still
insignificant. It has also been noted that the character
of the political power structure reflects the spreading
ineffectiveness of tax collection, and that landlords,
and the urban and military elite are usually able to
manipulate the tax to benefit themselves and their
Tfha.
supporters at the expense ofj community at large,
especially the urban poor.
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Housing land policy approaches vary considerably from 
country to country. Nevertheless, the lure of rising land 
values and profits, the ideological commitment to private 
property and uncontrolled market in urban land swamped the 
good intention of the legislators and reformers and showed 
that even in a country with supposedly an efficient, 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  and unco r r u p t e d  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  the 
introduction of equitable urban land policies needs more 
than a fair land law.
There are many imperfections in the market which 
prevent land from being allocated efficiently in the short 
term. To achieve efficiency one would need to remove the 
imperfections, and to remove imperfections means adjusting 
the underlying social forces which institutionalise them. 
In other words a revolutionary change to remove the free 
market mechanism in the form of total state control. This 
approach has been questioned mainly on two accounts. 
Firstly, the introduction of state control would itself 
mean the institutionalisation of a monopoly and secondly, 
a public body would be unable to be sufficiently sensitive 
to the forces at work in the urban land market, by virtue 
of its complexity. However, an acknowledgement of the 
s evere i m p e r f ections of the land market, and the 
increasing importance of equity as a social goal for many 
governments, have given rise to government intervention 
into the market system, in an attempt to reduce the 
undesirable effects of the free market mechanism.
Although, there is competition and less monopoly control 
of urban land in capitalist world. In effect the
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criticism is that traditional theory fails to analyse many 
of the social and institutional forces such as unequal 
income distribution and monopolistic power of private land 
ownership, which gives rise to urban land use patterns.
7Ju
In^ [ Middle East and elsewhere, a basically capitalist 
urban world is made of a few landlords, is approached by a 
mass invasion of pre-capitalist and money-less migrants,
. , fh*
from the country. In these condition s^ state should 
intervene because the market cannot control the urban 
landlords' power.
2.3.3 State Intervention
State control over land is now universally regarded as a 
key part of a governments' armoury of controls, both over 
land and over the economy generally. Lack of access to 
land by the poor in capitalist economies and in Third 
World countries has changed the people's attitude towards 
capitalism. Abrams argues that, "private ownership of 
land, previously affirmed as a natural right, began to be 
considered a new type of robbery, and a capitalist thought^ 
as an exploiter” , (Abrams, 1967). Even Karl Marx (1967), 
whose target was the industrialist rather than the 
landlord, thought the latter the worse culprit, since he 
just sat on his land and made no contribution to wealth at 
all. The unacceptable face of the capitalist economies is 
in the maldistribution of products i.e. low-income people 
influenced by the private owners and ultimately divorced 
from land, (Lichfield, 1980). In Bombay for instance, 
large private gardens and clubs with extensive open
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grounds limit the amount of living space in favour of 
exclusive upper income land use. One family alone owns
2,000 hectares of vacant land, enough land to house most 
of the city’s slums, shanty town and pavement dwellers- 
estimated at more than three millions (Harries, 1978).
Massey and Catalano (1978) argue that the spread of the 
capitalist market economy has replaced old, limited land 
rights systems by virtually unlimited rights. They state 
that, as rights to land became more absolute and parcels 
of land became more freely marketable commodities, the 
limitation of rights to land ownership has become more
desirable. Therefore, the situation of monopoly privileges
Jh
o f ^ c a p i t a l i s t  system exert p ressure on the public 
authorities to control the land market. These constraints 
have forced public authorities of nations to find a way 
of ensuring that urban land is used in the general 
interest of the community. Land demand for public use is 
the main motive for such involvement.
Public ownership of urban land became a core of 
attention to many revolutionary governments in which land 
reform or land nationalisation were regarded as a basic 
step towards equitable distribution of wealth. Moreover, 
as observed by Drabkin and Darin (1980), the produced 
value of urban land is the resultant of society planning 
decision on raw land.
Turner (1967), has recommended greater intervention by 
the state, maintaining that land must be subject to state 
control if it is not to be exploited by private interest.
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McAuslan (1980), claims there is a general consensus that 
societies which have prompted government intervention have 
not discovered so far the best way of associating social 
justice and efficiency in production. Most sociologists 
accept that this market failure needs to be moderated by 
the government intervention.
Several measures of intervention in the land market, 
especially those that influence speculative withholding of 
land, directly and indirectly had to be adopted by 
government. These include dictating norms to limit 
speculation, or creating a public body to enter the land 
market directly. Dictating norms consists of the general 
direction and controlling of development through the use 
of plans, zoning schemes and sector plans. These 
provisions are generally provided as part of a planning 
Act whose implementation is in the hands of a public body, 
such as Ministry of Town and Country Planning. The direct 
Public intervention is made up of land acquisition by 
public authorities to further planning objectives. Such 
objectives include the supply of building land to the 
market, planned d evelopment schemes, short term 
development such as housing and long term schemes such as
recreational schemes. The measures to make these controls
<£ ftCoStxL
are necessary, and as observed by Hardoy^ (1976) are of an 
economic and political nature. To them if the state only 
regulates the use and not the value of the urban and 
suburban land, it is not able to impede speculation. They 
concluded that the constitutional precepts should have 
immediate application in drawing up a land policy and to 
serve as the basis for urban de v e l o p m e n t .  Direct
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intervention in the land market stems from the need to 
rectify the imbalance between supply and demand in the 
market. Not all views, however, support public control of 
urban land.
2.4 The Control of Urban land.
Having reviewed all possible measures for controlling
land in urban areas, then the question of, who should
q
control the land ibecomes inevitable. A brief review of 
the arguments in this controversy will provide a relevant 
setting for this study.
The opposing views are distinct, with respect to the 
system of control and management of land; the first is the 
"market" view, which espouses a non- public interference 
policy in urban land questions and little or no planning 
control. To this group, economic forces (perfect market 
mechanism) should be left to allocate land to its "best" 
uses, "best use" here meaning the most profitable use. 
And the second advocates the total nationalisation or 
c o m p l e t e  public ownership of urban land and the 
enforcement of stricter planning controls.
According to the traditional economists' view the price 
of land is determined by the demand for it, and that the 
price which people bid serves to allocate land to its most 
productive uses and serves also as an incentive to further 
supply, high land prices are caused by high demands for it 
or its services and its limited supply, not by 
speculators' profits as advocates of public intervention
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and ownership of urban land have argued (Walters, 1974). 
Siegan (1972) for example, argues that the market works 
better in the absence of government controls. He does not 
view zoning as a necessary means to maintain or protect 
property values, or to aid planning. On the contrary, he 
believes , that zoning has adverse effects on both public 
and private sectors, and the private sector is much more 
likely to utilise the land to provide better for the 
environmental and material needs of people (Siegan 1972). 
Public control and management of urban land imposes a 
double cost in terms of money: The administrative cost of 
m a n a g e m e n t  and control, and the e c o n o m i c  cost of 
distortion; yet the objectives of such public involvement 
are seldom achieved. They reject the conclusion that the 
solution is yet more government controls and management. 
The "solution lies in fewer controls and fewer public 
interventions, and in the more sophisticated use of market 
systems to facilitate the harmonisation of supply and 
demand." (Walters, 1974). They argue that public land 
ownership and management simply puts power into the hands 
of a few in a manner "which towers above the petty powers 
of individual land owners" (Ibid, 1974). The state as 
landlord, they claim, allows no alternative.
The theory behind the public ownership of land is that 
it will transfer the undeniable benefit of ownership of 
land from the hands of individual capitalists to the 
community as a whole. It is further argued that public 
ownership of urban land would secure consistency and 
continuity in forming and executing a national policy with 
respect to the use and development of land (Buchanan,
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1972). The advocates of public ownership insist that 
exclusive or even primary reliance on the private market 
mechanisms always exacerbate a number of social problems* 
Firstly, they argue that accessibility to land is not 
neutral, and therefore it favours those who enter the
marketplace with more money. This leads to the exclusion 
of the poor from the market, and consequently results in a 
society increasingly segregated along economic lines. 
Secondly, the allocation of the land according to the 
taste of the market tends to neglect broader desirable 
societal objectives which have no money values placed on 
them, but which nevertheless are very vital for the peace 
and stability of the society.
Various UN conferences have supported and advanced the 
public ownership and management of land. They point out 
that private land ownership is a principal instrument of 
accumulation of wealth, and therefore contributes to 
social injustice; and that if unchecked, private land 
ownership may constitute a major obstacle in the planning 
and implementation of development schemes. To the UN 
experts, public ownership or effective control of land in 
the public interest is the single most important means of 
improving the capacity of human settlements to absorb 
changes and movements in population modifying their 
i n t e r n a l  structure and achieving a more e q u i t a b l e  
distribution of benefits of development, whilst assuring 
that environmental impacts are considered (UN, 1976).
Whether these supposed advantages are, or can be, 
realised in practical terms is far from certain. It would
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seem from their arguments, however, that proponents of 
public ownership and management imply that the state and 
its personification constitute the plenitude of virtues, 
the repository of social justice and fairness, which 
presumably would blindly and selflessly give every man and 
woman his or her due. They also tend to imply the public 
ownership and management are always better than the system 
it seeks to replace.
Nevertheless, there is a gap between the accepted 
principles of land policy and the means of implementation 
of these principles, between the expressed principles of 
programme and actual programme. Consequently, neither 
public nor market mode of land control have solved the 
problems arising from conception over land management. In 
both societies some people continue to grow wealthy 
through their control of land, while lack of land helps 
to keep others poor. Land nationalisation in Yugoslavia 
for instance, has reportedly eliminated urban land 
speculation. But a recent study of planning in Slovenia 
revealed two distinct markets for housing land. In the 
unorganised market, land prices were rising at a rate of 
20-25 percent a year. Urban centres experiencing land 
shortage and illegal houses were common. The price of 
land in the illegal home building area sold much cheaper 
than the land on which home building was authorised by the 
land-use plan (Mardelkar, 1981). Another example is 
Poland, in which expropriated owners could build 
themselves a second home (additional to the home, given fey 
the state), with the amount of compensation (McAuslam, 
1987). These facts have caused a shift in policy of many
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capitalist and communist countries.
Unlike capitalist society, communist countries adopted 
absolute public or state ownership. Still it is believed 
that even full state ownership of land would not change 
the fundamental nature of the definition of land property. 
In this regard there are many examples of regressive 
social and economic effects of public ownership. For 
instance, during the last decade the Soviet authorities 
have embarked on a programme of selling government-owned 
apartments to tenants, assisted by the provision of very 
low interest mortgage finance (Turnbull, 1983). Turnbull 
argues that the alternative public ownership introduces 
gross inefficiencies as neither the tenants nor the 
landlords have sufficient incentive to maintain and 
improve the housing stock. Moreover, without private 
ownership there is no incentive for individuals to 
contribute either their funds or labour to improve the 
value of their properties. Also, he maintains that any 
system for owning land and housing must mobilise 'sweat 
equity' this is not only the most universal and efficient 
means of creating or enhancing the housing stock, but it 
also creates the most satisfying shelter for the consumer 
(Turnbull, 1983). As already pointed out, in East Europe 
many of the centrally planned economies still have a great 
deal of private owned urban and rural land.
It is more likely that the most desirable and acceptable 
position cannot lie wholly and exclusively with only one 
of these polar opposites. Both are merely possibilities 
among a range of measures, from which to construct
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appropriate land policies to support economic and social 
development programmes.
Either view tends to emphasise its respective strengths 
and a dvantages* without as much d i s c u s s i o n  or 
a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t  of their r e s p e c t i v e  w e a k n e s s e s  or 
disadvantages. Important questions are of distributional 
equity and social justice, and implications for general 
income distribution, structure and social peace are either 
ignored, treated with levity, or taken for granted by 
either of the two views. While the case for some public 
involvement in urban land management could be made on 
grounds of the negative externalities (both physical and 
social) and outcomes of the free and private market, or 
decision making, proponents of public involvement would 
seem to be too optimistic in taking the human element for 
granted. The State (public) after all is personified by 
fallible human beings, who could conceivably exercise 
public authority in such a perverse manner that the 
resulting outcome could prove as undesirable as or even
K  <*-T
more than the outcome of "private" land market that it dTs 
sought to remedy. In other words, management skill and 
competence, integrity and administrative efficiency on the 
part of public administrators- qualities that essentially 
determine the success of any policy or enterprise, may be 
assumed but not found.
From what has been experienced in developing countries, 
it can be sustained that being extremist to Right or Left 
(private or public), c ontroversy tends to become 
simplistic and perhaps irrelevant. The relevant question
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then become not necessarily whether land is privately or 
publicly owned per se, but rather that of how the given 
policy or management system is applied and with what 
effects, outcomes or consequences for the various groups 
affected and for the general public good. In any case, 
solutions to the problem of land and housing may have to 
vary from context to context, taking social, cultural, 
economic and political environment into consideration. 
These environmental factors may have not been taken into 
account in Muslim countries, since all the emphasis and 
pressure for reform in urban land tenure involve adopting, 
modernising and localising ex-colonial law rather than 
reverting to Islamic Law. The Islamic Law, as claimed by 
Muslim^ potentially has its place particularly in terms of 
property ownership, though there is no empirical study to 
demonstrate this feasibility hitherto. In an Islamic 
state like Iran, it is considered that the adoption, 
rather than abolition, of Islamic land tenure may be of 
more help to the urban poor. It is under this basis that 
the urban land policy in Iran is evaluated.
2.5 Conclusion.
Urbanisation is a problem in the world today and seems 
likely to increase. With its emerging problems, most 
national and urban governments are under pressure to 
accept the large and growing proportion of the urban poor 
and to help them find shelter suitable to their immediate 
needs and which they can afford.
A closer examination has shown that acute housing
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problems stem from the fact that public resources have not 
been equally distributed among the population, and indeed, 
the u n b a l a n c e d  c o m p o s i t i o n  of the p o p u l a t i o n  has&«w 
aggravated rather than aided, by the implementation of 
urban land and housing programmes. In other words, short­
sighted policies have led to wasted opportunities, 
distorted priorities and misallocation of funds and 
resources.
To make land available at cheap prices for the urban 
resident to enable him to provide himself with shelter, 
the private land market must be entered into by the state. 
The state intervention is therefore based in a search for 
both social justice in the distribution and greater 
e con o m i c  and efficiency in the use of r e s o u r c e s . 
Intervention consequently takes place in nearly all world 
economies, but their approaches to the above goals vary 
radically. In capitalist oriented societies intervention 
has taken the form of a physical planning system aimed at 
supplementing or modifying the market. In the socialist 
oriented economies, on the other hand, public intervention 
has replaced the market. The Iranian society is a mixed 
economy and so public intervention has been described in 
the context of an Islamic economy where both public and 
private ownership of land prevail.
Above all, it is important that policy- makers bear in 
mind that the success of any given land ownership system 
will be measured first, by how far it en a b l e s  the 
economically disadvantaged urban resident to provide 
himself with accommodation. The reform measures suggested
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should satisfy this criterion, but its success will depend 
upon the development of a satisfactory machinery for 
implementing and monitoring it, rather than the system of 
ownership and control per se.
6 0
CHAPTER THREE 
FOUNDATION OF THE ISLAMIC ECONOMY
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, the world has witnessed active movement 
in the Islamic world; political, social and economic. On 
these aspects Muslims proclaimed that a socio-economic 
system, based on the principles of the Islamic law, is 
feasible. To practise what they preach, Muslims have 
decided to put the system into effect. The establishment 
of Islamic social and economic institutions such as 
Islamic banking and establishment of an Islamic State in 
Iran are major landmarks in this movement. It is not the 
subject of this study to investigate, how the system 
works, nor how the Islamic socio-economic system fares as 
compared to other socio-economic models in detail. But it 
is important, as emphasised in this study, to find out as 
to how the Islamic system has solved urban problems such 
as land m a nagement and housing s h o r t a g e  in the 
urbanisation process.
We now make an e x a m i nation of the degree of 
applicability of Islamic principles on urban management 
patterns. The Islamic faith is considered to be a basis 
for the initiation of the current urban land policy in 
Iran. To assess this, it is necessary to be conversant 
with the existing Islamic philosophy, as practised in 
Iran, and its implication for property ownership within
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which these policies have been initiated and pursued.
3.2 Different Islamic Schools of Thought.
The main basis of all Islamic ideology is the ’Sharia’, 
which is Islamic law historically derived from the Qur-an 
(the Holy Book) and the Sunna (tradition). The Qur-an as 
the pivot of Islamic ideology, is the main source of the 
’S h a r i a ’. The principles of the law in the Qur-an are 
interpreted and amplified in the Hadith (traditions, 
sayings of the prophet), which together constitute the 
second basic source of the Sharia. The literature of the 
Ahadith (plural of Hadith), is extensive, the more 
important and reliable elements of which are known as 
Sehah - al - Set- the six reliable sources. Among these, 
the Bukhari by Mohammad Ismail al-Bukhari holds first 
place.
The interpretation of the Qur-an and the Hadith by 
different Islamic scholars has resulted in the creation of 
five distinct schools of thought. They are: The Hanafi; 
Maliki; Ash-shafii; Hanbaly and Jafari (Shiia). Each of 
these schools tends to predominate in a different region 
of the Muslim world. The Shiia school which dominates Iran 
is not in line with the other four s c h o o l s ’ teaching, 
especially in terms of the political concepts that will be 
discussed in this chapter. However, not all sources of the 
above — mentioned schools are accepted by the Shiia sect. 
Rather they have eight reliable sources of which the Osul- 
al-Kafi by Kollaini is the more important.
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3.3 Concept and Basis of Islamic Economy,
The Islamic economy in general is deemed by Muslim 
economists as being founded on ethical values. In their 
views, ethical values are not treated as exogenous, as 
they are treated in conventional economics (Naqavi, 1981). 
Q u r a n i c  verses that deal with economic issues are 
intermingled with those that deal with ethics and morals. 
So are the Traditions. Ethics and Islamic norms are a set 
of axioms upon which the philosophy of Islamic economics 
is established, leaving no question as to what comes first 
or what dominates what: ethics or economics, (Al-Ashkar,
1987). Naqavi (1981), argues that Islamic ethical 
principles not only determine individual choice and 
collective choice, but also provide a principle of 
integrating the two. The primary function of Islam is to 
guide human development on correct lines and in the right 
d i r e c t i o n .  It deals with all aspects of economic 
development and never in a form divorced from this 
perspective (Kahf, 1978). This is why the focus, even in 
the economic sector, is on human development with the 
result that economic development is considered an 
integrated and indivisible element of the moral and socio- 
economic development of human society.
Universal principles found in Ahadith (the sayings of 
the prophet), include the maxim that there is no legal 
validity in any action that brings injury to oneself or 
others, which does not protect a person from injury and 
does not prohibit him from causing damage to his 
neighbour, to society, or to creation as a whole. This is
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an intrinsic part of the religion, since it claims to 
improve the system of life as a whole, boost the spiritual 
development of individuals and rectify the socio-economic 
structure of society by promoting social justice. It 
could be said that Islam has carried the seeds of the 
spirit of capitalism since its early days, (Al-Ashkar, 
1987). The recognition of profit* the encouragement of 
the creation of wealth, the respect for free enterprise, 
the organisation of legal and financial matters and the 
high regard given to private ownership are some major 
characteristics accepted in the Quran and the Traditions, 
(Ahmad, 1980).
Almubarak (1974) views "production and profit (in an 
Islamic system), not as ends but means. The moving force 
of current systems is profit, but in the Islamic system it 
is human welfare" (Al-Mubarak, 1974). Islam has thus a 
set of goals and values encompassing all aspects of human 
life including the social, economic and political. Since 
all aspects of life are interdependent and the Islamic way 
of life is a whole, its goals and values in one field 
determine the goals and values in the other fields as 
well. This is a holistic view of society, economy and 
government.
3.4 Market Structure in Islam.
Free competition is a fundamental feature of the
Islamic market structure. Various sayings from the
Traditions emphasise that prices of goods and commodities
should be determined by market forces, demand and supply. 
^Profit, as opposed to 'Riba' (interest),— is— not a 
predetermined rate of return on capital.
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All forms of monopolistic power, hoarding of wealth and 
mobile assets are condemned, (Al-Sadr, 1968).
The state of laissez-faire is not advocated in Islamic 
market structure. However, the general view is that 
whenever the market is stable, market forces should be 
allowed to play their roles fully. But when the market 
s u ffers from lack of stability such as when land 
speculation arises for example, the state should intervene 
in market operations. The involvement of the government 
in the market is not considered occasional nor temporary. 
The Islamic economic system views, government as c o ­
existing in the market together with other economic actors 
on a permanent and stable basis. It is seen as planner, 
supervisor and producer as well as consumer (Kahf, 1978).
3.5 Ownership in Islam.
Property can be owned privately but it is considered 
as a trust from God and to be acquired and spent in 
accordance with the terms of that trust (Naqavi, 1981). 
Contrary to what is socially believed, absolute ownership 
by man is not a concept alien to Islam, as all land is 
believed to belong to Allah alone. There are definite 
obligations towards others attending upon the individual 
rights of ownership, and public ownership is a central 
concept in Islam (Al-Sadr, 1968).
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3.5.1 The O w n e r s h i p  and C o ntrol of the M e a n s  of 
Production.
At a deeper philosophical level, the question of the 
ownership of the means of production in any society is 
related to its general attitude towards the institution of 
private property. Under c o m m u n i s m  all m eans of 
production, distribution and exchange are owned by the 
community collectively, usually, through the State. 
Conversely, laissez-faire capitalism, which accepts the 
individual’s right to property as an article of faith, 
also allows production revenues to be owned privately. 
To focus more on the main features of the Islamic economic 
system it may be useful to compare it with the other 
existing economic systems, viz, capitalism and socialism. 
However, of the several factors that can be used to 
differentiate between various economic systems, the 
ownership of means of production and the role of the state 
in the economy are two major ones.
Muslim scholars are not in full agreement as to what 
the "means of production" are. Some go along with neo­
classical theory and classify these as land, labour 
capital and organisation. Others reduced the means to 
three: elements of nature, good work (which include labour 
and organisation), and capital which is viewed as 
resulting from human labour or elements of nature (Abu — 
Saud, 1967). The third group views the means as wealth, 
which includes land and capital, and labour, which 
i n c l u d e s  organisation (Al — naggar, 1973). This 
divergence of views arises from differences of opinion as
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to the weight given to 'man1 as a means of production. 
However, all Muslim scholars agree on the belief that man 
is the centre of the universe for whose benefit God has 
provided goods on earth (Al-Ashkar, 1987).
According to Islamic law, Allah is the ultimate owner 
of all things, and human beings must manage them in 
accordance with the will of their Sustainer for the 
greatest good to all his creatures. Human beings enjoy 
His beneficial interest in the property with which they 
are entrusted. The rights of men and women to private 
property are established to safeguard the individual's 
full freedom for creative, beneficial use of property, and 
it cannot be revoked by anyone in authority except for a 
clear public need and for prompt and just compensation, or 
in a clear case of misuse or m i s t r e a t m e n t .  The 
maximisation of utilisation of economic resources and the 
minimisation of the distribution gap in society are the 
two suggested objectives for Islamic economic development 
(Ahmad 1979). It is the responsibility of the state to 
carry out the task of implementing a balanced strategy 
towards the relation of these objectives and to ensure 
that the means exist to achieve these objectives (Ahmad
1979). It should be noted in this connection that the 
Quranic verses, " whatever is in the heavens and whatever 
is in the earth belongs to Allah", (2:284), does not 
necessarily dictate complete state control of all means of 
production, for according to the Islamic philosophy, man, 
in his individual capacity, is God s trustee on earth.
The State is empowered under Islamic law to take and
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sell property which has been misused to cause injury. 
According to the principle that "the repelling of evil 
takes precedence over the acquisition of benefits", an 
industry causing injury by pollution could be closed in 
spite of the economic loss. Consequently, things that do 
not have any advantages and do not help to improve human 
beings are not goods according to Islamic concept, nor can 
they be considered as the property or assets of Muslims. 
Things such as alcoholic beverages or pork and its 
products are not the object of the right of ownership and 
cannot be transacted in the Islamic economy, (Kahaf, 
1978).
3.5.2 The Ownership of Land in Islam.
According to the general rule of Islam's philosophy, 
ownership of land in Islam is related to the Islamic view 
of the position of man in the universe. Man is not a mere 
component of God's creation, he is the centre of the
universe and God's vice-regent on earth. As such, he is
the pivot upon which all elements of creation revolve 
(Quran 2:50, 31:20). Beside the 'individual' man, Islamic 
teachings also stress the concept of 'collective' man. 
The concept emanates from the pr i n c i p l e  of the
responsibility assumed by man toward the community. The 
dual characteristic of man shapes the type and the 
dimension of land ownership in Islamic society and
outlines the role of the state in the economy. Basically, 
there are two types of land ownership in Islamic system: 
a) private ownership and b) public ownership.
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a) Private Ownership
Private ownership of land is highly regarded in Islamic 
teaching. Private ownership which includes the ownership 
of means of production, is not absolute. However, Man 
owns property as a trustee to God which introduces two 
main principles regarding private ownership. First, 
ownership is not to be abused, but should be used for the 
welfare of the society causing no harm nor injury. This 
principle is not confined to an action that may cause harm 
to society; it also includes any action that might 
result in foregoing benefits to the society. Society, 
represented by the state, has the right, therefore, to 
step in to rectify the situation. For example, neglecting 
cultivable land impedes economic development and if it 
is neglected for more than three years, the Islamic state 
has the right to expropriate it and give it to somebody 
else who can look after it (Sahih Muslinj). What is said 
by the Prophet about neglecting cultivable land has also 
been applied to neglecting urban land and means of 
production in general, (Al-Sadr, 1968). Obviously these 
principles have direct application in the matter of urban 
land dealt with in this dissertation.
Second, the right to private land ownership is a 
limited right, limited to the life of the owner. The 
owner does not have discretion, beyond one third of his 
w e a l t h , as to how his wealth is distributed after his 
death. The exercise of private ownership is, however, 
circumscribed by the greater needs of the community, and 
the individual is emphatically forbidden to use his
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property in ways resulting in net harm to society. The 
rights of ownership are thus, limited by similar rights of 
others and by the public interest. Ownership ceases if 
the welfare of the community demands or if the need of 
another individual reaches extreme necessity (Chapra,
1980). Also the owner does not have an absolute right of 
disposal over his property.
b) Public Ownership
The question of the private land ownership and the 
limits of the authority of the Islamic state over land has 
always been one of the most important topics of Islamic 
law. Most lands within the Muslim territories were 
regarded by the majority of Islamic legal scholars as the 
Muslim common estate or state domain. Those who held such 
lands were regarded as tenants. Tenants of the common and 
state lands paid a land tax known as 'Kharaj'. The rate 
of this tax at one time exceeded half of the tenants' 
income. In the case of 'Kharaj' land, the state had full 
authority to take it from a holder and give it to another 
(Al-Sader 1969). Unfortunately some unjust rulers 
sometimes used it as an excuse to confiscate people's 
land.
The idea of common ownership of land and the state's 
authority over land is favoured by contemporary scholars. 
The scholars under the pressure of popularity of socialist 
thought, have tried to establish common ground between 
Islam and socialism. This may emanate from the legal 
ground that such an approach provides to limit land
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ownership; and the warrant it gives to the government to 
confiscate land and distribute it among the needy. The 
same idea is supported by a group of contemporary Shiia 
jurists on the basis of the Islamic principle of the topic 
of 'Anfal1. According to Shiia law, land conquered by war 
belongs to the Muslim community, i.e. to all Muslims in 
the past, present and future. All lands of this category 
are left to the discretionary authority of the Islamic 
government who will give them to farmers by mutual 
agreements in return for a regular payment of fixed amount 
or a share of the crop. A similar practice is followed in 
the case of state domain known in Shiia law as ’Anfal’ 
which includes all non-used natural resources including 
’Mavat' (dead lands) (Modarrassi 1987).
Both types of ownership are equally important and they 
participate in economic activities on an equal footing, 
even if they are of different sizes. The government may 
expand public ownership in one society or another, or vice 
versa, but the fact remains that both kinds of ownership 
have, or should have equal opportunities in the economy. 
Public ownership in Islamic thought not only includes 
features which are formally known as public utilities, 
such as roads and rivers, but, in addition, what is known 
in the Islamic literature as "the publicly-shared sources 
of utility". This position originated in the stand of the 
prophet, when he refused to admit any private ownership of 
such sources (Ahmed, 1983). Ahmed (1983) points out that 
Islamic law does not permit the degree of collectivization 
or regulation by the state found in contemporary communist 
regimes.
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3.6 Islamic State and its Difference from other Nation 
States.
Government, from the viewpoint of Islam, is not a 
product of any class position or the supremacy of an 
individual or group. Rather, it is the crystallisation of 
the political ideas of a people of the same religion, and 
through which they are organised, so that in the process 
they change their thoughts and beliefs. It opens the way 
towards the final goals, moving towards God, (Ahmad, K. 
1979).
The central point about the current situation in 
predominantly Muslim areas of the world today is simply 
that the Muslim world is divided into countries and 
states. This is in total contrast with the Muslim empire 
of the early Islamic societies. Siddiqui (1980), views 
Muslim nation-states however, as essentially no different 
from all other nation-states. He claims that few of the 
states, if any, admit moral values, except as slogans. He 
adds, ’’some like Pakistan, even fly a flag of convenience 
and call themselves 'Islamic Republic'. The fact, 
however, is that all nation-states are the product of 
western civilisation and its period of colonial dominance. 
Their purposes, structures and behaviour patterns are all 
alike whether the nation-state happens to be in Europe 
(its mother continent), or in Africa, Asia or America. The 
countries are Muslim but their political structure — the 
nation state— is non— Muslim" (Siddiqui, 1980).
The idea of state in Islam is fundamentally different
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from the idea of the modern nation-state (Iqbal, 1971). 
To Siddiqui (1980), the two states have nothing in common. 
He argues that, while Islam brings the state into 
existence as an instrument of divine purpose, the nation 
state comes into existence for precisely the opposite 
reason: to dismiss God and to replace Him with the
" n a t i o n a l - i n t e r e s t "  as d e t ermined by human reason  
(Siddiqui, 1980). "The nation-state, itself does not 
recognise any moral values, except those of the profane 
world. Such values are neither immutable nor universal. 
They are different from nation-state to nation-state and 
in the same nation-state different values are often used 
in different situations depending on the ’national- 
interest’ involved in each situation. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, international relations between nation-states 
represents a struggle for power, by means of power, for 
the sake of more power", (Hans J. Morgenthau, 1948). 
Siddiqui claims that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the 
single Islamic State in the world.
3.6.1 The role of the Islamic State.
In Islam, economics is a means, a means of achievement 
of nothing other than more efficiency in reaching an 
objective. On the basis of this view, the economic 
programme of the Islamic government is to prepare the 
ground for the emergence of different human creative 
forces. It is the res p o n s i b i l i t y  of the Islamic 
government, therefore, to provide equal and suitable 
possibilities, to create work for all human beings and to 
satisfy the essential needs towards the continuation of
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their evolution.
God has provided all necessary resources for his 
material well-being. Says the Qur-an: "He it is Who has
created for you everything on earth" (2:29) and "has made 
subservient to you whatever is in the heavens and the 
earth and granted you His bounties, manifested and hidden" 
(31:20, 4:32-3, 16:12-14, 22:65 and 45:12). Chapra (1980) 
has derived two fundamental principles from the above- 
mentioned verses. One, that God-given resources are for 
"you", which is addressed to all people and not to any 
privileged group or class; and two, that they are meant 
for general human welfare, and at least, for eradicating 
poverty and fulfilling the basic material needs including 
comfortable housing for all people. The fulfilment of 
these needs of individuals and society would naturally 
necessitate the playing of vital role by the state in the 
economic system of Islam.
The role of the state in an Islamic society emanates 
from its political role, which is organised in the Sharia 
(Islamic law). The authority of the state is derived from 
the concept of man's vicer.ejency of God on earth, while 
its r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  is to s a f e g u a r d  the c o m m u n i t y  
religiously, politically and economically. The state may 
adopt all available resources to implement its policies 
within the framework of Islamic law. The Islamic law 
organises, among other things, the relationship between 
the state and individuals.
The role of the government in an Islamic state, in
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relation to social welfare, is of special importance in 
the market mechanism. Social insurance in Islam is based 
on two things: government mutual responsibility with
society and the claim of the public upon government 
revenues. This general mutual responsibility is one of the 
duties imposed on Muslims and they should fulfil it within 
the limits of their capacities. The government’s guarantee 
of a minimum standard of living stems from the fact that 
it acts as an agent of the public and it is authorised to 
collect enough funds through Al-Zakat (alms giving), to 
finance this guarantee. The second basis for social 
insurance, namely the rights of the public over government 
revenues, is a direct one. It imposes a direct duty on 
the state toward individuals which implies not only the 
guarantee of a minimum subsistence, but an adequate level 
of living as compared with the general level prevailing in 
the society.
The State is viewed by Islam as an instrument for the 
realisation of the ultimate goals, both spiritual and 
material, of the Islamic society. However, the authority 
exercised by the state is not absolute. It is a trust 
from God and is to be exercised in accordance with the 
terms of trust. Two of the most important terms of this 
trust are that the state should be democratic and welfare 
oriented, (Ahmad, 1980).
One principle, clearly recognised by all jurists, is 
that the state has no right to acquire resources by the 
confiscation of property duly possessed by individuals and 
groups. However, if income or property has been
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wrongfully acquired, then the State not only has the right 
to confiscate it, but it is its moral responsibility to 
rectify this state of affairs (Iqbal, 1971). The above 
discussion indicates that the Islamic state is essentially 
a welfare state and is duty- bound to play an important 
role in the economy for the fulfilment of the goals of the 
Sharia (Islamic Law) in the Economy. All these various 
considerations make the Islamic state different from both 
the communist and the capitalist systems. If Islam 
accepts neither capitalism nor communism, the question 
posed now is, "what is its attitude towards welfare state 
doctrine, which seeks to strike a balance between the two 
capitalist and communist systems"? Muslim scholars found 
that the basic social attitudes of Islamic and (welfare 
state), systems is so similar, that if one was constrained 
to chose from among the economic systems that already 
exist, then a welfare state would almost certainly be 
picked out by Muslim policy-makers as the next best 
economic institution (Naqavi 1981: 112). While the
s i m i l a r i t i e s  between the two s y stems are quite 
fundamental, no less basic are the dissimilarities which 
distinguish the one from the other. Islam’s originality 
lies in making ethics the point of departure of its view 
on economics. By contrast, the welfare state ethics which 
are by and large secular, do not aim at a ’v e r t i c a l ’ 
i n t e g r a t i o n  of man's m a t e r i a l i s t i c  and s p i r i t u a l  
aspirations. In the Scandinavian countries for instance, 
there has been a long tradition of combining individual 
freedom with social responsibility, by insisting on a 
socialistic economic programme along with political 
democracy. The results have been highly satisfactory, in
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terms of both a moderate economic growth and an egalitarian 
income distribution. However, due to the absence of 
appropriate ethical props, this system is reported as 
"labouring under the crushing weight of moral turpitude" 
(Naqavi, 1981). Naqavi (1981) believes that, once this 
central feature of Islamic economics (ethics) is clearly 
grasped, there is no possibility of confusing it with 
other systems of economy. the Islamic welfare state hence 
neither capitalist nor socialist. It is "based on its own 
values and guided by its own goals. It has its own 
identity and bears no resemblance to any other form of 
state." (Chapra, 1980).
3.6.2 Islamic State and Income Distribution.
On the distribution side of the economy, Islam is in 
favour of equitable distribution rather than equal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  (Al-Ashkar, 1987). Islam r e c o g n i s e s  
differences between individuals and their skill and 
capacity to produce income. As such, Islam recognises the 
inequality of income that results from these differences 
and does not advocate a flat-equal distribution of income. 
"He it is who hath placed you a viceroy of the earth and 
hath exalted some of you in rank above others, that He may 
try you by (the test), that which He hath given you" 
(Quran, 61: 165). According to Islamic teaching Muslims
are ordained to give from their surplus to those who are 
in need of it. Offerings made by the rich to the poor are 
not considered an act of charity, they are the poor's 
rights to the wealth of the rich, (Quran, 51:19).
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However, Muslims believe that economic growth in an 
Islamic economy cannot be a pretext for exaggerating 
inequalities in the distribution of income or for adding 
to human misery by impo s i n g  e c o n o m i c  or p o l i t i c a l 
servitude on the common man.
3.6.3 The Motive of Islamic State Intervention in the 
Market*
State intervention in the market, in an Islamic state, 
is directed primarily at reconciling the possible social 
conflicts between m a n ’s ethical and economic behaviours, 
which will guide the society gently along the road to 
human freedom and dignity, rather than onto the ’’road to 
serfdom" (Naqavi, 1981). In the light of this concept 
state intervention takes four types of action:
(i) Ensuring compliance with the Islamic code of conduct
by individuals through education.
(ii) Maintaining healthy conditions in the market to
ensure its proper functioning.
(iii) M o d i f y i n g  the a l l o c a t i o n  of r e s o u r c e s  and 
distribution of income affected by the market disorder, by 
guiding and regulating it as well as direct intervention 
and participation in the process.
(iv) Taking positive steps in the field of production and 
capital formation to accelerate growth and ensure social 
justice.
78
Besides enforcing the relevant laws the state guarantees 
social security, ensuring fulfilment of the needs of each 
individual, and maintains a balance in the standards of
living in the society. other motives for government
aft
intervention in the market^ the setting of standards and 
provision of incentives, favouring the most beneficial 
land-use and the best management techniques so as to 
realise the betterment of society (Ahmad, 1980).
The extraction of every particle of usefulness from the 
entire universe is an ideological objective of Islamic 
society. The Islamic state approaches these goals by two 
means: ethical teaching and legislation. The legislative 
means taken by Islam to promote p r o d u c t i v i t y  and 
discourage idleness or non-utilisation of resources will 
become clear in a summary of eleven out of twenty clauses 
given by Al-Sadr as examples (Al-Sadr, 1968).
(1) The government will take land away from the private 
owner if he does not till it and a b s t a i n s  from 
utilisation. The state will not pay any compensation and 
will dispose of the land to the best of its use.
(2) Acquisition of ownerless land does not establish the 
right to ownership of it. Colonisation of land is a source 
of ownership in Islam under four conditions: (i) Non­
existence of any previous claim of ownership; (ii) 
Continuous productive use of it; (iii) The absence of 
others' labour even if it is paid for in the process of 
utilisation; and (iv) The non-violation of the principle 
of equal opportunity.
(3) No privately owned natural resources are to be left
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unused. Non-use of them leads to the invalidation of the 
private claim on them.
(4) Public land may be given to private bodies only in 
accordance with their capacity of utilisation.
(5) All kinds of non productive intermediary activities 
are prohibited, such as leasing a piece of land at a
certain rate and renting it at a higher rate.
(6) Hoarding of land is discouraged by the imposition 
of a yearly tax on it.
(7) Speculation is restricted and mere speculative 
transactions in both the finance market and the commodity 
market are prohibited.
(8) There should be social insurance in relation to both
the guaranteed standard of living and the guaranteed
payment of debts.
(9) The state has a leading role to play in production in 
relation to planning and public enterprise.
(10) The state is allowed to obtain resources and 
redistribute them in order to maximise the realisation 
of the normative objectives of society.
(11) The state enters the field of economic activity as 
the central planner and supervisor.
3.7 The Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Iranian nation under the leadership of Imam 
Khomaini in 1979, shed alien socio-economic concepts in 
order to be able to return to a traditional mode of 
thinking and world view of Islam. They believe that they 
are building an exemplary society (Oswah) on the basis of 
this foundation.
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The Islamic Republic of Iran is deeply rooted in the 
Islamic Shiia tradition. Shiia Muslims believe in twelve 
Imams after the prophet. Of these, the last one Imam 
M o h a m m a d  al-Mehdi, is believed to be in Ghayba 
(occultation), since 874. During the Ghayba of the Imam, 
the believer has either to be a Mujtahid (independent in 
interpreting the Islamic Law), or Muqallid (follow a 
Mujtahid). This tradition has regarded all political 
authorities as illegitimate, particularly monarchical, 
royal authority. In their particular belief in the absence 
of the Imam all authority is illegitimate by definition, 
and this led the Shiia Ulama (scholars) to insist on the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  reforms that were known as the 
Constitutional Revolution in the early part of the century 
from 1906-1911 (Siddiqi, 1973).
The basic attempt in an Islamic state such as Iran is 
not to legitimize the system, but to minimise the degree 
of illegitimacy of the political system. Legitimacy being 
impossible in the absence of the twelfth Imam, the attempt 
was a constitutional means of keeping the degree of 
illegitimacy within acceptable limits.
By contrast, Sunni political thought for the greater 
part of history, in its classical formulation, as put 
forward by Al-Mavardi, was that the existing political 
order should not be disputed or challenged on condition 
that the Sultan (king) performed the Friday prayer and 
implemented a basic minimum of the Shariah (Islamic norms) 
regulations.
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In the light of Shiia concepts, Iran’s government has 
some s i m i l a r i t i e s  and some d i f f e r e n c e s  with other 
republics of the world, as far as its form and structure 
are concerned. Government is organised in three powers of 
Legislative, Executive and Judicial. In this it is similar 
to many other governments. It is different from other 
governments in that there are some organisations in 
a d d i t i o n  to the three powers which s u p e r v i s e  the 
f u n c t i o n i n g  of these three powers. These other 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  are The Guardian Co u n c i l  of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Judicial Council and the 
Leadership of Valayat-e-Faghih.
The ’’Guardian Council of the Constitution" which is 
composed of six Faqihs (top scholars) and six lawyers was 
established to supervise the acts of the Parliament 
(Majlis: the Islamic Consultative Assembly), and to
guarantee its accordance with the Islamic precepts and 
laws, and the Constitution. This Council is, in fact, the 
highest authority in the country that decides on acts and 
laws passed within the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Some of the duties of the Guardian Council of the 
Constitution are the interpretation of the Constitution, 
supervision of presidential elections, and the elections 
of the deputies to the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
(Majlis), and the approval of the competence of the 
presidential candidates.
The Constitution provided for a council called the 
Supreme Judicial Council which is the highest judicial
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rank and is responsible for the preparation of the 
Judicial Organisations according to Islamic precepts.
This Council consists of five members, all of whom should 
be just Mujahids (top scholars). Two of them, the chief
of the Supreme Council and the prosecutor general of the 
country are chosen by the Leader or the Leading Council. 
The other three are elected by the judges. So the Supreme 
Judicial Council is considered as the best and most
trustworthy authority to control the Judicial system of
Iran and transform it into a purely Islamic system. The 
Leader or the Vali-e- Faqih is the one who supervises and 
correlates government policies with divine decrees and 
Islamic precepts. In this way, he is responsible for this 
concordance before both God and the people. Vali-e-Faqih 
is someone who is trusted by the people, and secondly, is 
completely familiar with the divine decrees and the 
fundamentals of Islam to the level of Ijtihad (independent 
judgment in legal and theological questions).
It is argued that the ideology of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, apart from overall Islamic principles, was 
influenced in terms of economic principles by the three 
major works: "Islam va Malekyat, (Islam and Property)" by
Mahmud Taleghani; "Iqtisadona (Our Economy)" by Muhammad 
Baghir Al-Sadr and "Iqtesade-Towhidi, (The Economics of 
Divine Harmony)" by Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, (Katuzian, 
1985).
Despite differences in methods and emphasis, the three 
authors have three objectives in common. First, they 
demonstrate that Islam has its own economic philosophy and
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its own answer to contemporary economic problems. Second, 
fill three authors sought to depict Islam as a religion 
committed to social justice and the equitable distribution 
of wealth. They attempt to use Islam as an instrument for 
social and economic reform, and to suggest that Islam also 
could serve as a vehicle for social transformation. Third, 
they tried to prove that the economic system and doctrines 
they were advancing could be derived systematically and 
in a manner acceptable to Islamic justice, from the Quran 
and the authoritative text on Islamic jurisprudence, (yC,l — 
Sadr, 1969; Bani-Sadr, A. 1978; Taleghani, M. 1965). A 
major move towards implementing such Islamic concepts in 
Iran came with the declaration of the Iranian government 
in 1979, that they aimed to convert the whole economic 
system into an Islamic economy. Various steps were taken 
in order to "Islamise" all aspects of Iranian life 
including the economic system.
The Islamic Republic of Iran asserts that its 
continuation is based on the Islamic system of economy and 
represent the "government of God". The Constitution 
devotes several sections to the economic affairs of the 
country. However, in chapter 3 of the Constitution, where 
articles of the economic programme are described, there 
are few hints about the economic objectives. In explaining 
the meaning of independence, the programme describes its 
policy as "terminating all subsequent i m p e r i a l i s t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  ....to present economic d ependency;  
exercising national sovereignty over all natural resources 
and national wealth; withdrawing from a mon o -cultural 
economy and budget which relies only on oil as a source of
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revenue.... nationalising foreign trade.... giving 
priority to agriculture; and revitalising national 
industries, (Constitution of I.R.I, 1979). At the same 
time the programme emphasises that "independence from and 
hostility against imperialism does not mean enmity towards 
industrial countries in their historical, economic, 
technical and cultural totality". Also of interest is the 
fact that "the government accepts domestic investment, as 
well as private and personal property, provided that they 
do not develop boundless dimensions, dependent and 
comprador tendencies, and do not paralyse the socio­
economic growth of the society. ..Unchecked liberalism by 
giving ground to compradorism leads to a new politico- 
economic dependency" (Ibid, 1979).
This is, in fact where the government programme falls 
into a trap. After private ownership of factors of 
production is allowed, it becomes quite difficult to 
implement policies which keep this ownership within 
restricted dimensions. This dichotomy is generally 
observed in Islamic economists’ views of the economic 
system. They are usually bound to respect private 
ownership and at the same time are motivated to contend 
against "the exploitation of man by man". This philosophy 
then leads to contradictory policies, adding to 
instabilities of the economic system.
The revolution in Iran for example, came to power with 
the above discussed ideological basis. But like many if 
not most LDC countries in the 1950s, 1960s and early
1970s, Iran adopted strategies of massive government
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intervention often by nationalisation, which resulted in 
considerable disruption and to far-reaching changes in the 
structure of Iran’s economy. The revolutionary government 
in Iran took over large sectors of the economy through 
nationalisation and expropriation, including banking, 
insurance, major industry, large-scale agriculture and 
construction. The economic role of the state was swollen 
and led to the reduction of the role of private sector. 
These developments occurred as a result of ideological 
misinterpretation, pressure from the people, the momentum 
of the revolution, internal disorder and foreign war, 
which are believed to be contrary to the Islamic law of 
property.
The prohibition of Riba (interest), in Islam has led to 
nationalisation of the banking system in Iran. Twenty- 
seven privately owned banks, thirteen of them joint 
ventures with minority foreign share holdings, were 
affected. The then prime minister and director of the Plan 
and Budget Organisation (PBO), d e s c r i b e d  the 
nationalisation as a first step toward creating a banking 
system in keeping with the Islamic ban on interest. The 
n a t i o n a l i s e d  banks were subsequently merged with 
government-owned banks to create f o u r  specialised banking 
e n t i t i e s  in the fields of commerce, a g r i c u l t u r e ,  
industries^ and mines, and housing and construction.
The revolutionary government was also hard pressed to 
provide housing for the urban poor. Many of those who had 
marched against the Shah were drawn from the badly housed 
population of the large urban centres. In the immediate
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post revolutionary period, housing problems quickly 
mounted. Rural migrants poured into urban centres, 
believing that at the dawn of the revolutionary era 
Islamic government would freely distribute land and 
housing to the deprived and deserving classes.
As a summary, the Islamic economic system is often 
presented as an alternative line of thought in the attempt 
to understand man and his relationship with things. Its 
proponents believe that the Islamic approach is more moral 
in its points of departure and more pragmatic in its 
application. The defenders of the Islamic alternative 
have condemned other major economic systems, namely 
communism and capitalism, as extremist and hence biased in 
their solutions. Owing to the one-sidedness of these two 
systems, the proponents of the Islamic solution predict 
that they will come closer and closer to each other and 
will meet midway at a point which is that of the Islamic 
solution.
In fact, the Muslim nation has been characterised 
in the Holy Quran as the people of the middle. "We have 
appointed you a middle nation ...", (2:143)— that is a
nation which avoids extremes. Islam is not a mean between 
communism and capitalism, but it is symptomatic of a 
general philosophy which abhors un-natural extremist 
behaviour at individual and collective levels.
Islam, unlike capitalism, controls the freedom of 
individuals to own land not through the mechanisms of the 
market but through ethics on utilisation (Naqavi, 1981).
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Therefore, any change towards more equal distribution of 
wealth including land ownership which comprise fulfilment 
o f : the needs of individuals - more people to have access 
to land; and the most beneficial land-use would be 
considered progress in the sense of social equity 
(Taleghani, 1965). It will thus be important to find out 
as to how this Islamic philosophy has fared practically in 
its income distribution policies, specially in the land 
and housing distribution. It will be of particular 
interest to find out whether this distribution has been 
able to reach the majority in need for shelter, especially 
the poor.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
The problem of this research study is founded on the 
fact that there is an acute housing shortage in developing 
countries and particularly in the major urban areas of
Iran such as Ahwaz. Such acute housing problems are 
caused mainly by the absence of appropriate urban land 
policy and management, which restricts accessibility to
urban land for housing by low-income families. To „ be
effective, urban land policy must be relevant to the needs 
of the poor, and should evolve over time in response to 
changing requirements and circumstances of cities and 
their poor inhabitants. Urban land policy must be
properly monitored, as meaningful policy changes can be 
made only on the basis of reliable information. Feedback 
from field experience can be used to gauge the 
effectiveness of housing land policy in achieving their 
objectives. This study, in responding to these problems, 
seeks to provide the necessary information by evaluating 
the recent urban land policy in Ahwaz (Iran). The 
findings of this study might give administrators, and 
policy-makers a clear understanding of the problems of 
l o w - income groups, and the policy l i m i t a t i o n s  (as 
discussed in Chapters 6, 7, and 8,), which can be
reviewed and modified where necessary.
The finite nature of land coupled with current
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urbanisation phenomenon produces a situation where 
different groups are often competing for land acquisition, 
and for different land~use. Urban land policy evaluation, 
then, consists of an assessment of the ability of a given 
policy in meeting these needs within the current social, 
economic, political and cultural context.
4.2 Source of Data
Data used in this study ourc based on both primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources of information 
included survey data from the beneficiaries of the ULO ’ s 
land and housing programme. A set of interviews with 
government officials included a member of the Board of 
Directors of the Urban Land Organisation (ULO) for Iran, 
ULO employees, planners in national and local agencies and 
the Mayor of Ahwaz.
The secondary sources included official publications, 
national censuses and institutional reports. A standard 
set of historical and quantitative information for Ahwaz 
on land acquisition and distribution was obtained from the 
ULO in Ahwaz. Other information was obtained from other 
institutions which deal with housing construction such as 
the Housing Foundation, the Housing and Urban Development 
office in Ahwaz. These provided information on the number 
of plots and dwelling units distributed by these 
institutions. Information about Ahwaz s city limits, 
zones and their land use and land ownership patterns was 
obtained from the land and property office in Ahwaz. Some 
information on the conditions of the beneficiaries
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residential areas, is based on observations by author.
4.3 Sampling Framework
A master list enumerating all the plots and districts 
and the number of heads of household who obtained their 
land through two different types of land allocation 
(individual and cooperative), was obtained from the ULO 
office in Ahwaz. According to this, there were roughly 
11,000 h o u s e h o l d s  who acquired land for dwel l i n g  
construction from the state since 1979. Six hundred (6%) 
households (300 individuals and 300 cooperatives), were 
systematically selected from the list choosing every 18th 
entry. The third type of ULO activity was the allocation 
of completed dwellings to those who are on the waiting 
list for land. This had only 200 beneficiaries, and 100 of 
them (50%) was selected randomly from the list. Thus the 
total survey sample was 700 households (See Appendi: V).
4.4 Structure of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire sought information on the demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics of the households. 
These would define what type of people benefit from ULO ’ s 
schemes, and whether the actual distribution or allocation 
goes strictly to the intended beneficiary group.
The second set of questions dealt with dwelling  
construction and the related problems experienced by the 
beneficiaries. These include state provision of housing 
components, the amount of building materials and the time
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required to obtain them, availability of services and 
their accessibility to them, and finance.
The third set of questions dealt with the 
beneficiaries' attitudes towards: a) their dwellings'
characteristics, in terms of size, privacy, density and 
location; b) the state's policy for implementation, 
community services at the site and the extent to which the 
respondents made use of them; how the move to a new site 
a f f e c t e d  the household and its members (socially, 
economically, and culturally); aspects of construction and 
credit; views on the quality of housing provided and the 
general assessment of available community services.
4.5 Data Collection
The survey itself was carried out between Feb. 10th and 
May 3rd, 1987. Research assistants were used to assist in 
filling in the questionnaire. The city's areas were 
divided into three sections, a team of four was assigned 
to carry out the survey. Three members of the team were 
responsible for the neighbourhoods of these sections. 
The fourth member conducted official interviews and data 
collection from government offices.
Most of the interviews were done on the first contact 
without any advance appointment. All interviews were 
conducted in either Persian or Arabic. To avoid any 
suspicions of being mistaken for a government agent, the 
interviewers were instructed to introduce themselves as a 
student of Ahwaz University and had their I.D. cards with
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them.
A majority of the sample especially in the poorly
serviced areas presumed that the investigation was 
intended to provide them with infrastructure, community 
services or other benefits which they desired. This 
attitude provided possible insights into the socio­
economic conditions of the household.
4.6 Data Analysis
It was found difficult to apply rigorous methods such 
as Cost Benefit Analysis, "Planning balance sheet
analysis" (Lichfield, 1964), or Goal Achievement Matrix 
(Morris, 1968),in the analysis.
Cost Benefit Analysis was found more suitable for 
ranking or comparing alternative courses of action
designed to attain roughly the same ends rather than for 
testing the absolute desirability of a course of action. 
In this study, only one alternative action was measured. 
Beside this, given the nature of data available, not much 
emphasis is given to measure the exact financial costs 
which have been incurred nor the monetary returns to be 
accrued. Rather, an attempt is made to measure how the 
different socio-economic groups of people have benefited 
from a given policy- housing.
Even modified variants of Cost - Benefit methods by 
Lichfield (1956), such as the Balance Sheet of Development 
that attempts to value those elements which can be priced,
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and to measure either in n o n —mone t a r y  terms or 
qualitatively what can not in fact be priced, is more 
appropriate to ex-ante analysis rather than, after the 
policy results. It is a technique whereby benefits and 
costs measure all the "good” and "bad" consequences of 
alternative courses of action relating to a range of 
o b j e c t i v e s .  Besides the other l i m i t a t i o n s  of this 
technique, its application to this particular study is 
also limited as again we have only one alternative course 
of action in achieving the desired policy. As with the 
Cost Benefit Analysis the data available can not be used 
for such measurements.
The Goal Achievement Matrix (Morris, 1968), is 
another method of cost-benefit analysis whereby the 
achievement of any objective of the established goals or 
policy can be measured directly from the costs and 
benefits identified and presented in a matrix table. This 
method can not be applied in this study as it demands the 
objectives to be defined operationally as far as possible. 
The objectives evaluated in this study have not been 
defined in this way. Moreover, all these three methods of 
evaluating policies are unsuitable for this study as they 
focus on the costs and benefits of implementing certain 
policies or objectives. They do not specifically lend 
themselves to identifying the relationship and differences 
between the different socio-economic groups of the society 
in question, rather to the benefits accrued.
The interest in this study is not only to identify 
the benefits of the policy, but also the groups of people
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who have benefited and to what extent. Also, all these 
techniques of evaluation are designed primarily for the 
comparison and ranking of an alternative project rather 
than for testing their absolute desirability. In this 
study interest is directed i n t o testing a b s o l u t e  
desirability of the policy in terms of meeting the stated 
objectives. Taking all these factors into account the 
cost-benefit approach does not fit properly in this study.
The success or failure of an urban land policy can be 
measured by various indicators. The choice of indicators 
of policies in developing countries is, however, strongly 
limited, due to the lack of data availability. Taking all 
listed below factors into account, it is apparent that we 
have to search for other approaches if we are to achieve a 
more profound understanding of the contents and the 
results of an urban land policy as applied to urban areas.
Given the significance of urban land and considering the 
rational for public involvement in its control and 
management, an appropriate set of expectations against 
which to gauge the performance and effectiveness of a 
public urban land policy would include such measures as 
efficiency in land-use (the process of minimising waste 
(of land) and cost in land development); equity (extent to 
which the given policy generally makes urban land and 
housing available to those most in need of it); and impact 
(the difference that the policy makes in the resolution of 
the existing urban land and housing problems.
The most important issues in urban land management
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appear to be simple extensions of these three concepts of 
efficiency, impact and equity. A system of control and 
management (be it public or private), however, ought not 
be judged on the basis of a single criterion to the 
exclusion of others (even though some criteria are more 
important than others). Furthermore, poor performance by 
one mode or system with respect to any one criterion has 
to be weighted against the potential of alternative modes 
or systems to perform better under the same criterion. In 
general, however, these three criteria are the measures 
against which effectiveness and desirability of public 
urban land management should be evaluated. An attempt was 
also made to measure how the method of dwell i n g  
construction and condition of housing has been improved in 
terms of the dwelling’s physical characteristics including 
building materials, density, privacy^ .infrastructure such 
as water and electricity.
Access to urban land for housing was measured by first 
comparing how the different socio-economic groups fared 
in obtaining such land. The other aspects of the land 
acquired were considered in relation to the location of 
plots obtained by different groups and availability of 
services, price paid by each group, the time it took for 
each group to obtain that particular land (from the first 
contact they made with ULO), for construction as well as 
the qualifications for getting the land.
Access to credit was measured by finding out their 
source of finance for purchasing land, as well as for 
c o n s t r u c t i n g  the houses, and by c a l c ulating what
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percentage of the total costs of a dwelling construction 
was ensured by loans. An examination was made of the 
conditions necessary for qualifying for credit, the terms 
and interest rates. The correlation between variables such 
as income, occupation, and age, and accessibility to loan 
were identified.
The relationship between accessibility to housing 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  available community s e rvices and the 
beneficiaries' socio*economic characteristics such as 
income, education and occupation was established.
4.7 Limitation of the Study
Originally I intended to concentrate a substantial part 
of my research on the study of archival materials. 
However, the Urban Land Organisation in Ahwaz refused to 
give me any access to the archive materials, as they 
regarded them as confidential. Consequently this study is 
based on data collected in the study area, in addition to 
other published government documents and accessible files.
I began this study during the ruthless war between Iran 
and Iraq. Although I expected many difficulties in the 
early stages, I continued and tried to overcome the 
difficulties. Work was started at a time when access to 
documents and data were almost impossible. People did not 
feel like talking to anybody. The survey was carried out 
under even more difficult conditions due to the outbreak 
of missile attacks on cities. Among the roar of machine 
guns and missiles and frightened people I did not know
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whether I could get hold of sufficient data. The purpose of 
this statement is not purely to acknowledge the problems 
of the people. The purpose, here is to explain the 
situation which existed at the time of preparing this 
study. As soon as the survey started, however, I realised 
that people were more anxious to contribute than it was 
expected.
Nevertheless, social and cultural characteristics such 
as individual’s privacy, the generosity and warmth which 
are inherent in the people of the study area imposed 
f u r t h e r  limitation on data collection. These 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  should not be taken for granted, 
especially when it comes to personal matters. For example, 
the social tradition and customs of the people in that 
area prevent interviewing a female, neither is it 
socially accepted to call on a household when the head 
(man), is away. Thus the suitable time to visit was 
between 6-9 p.m. every day, as the heads of household were 
likely to be at home after they had finished their work. 
Whatever methods were used in securing the willingness of 
the subject, there is still the issue of suspicion and 
trust on the part of the subject which may introduce 
v a r i o u s  sorts of bias. To overcome such bias the 
researcher sought the help of several mediators or third 
party personnel, in order to develop rapport, and thereby 
gain initial acceptance from informants. These mediators, 
who facilitate arranging meetings, include relatives of 
the subject, close friends in many cases the chief of the 
tribe (shaykh).
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CHAPTER FIVE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY IN IRAN
5.1 Introduction
This chapter aims at establishing the general context 
of land policy approaches to housing and s e r v i c e s  
development in Iran. An evaluation of land policy 
measures aimed at general development or at residential 
development in particular must therefore be undertaken in 
the context of the institutional characteristics of 
Iranian society. Moreover, analysis must take account of a 
long time span as a consequence of the dynamic 
interdependence between physical development and socio­
economic and cultural processes in a view of the widely 
held opinion that the physical development of a city is 
"the most enduring artifact with which man has to deal." 
(Lichfield & Drabkin, 1980: 103).
This will be pursued by providing firstly a description 
of the historical economic development and strategies of 
the pre-revolutionary government which manifest themselves 
in the present housing problems, as a result of the role 
which private land ownership has played in the Iranian 
housing development. This section is followed by a 
description of the revolutionary government’s economic 
development strategies, socio-economic and political 
conditions in which the current policy was formulated and 
implemented. Finally, having provided a general context, 
the Iranian national settlement development policy is
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d e s c r i b e d .
5.2 Background to the Economy.
The economy of Iran^ had been based on agriculture 
since its early history. Agrarian activities, although 
backward, had been able to satisfy domestic needs and to 
export a surplus (Table V-l). The first major change to 
this structure came as a result of exploitation of natural 
resources other than land and water, namely, minerals and 
mainly oil. Oil, though not very significant initially, 
has played such a critical role in the modern era of the 
economy that Iran may be said to have a dual economy. The 
country’s economy at present, as it was during the pre­
revolutionary government, is based mainly on oil revenues, 
which led it towards industrialisation.
Table V-l 
GNP in Iran (in Billions Rials)
Sector 1959-1960 1962-1963 1968-1969 1971-1972 1974-1975
Agriculture 85 97 140 172 305
Industry 45 58 130 205 464
Services 108 130 242 375 826
Oil 28 38 83 180 1635
Source:Bank Markazi, National Income of Iran , selected
years.
Iran was experiencing a transitional period in its 
economic life in the seventies. Nevertheless, thanks to 
the richness of its natural resources, Iran is one of the
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rare countries which has the potentiality of reaching a 
stage of self-sufficiency in agricultural products- the 
prime aim of the new government. In spite of such an 
idealistic goal, which is rather hypothetical in the 
context of Iranian contemporary economics, the rate of use 
of natural resources is not enough to sustain continued 
growth in the absence of proper management, sufficient 
qualified manpower and a peaceful political background. 
With the increases in oil revenues, the previous regime 
d i r e c t e d  its development strategy towards 
industrialisation. This destroyed the old and vital 
agricultural sector in favour of industry, which moreover 
was urban based.
Prior to the late 1940s there hardly existed any 
planning or well-defined development policy. Policy 
makers were less interested in regional development per 
se. Public investments or expenditures were largely, if 
not totally, distributed on an ad hoc basis and on 
sectoral lines among a few provinces. A disproportionate 
share always went to Tehran in particular. Development 
funds were largely invested in the military, 
infrastructure and import - substitution industries 
primarily located in large urban centres. These policies 
continued and were indeed accentuated during the first 
three Development Plans (1949-1954; 1955-1962; 1963-1967). 
A few changes were introduced however, including the 
creation of several Regional Development Authorities in a 
few provinces, including Khuzistan, which was by far the 
most important and effective one. These authorities were 
primarily devoted to large-scale agriculture/ irrigation/
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electricity generation projects. The Third Plan witnessed 
the creation of provincial planning offices, agricultural 
growth poles and industrial growth centres in different 
provinces. On balance, the first three plans neglected the 
provision of social services, development of rural areas 
and a s s i s t a n c e  to s u b s i s t e n c e  a g r i c u l t u r e  (thus 
undermining the least developed provinces), while paying 
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  a t t e n t i o n  to urban centred 
industrialisation, infrastructural development, and urban 
expansion. As the income from agricultural production was 
no longer attractive, much agricultural land adjacent to 
city boundaries was subdivided and transferred to urban 
use. Land and property however, remained as an important 
measuring stick of social status in Iranian society. 
These continued to be attractive forms of investment in 
urban and rural areas.
The increasing development gap among the regions in 
general and between rural and urban areas in particular, 
and its perceived political consequences, forced the 
government to pay more attention to balanced regional 
development. The new policy was reflected in the Fourth 
and Fifth Plans (1968-1972; 1973-1978). the Fourth Plan
in particular introduced a series of administrative 
changes at regional level aimed at the decentralisation of 
certain development functions. The creation of town/ 
county/ provincial councils and of provincial Plan and 
Budget Bureaux were the most significant among such
government continued to focus on development and the 
expansion of large - scale agricultural and industrial
However, alongside these policies, the
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growth centres in more developed and resource - rich 
provinces. New agricultural and industrial centres were 
largely concentrated in Tehran, Esfahan, Khuzistan and 
Fars provinces (Fig. V-l). The Fifth Plan (1973-1978) was 
even more c o n s c i o u s  of the problem of regional 
d i s p a r i t i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in social c o n d i t i o n s  
(Amirahmadi, 1989). Emphasis was thus shifted to the 
provision of social services including employment. 
Moreover, the policies designed to benefit the least 
developed areas remained comparatively marginal, while 
growth and capital-oriented policies continued to favour 
areas where conditions for profitable investment and rapid 
growth were higher (Amirahmadi & Atash, 1987).
The g o v e r n m e n t ’s policies encouraged urban-based 
economic activities at the expense of rural activities, 
which has resulted in rural degradation. However, urban 
development did not allow the country to keep pace with 
the rapidly rising demand for food. As a result, the value 
of agricultural production rose steadily though less 
rapidly than the other sectors. The slow rate of growth 
of agricultural production has frequently been cited as 
evidence of the dualistic nature of the Iranian economy. 
Critics cite the large amounts of planned expenditure on 
agriculture, ranging from 5.7 to 47.3 million rials for 
the period of 1949-1967, (Table V-2), and lament the 
sluggish increase in production of only three percent 
which is frequently compared with industry's average 
growth rate of 11 percent (Amozgar, 1970). Such 
criticism however, fails to note that the bulk of the 
government’s agricultural investment was allocated to a
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few capital- intensive large scale- projects which in the 
event did not result in the expected improvement in 
yields.
Table V-2
The Development Plans’ Allocation of Funds 
(in million rials)
First Plan 
(1949-1955) 
Second Plan 
(1956-1962) 
Third Plan 
(1963-1967) 
Fourth Plan 
(1968-1972) 
Fifth Plan 
(1973-1978)
Agriculture/Irrigation
5.7
(40.4% of total) 
17.4
(20.9% of total)
47.3
(23.1% of total)
41.2
(8.1% of total) 
30.9
(6.6% of total)
Industry
4.1
(29.1% of total)
7.0
(8.4% of total) 
17.1
(8.4% of total)
113.1 
(22.3% of total)
84.0
(18% of total)
Source: Bank Markazi Annual Reports.
The Fourth Development Plan unlike the preceding plans, 
had laid a set of economic development patterns that were 
to a large extent responsible for the economic trends 
that emerged later on. The sectoral imbalances of 
economic growth, the widening urban-rural gap, the 
increasing involvement of the government in investment and 
in p r o d u c t i o n  of goods and services, the growing 
dependence on foreign imports, and the deterioration of 
balance of payments were all a part of these development
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p a t t e r n s .
As Table V.2 shows, the primary development objectives 
of the dev e l o p m e n t  plans ( F o u r - Five), were rapid 
industrialisation and the development of the country’s 
infrastructure. Agriculture was by and large ignored. 
The control of food prices in urban areas- made possible 
by the food imports and government sponsored food 
subsidies were undoubtedly responsible for the low growth 
rate of the agriculture sector (Majd, 1991). One of the 
consequences of the depression of agriculture was rapid 
rural-urban migration. Thus by the final years of the 
F o u r t h  D e v e l o p m e n t  Plan, Iran had turned into a 
consumption-oriented, largely urban society with an 
explosive deficit in the balance of payments (Katouzian,
1981).
The pre-revolutionary government's failure to fill 
effectively the organisational and physical vacuum created 
by the half-hearted removal of landlords during the 
I r a n i a n  land reform of 1 963- and its neglect of 
agricultural investment left many disenchanted and 
disappointed peasants with little option but to look for 
work in the fast growing industrial centres (Lahsaiezadeh, 
1989). It was reported that 5 million people migrated to 
urban areas in the period of 1966-1976 (Afshar, 1985). 
The volume of migration and natural increase of the urban 
population, resulted in rapid urbanisation which rose 
very sharply from 31.98 percent in 1956 to 46.72 percent 
in 1976 (National Census, 1976). Furthermore, most of the 
discontented migrants, reacting to the pull of the high
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and rising demand for labour, particularly for unskilled 
construction workers in urban centres, eventually found 
their way into the large overcrowded cities as Tehran,
Esfahan, Ahwaz and Tabriz, thereby intensifying the
already acute problems of housing, traffic, and water 
shortage in these centres. Finally, contrary to the
regime's highly publicised objective of greater social and 
economic equity embodied in the Shah's social reforms of 
the early 1960s, regional development disparity still 
prevailed. It gradually became clear that the benefit of 
industrialisation and agrarian land reform did not 
" t r i c k l e  down" at a satisfactory rate, and income
d i s t r i b u t i o n  both in urban and rural areas became 
increasingly unequal over the post-1963 period.
The disparities of development in Iran are well defined 
by Amirahmadi and Atash (1987), who classified the 
provinces of Iran, based on the level of development, into 
three categories: "relatively developed"; "intermediate
developed"; and "least developed" provinces (Fig. V-I). 
In h a nalysis thej found the relatively dev e l o p e d 
provinces together accounted for 32 percent of the 
national land and 42 percent of the nation's population. 
This p r o p o r t i o n  was 43 percent and 41 percent for 
intermediate and 26 percent and 17 percent for least 
developed provinces. Thus, over 83 percent of the Iranian 
p o p u l a t i o n  live in "relatively d e v eloped" and 
"intermediate developed" provinces with 75 percent of the 
land area. A correlation exists between the level of 
urbanisation and population density, on one hand, and the 
level of development on the other. The relatively
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Fig. V-1 
Development Disparities Among Iranian Provinces, 1976
*. i7V.‘ ! : I
x:- Lfiffi#
LEGEND:
1 Markazi
2 Gilan
3 Mazandaran
4 E. Azarbaijan
5 W. Azarbaijan
6 Bakhtaran
7 Khuzistan
8 Fars
9 Kerman
10 Khurasan
11 Esfahan
12 Sistan/Baluchestan
13 Kurdestan
14 Hamadan
15 Charmahal/Bakhtiari
16 Lurestan
17 llam
18 Kuhkiluyeh/Boirahmad
19 Bushehr
20 Zanjan
21 Semnan
22 Yazd
23 Hurmuzgan
Relatively Developed 
Intermediate 
Least Developed
*For Details on Measurement of Disparities, See: Amirahmadi and Atash, 1987.
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developed" provinces have the highest percentage of their 
population living in urban areas, about 57 percent as 
compared with 35 percent for the "intermediate", 28 
percent for the least developed provinces, and 47 percent 
for national as a whole (Table V-3).
Table V-3
General Characteristics of the Three Categories of Iranian
Provinces 1976.
Characteristics Iran Relatively Intermediate Least
Developed Developed Develop.
Area 100.0 31.7 42.8 25.5
(% of nation)
Population 100.0 41.5 41.4 17.1
(% of nation)
Density 20.5 26.8 19.7 13.6
(per s. mil.)
Urbanisation(%) 47.1 66.9 35.1 27.8
Source: Amirahmadi and Atash, 1987.
Nevertheless, the period 1963 and 1973 was a decade of 
rapid economic growth, which led to expanding job and 
education opportunities, improved standards'of housing and 
rising patterns of consumption. More Iranians were able 
to meet their basic needs but the benefits of the economic 
boom were not evenly distributed. Housing conditions in 
large urban centres deteriorated for the lower-income 
groups. However, as long as the majority had a chance to 
improve their condition at a reasonable pace, these 
problems did not seem likely to generate insuperable
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political problems. It was the explosion in oil prices in 
1974 (following the oil embargo of Arab countries), that 
severely dislocated both economic and social life. 
Virtually overnight, Iran’s oil revenues quadrupled, from 
under $5 billion to nearly $20 billion a year. The Shah 
believed that this money would enable him at last to carry 
the country to his long promised "Great Civilisation", and 
within a decade, turn Iran into one of the world’s five 
leading industrial countries. He plunged into a reckless 
spending programme, investing in an assembly plant system 
rather than heavy industry.
Generally speaking, assembly plants are established 
close to cities in order to economise transportation and 
distribution costs. Thus, financial and administrative 
establishments like banks, insurance companies, custom 
duties and so on, which are the most needed by these 
plants, are located in the cities. As a result in most of 
the big cities of Iran, like Ahwaz, there are numbers of
rural migrants demanding job and housing, which put more
(Prv
pressure on,already acute housing market.
A
The results were predictable; the economy overheated, 
the prices of housing, food, and basic necessities soared. 
Rural migrants drained the countryside of agricultural 
labour and swelled the shanty towns and urban slums of the 
large cities. Bottlenecks developed in all sectors of the 
economy. Ships waited months for their turn to unload 
cargo at Iranian ports. The shortage of skilled labour 
necessitated the bringing in of tens of thousands of 
foreign workers. There were massive electricity shortages.
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Iranians remarked that the power failures and blackouts
marked the arrival of the so-called "Great Civilisation" 
(Graham, 1978).
When the country was at the gate of the so-called ’Great 
Civilisation the share of all (including rural and 
traditional) manufacturing in non-oil GDP was 20 percent, 
while the share of services was 56 percent. Yet urban 
transport everywhere, and especially in Tehran, was very 
poor. Housing conditions, except for the state clientele 
and trading community, were also very poor. Most towns 
and cities, including Tehran lacked a workable sewerage 
system. What took place in Iran was neither social and 
economic development, nor modernisation, but as stated by 
Katouzian (1981) "pseudo-modernism fuelled by the oil 
revenues". Likewise, the structural changes of the 
economy were due not to urbanisation, but to "urbanism", 
(Katouzian 1981: 196).
Moreover, although real income for workers and the 
white collar salaried employees steadily improved in the 
1963-73 period, after 1974 resentment was intensified by 
the widening gap in incomes, by the ability of the 
privileged few to make fortunes by dealing in urban land, 
scarce commodities and goods, and through commissions on 
large government contracts. The purchase of a house was 
s u d d e n l y  beyond the reach of low and m i d d l e - c l a s s  
f a m i l i e s .  The pressure of frustrated a s p i r a t i o n s  
triggered the political crisis that led to the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979.
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5.3 Pre revolution Housing Policy in Iran
The rapid urban and population growth increased the 
demand for land and housing. A greater state intervention 
emerged in response, and government power was extended 
through the preparation of Master Plans. In the Third 
Development Plan (1962-1968), a high council for city 
planning was established to oversee the preparation and to 
grant final approval of Master Plans. The expansion of 
the Iranian economy in the seventies largely affected the 
cities. This is why the necessity for planning is felt 
with particular acuteness in Iran. By mean of planning 
they can overcome their difficulties and realise their 
full potential. Otherwise, it is absolutely true, as John 
Galbraith states, "the country which does not have goals, 
and programme for reaching these goals, is commonly 
assumed to be going nowhere" (Galbraith, 1962:36).
The influx of rural migrants and the increased  
purchasing power of the urban families created a great 
demand for housing, and this was therefore followed by a 
high rise in the cost of land and housing. During 1976- 
77, the average price of housing in urban areas increased 
by 33.9 percent. Shortage of building materials especially 
cement and brick, a scarcity of manpower and a 39.4 
percent rise in wages, contributed to a 46.9 percent 
increase in housing costs (Iran Almanac, 1977).
In the course of the Fourth Development Plan 
(1968- 1972), the private sector should have had a
decisive role in the construction of residential units.
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Although the total investments of the government and 
private sector in housing construction were more than the 
anticipated figures of the plan, the greater part of the 
total investment was spent in construction of luxury and 
expensive houses rather than construction of housing units 
for poor and homeless people (Keyhan- International, 
1974:3).
The anticipation of credits for new governmental 
buildings in the Fourth Development Plan was 13.8 billion 
rials. From this amount, about 13.1 billion rials was 
invested in constructing the required buildings of 
military, prisons, detention barracks and Savak (secret 
police), houses. From the remaining credits, 2.3 million 
rials was allocated for construction of* Gendarmerie and 
Police headquarters (PBO, 1968: 226-227).
In the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978), 64 billion
rials was anticipated for the construction of housing 
units for the three military forces in addition to meet 
the needs of Gendarmerie, Police and Savak headquarters. 
This amount for public infrastructure and housing 
throughout the country was only 60 billion rials (Keyhan 
I. 1974: 7).
Problems arising from increased land speculation and the 
rising cost of land, necessitated new policy measures in 
the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978). These were in the 
form of taxation and regulations preventing the 
subdivision of plots. In addition to these measures, the 
Land Speculation Act in 1974 was introduced to impose a
11 1
limitation on the number of transactions on a certain 
plot. The Act maintained that any plot of land could be 
sold once, and that the purchaser should develop the land 
within three years. But this and other measures were not 
e f f e c t i v e  and speculation continued by simply not 
registering the transaction. The regulations, however, 
did not include large tracts of land acquired for the 
implementation of housing projects. The legal basis for 
such acquisition was also extracted from the Islamic Law 
of property ownership. The Law maintain that lands not 
utilised for three years automatically becomes state 
property.
A new department of Land Organisation was established by 
the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. The task 
for this department was to acquire compulsorily non­
utilised lands. This measure was intended to facilitate 
the provision of low-cost housing for civil servants and 
low-income families. Unfortunately, the Organisation 
could not take over the lands as it was confronted by many 
obstacles, such as landowners1 influence.
The government pledged to make a major new effort in 
h o u s i n g .  It was seen as an essential part of the 
transformation of Iran and a significant element in 
satisfying socio-economic aspirations brought about by the 
country1s increased oil revenues. Accordingly government 
c r e d i t s  to housing were raised by 129 percent and 
accounted for 17 percent of total allocations for the 
social affairs (PBO, Fifth plan, 1973). The Plan proposed
810,000 new units in urban areas and a further 240,000 in
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rural areas; the bulk to be built by the private sector. 
This target was based on a 1972 survey showing the urban 
areas to be at least 1.1 million units short. However, 
the intention and the outcome were two separate things. 
Throughout the 5 years of the Fourth plan, a total of
290.000 units were built and at no time had the rate of 
annual construction topped 100,000 units - despite a major 
building boom. Even the original Fifth Plan target of
630.000 units was considered .reasonably ambitious (IL0 
1973) .
In 1973 housing construction in the private sector was 
speeding up, and reached the annual rate of 14 percent. 
This implies that apart from the socio-economic factors 
affecting the housing sector, the housing construction 
rate was higher than the annual housing need of 5.6 
percent (4.4% population growth and 1.2% run - down 
dwellings). This could reduce the gap between the supply 
and demand for housing and even bring it to an end. This 
trend was interrupted by the government as they assumed 
that a large-scale housing programme was only possible if 
the g o v e r n m e n t  imposed a temporary ban on issuing 
construction permits. This ban lasted from April 1973 
through to January 1974, first in Tehran and then other 
cities. The ban was lifted, not because the shortage had 
eased but as a, result of pressure from builders and 
property speculators who were being squeezed by banks. The 
Bank Markazi, reviewing the year ending March 1974, 
reported: the implementation of certain government
construction projects of high priority necessitated the 
transfer of a greater part of construction activities to
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the government sector. This meant that the private sector
had to rely on its wits and the black market. By the last
year of the revised Plan, in 1977, housing construction
within the private sector had built less than 90,000 units
in urban areas. The Bank’s report reveals that despite
the increase of 14 percent in dwelling construction, and
5.6 percent increase in demand for housing, the ratio
between dwellings’ and families had declined steadily
between 1973 and 1977. In 1978, the ratio between dwelling
units and the number of households shows growth owing to
social unrest and the government inability to control the
building standards (Table V-4), such^ as minimum lot size, 
durable materia.Is, damp course and proper foundations .
Table V-4 
The Number of Dwelling Units 
per 1,000 Families in Iran 
(1973-1978)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
759 752 746 728 711 716
Source: Bank-e Markazi Iran 1979.
In many aspects the approach to the problem of housing 
by pre-revolutionary government was reactionary and 
improvised. Policies that anticipated problems were not 
adopted. The government reacted to problems only when 
they became overwhelming and crippling. As a result, 
measures were in many respects, not comprehensive, 
uncoordinated, misdirected and poorly executed. Hence the 
problem got worse instead of improving. In a period of 
five years (1974-1979) the housing cost rate had increased 
by 124 percent while the rate of rent doubled.
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The rapid increase in housing expenditure resulted in 
more pressure on low-income families which have to spend 
more than 30 percent of their income for this purpose. 
Table V-5 and V-6 demonstrate the housing deficit, density 
and tenure of housing in Iran.
Table V-5 
Housing Situation in Iran 
1976
number of number of housing
Area population households dwellings deficit
Urban 15,854,680 3,265,524 2,377,586 887,938
Rural 17,854,064 3,446,104 2,927,952 618,152
All 33,708,744 6,711,628 5,305,538 1,407,090
Source: Settlement Organization of Iran, Housing
Deficit and Housing Constructed in Urban 
Areas. MHUD, Tehran, Iran, 1976.
Table V-6 
Tenure Patterns and Density in Iran
-1976 in Iran.
P e r c e n t w R a t A  o
Areas owner rent & other person h.h person
occupier mortgage in dwl. in dwl. in rm.
Urban 62.6 28.1 9.2 6.7 1.4 1.8
Rural 89.0 20.9 8.1 6.1 1.2 2.2
All 76.1 15.2 8.7 6.4 1.3 2.0
Source: Settlement Organization of Iran, (same source as 
Table V-5), 1976.
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When the revolutionary government assumed power, it was 
confronted by seemingly staggering economic problems. The 
treasury was nearly empty. The equivalent of $700 million 
remaining in a government account with the Central Bank 
was used-up in a few days to cover debts and shore up 
shaky institutions. The government had to resort to 
printing money and to borrowing from the Central Bank. 
Huge deficits were looming (Katouzian, 1981).
5.4 Revolutionary Government's Economic Condition and 
Strategy.
The banking system appeared to be collapsing. The 
flight of capital had begun in the month leading to the 
revolution and continued after the revolution. In the 
five months between September 1978 and January 1979, the 
outflow of banks deposits topped $4 billion (Bank Markazi 
Iran 1979).
F o r e i g n  t e c h n i c i a n s  had dep a r t e d ,  l e a v i n g  major 
government-financed projects- steel mills, petrochemical 
plants, copper works, wood processing industries, power 
generating plants, nuclear reactors, and many road, port 
and construction projects- half completed. Great cranes 
stood idle above unfinished offices and apartment blocks. 
Lay-offs and closures downs left 2.5 million men and women 
out of work, nearly one million of them construction 
workers employed by private constructors involved in 
government projects (Ibid 1982).
This condition exacerbated by external events such as
117
the asset freeze declared by President Carter in November 
1979 caused by the hostage crisis, denied Iran access to 
valuable foreign exchange holdings. There was also the 
war with Iraq which wrecked Iran's largest ports, major 
industries, and disturbed trade.
In 1981, the revolutionary government was confronted 
with increased economic crisis due to the decline in oil 
export capacity. Iranian oil exports had fallen from 5 
million barrels a day in 1977 to under 700,000 barrels in 
1981. This was one-third the level necessary to meet the 
country's foreign exchange needs. Iran’s oil revenues in 
1983-84 were $3.7 billion below projected earnings due to 
Iraqi attacks on tankers and on the main oil jetty at 
Kharg Island which led to the disruption of oil exports. 
Oil revenues in 1985 were also running behind projected 
earnings of $20.7 billion.
The government’s debt to the Central Bank had increased 
by 100 percent over a one year period, rising from 1,000 
billion rials in March 1980 to 2,000 billion in 1981 ($1= 
80 rials in 1978). The Prime Minister was obliged to 
admit that the amount of the gover n m e n t ’s debt to the 
Central Bank indicated the bitter fact that the government 
had accomplished little in the sphere of the economy 
(Keyhan Havaei. 1981). Over the same period government 
receipts had fallen by 50 percent from 177 billion rials 
in 1980 to 89 billion rials in 1981, and the national 
industries had registered a loss of one billion rials 
(Ibid, 1981). War expenses were estimated at about 85.5 
billion rials (25% of the total national budget), while at
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same time the GNP had been falling by an estimated annual 
rate of 11 per cent since the revolution (Keyhan I. 1982). 
As a result the government was faced with a deficit of 878 
bn rials and a cash flow deficit of 285 bn rials (Ibid,
1982).
Foreign exchange difficulties mirrored problems in other 
sectors of the economy. The Central Bank reported in 1983 
that out of 4,045 projects funded, 1,332 were failures and 
had to be written off. As a result of deficit financing, 
the government debt to the Central Bank had soared and 
money in circulation had almost tripled between March 1979 
and March 1984 (Central Bank, 1984).
Meanwhile, the political and economic uncertainties, the 
condition of war with Iraq, the lack of a clear economic 
policy, international isolation and acute shortages of raw 
materials and managerial skills have all prevented the 
economy from returning to an acceptable level of capacity 
utilisation.
The new government's macro-economic strategies are: to 
maintain the agricultural sector while encouraging the 
development of a modern industry sector, in order to 
aggregate welfare of the society. In this regard the 
government's economic programme includes a long list of 
promises for the poor population in particular for workers 
and peasants. Both in the a g r i c u l t u r a l  and in the 
industrial sector, workers were to be relieved of all 
g o v e r n m e n t  d e d u c t i o n s  such as taxes and i n s u r a n c e  
payments. In addition, they were to enjoy housing,
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transportation, and sanitation facilities and their 
children provided with free education, from nursery to 
university .
5.5 Post-revolutionary Housing Policy
Owing to the catastrophic condition of the economy, the 
revolutionary government was hard pressed to provide 
housing for the urban poor. Many of those who had marched 
against the Shah were drawn from the poorly housed 
population of the great urban centres. Not surprisingly, 
Imam Khomaini accorded a high priority to the housing 
issue. "We will build homes for the poor all over Iran", 
he pledged in a major address on March 1st, just two weeks 
after the revolution (Keyhan 1979).
In the immediate post-revolutionary period, homeless 
people in major urban centres, took advantage of the 
b r e a k - d o w n  in m u n i c i p a l  c o n t r o l s  c o u p l e d  with the 
revolutionary government's attitude emanating from the 
declaration of Imam Khomaini, and started a boom in do- it 
- yourself housing by occupying state and private lands 
inside and o u t s i d e  city limits. M e m b e r s  of the 
revolutionary organisations routinely appropriated for 
their own use the homes of individuals they considered 
linked to the former regime. However, housing problems 
quickly mounted. Rural migrants poured into urban centres, 
in anticipation that at the dawn of the revolutionary era 
the government would distribute land and housing freely to 
the deprived and deserving classes.
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One of the radical measures which emerged was the 
establishment of the Housing Foundation (HF) in June 1979, 
at Imam Khomaini’s behest. The Foundation’s main objective 
was, to provide low-income and homeless population with a 
decent housing. To achieve this objective the seizure and 
distribution of privately owned land and housing was a 
daily routine of the Foundation which will be explained in 
next chapter.
The widening dispute over nationalisation, expropriation 
and state control of the economy was therefore only partly 
explained in terms of a struggle between the haves and 
the have nots, the " c o n s e r v a t i v e s "  and the
" r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . "  The d i s p u t e  was more complex,  
involving disagreements over Islamic doctrine, and over 
the capacity of the state, as against a mixed economy, to 
serve as the engine for economic development. The 
question of the state versus private ownership which had 
ramifications for a whole range of critical matters came 
to a head in the struggle over land distribution. Land 
reform (urban and rural), was the yardstick by which Iran 
would judge the revolutionary credentials of government 
and their dedication to the masses. As stated in Chapter 
Three, land figured prominently in Islamic jurisprudence. 
This meant government policy on land touched on intimate 
matters of Islamic law, and while Islamic jurists might 
pass over the nationalisation of industries, for example, 
in relative silence, legislation on land would inevitably 
engage their attention.
The sense of deprivation, and the expectation that an
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Islamic regime must do something to alleviate it, was also 
widespread. One squatter in Ahwaz remarked: "we continue
to struggle day and night for a piece of bread. If we all 
speak of an Islamic Republic or a government of the 
oppressed (the revolutionary government calls itself the 
government of the oppressed), then we must all be equal. 
Everyone who toils and suffers must also have a living. 
At least things should not be such that we die of hunger, 
whiles others are bursting with satiation" (Keyhan, 1980).
The outcome of the revolution and its impact on public 
attitudes contributed to the atmosphere of general 
disorder in the first year of the revolution. Partly in 
response to such developments, this situation required a 
radical housing programme and land legislation.
After the revolution of 1979, the mass movement of the 
people and the establishment of Revolutionary Courts 
frightened land owners. They rushed to sell their land 
inside and outside the city limits at cheap prices. In 
the meantime the Housing Foundation, the Oppressed 
F o u n d a t i o n  and other m u s h r o o m i n g  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
institutions, began land confiscation and distribution of 
urban land. These developments and the promulgation of 
UWLOAL in 1979 resulted in the sharp fall of land and 
housing prices in the first two years of the revolution 
(Appendix 3). In 1977 for instance, the average price of 
one square meter of urban land was 8,309 rials. This 
price reached its lowest possible level of 3,877 rials in 
1979. In the other words, a 50 percent decline brought 
it closer to the price of 1975 (Fig. V-2). The proportion
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of a dwelling’s cost accounted for by the price of land 
also declined from 49.8 percent in 1976 to 28.4 percent in 
1979 (Fig. V-3).
Before the enactment of the urban land policy in 1977 
the land acquired for private housing construction cost 
nearly 200 billion rials. In 1979, after implementation 
of the UWLOAL the price of the same area of land dropped 
to about 121 billion rials (Fig. V-4). Nevertheless, 
prices of urban land begun to soar again owing to the ban 
of the Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law (UWLOAL) 
in 1981 (Fig. V-2).
The revolutionary government's housing policy emanated 
from article 31 of the Constitution which grants each 
Iranian individual or family the right to have a decent 
house, giving priority to the poor (peasants and workers). 
In response to this article, the Parliament ratified the 
Urban Land Law in 1982, in order to provide the low-income 
p o p u l a t i o n  with access to plots of land, but its 
acquisition and the ability to build houses on such scale 
was questionable, given the uncertainty of private land 
ownership, which affected private investment in large- 
scale housing construction. The government was incapable 
of planning and executing a sizable housing programme for 
a long time after the revolution. The Constitution could 
not fulfil commitments to low-income families as these 
families had neither been identified nor characterised by 
the Constitution and the Urban Land Law.
The provision of housing and related services to the
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poor require the mobilisation of additional funds and 
resources far beyond those of the poor themselves. 
However, the government’s budget was already strained. 
The government was already constrained financially, and 
could not provide housing and services to the ever- 
increasing homeless urban population without the private 
sector.
A c c e s s i b i l i t y  to land is i m p o r t a n t  in h o u s i n g  
provision. If this is guaranteed, then affordability and 
cost recovery become critical issues. The expense of 
providing shelter and services far exceeds the ability of 
the poor to pay. It is clear that if the costs are too 
high, the low-income families will be denied access. 
Also, while the recovery of costs is always desirable, it 
is extremely difficult to accomplish in actuality. If the 
government subsidises cost recovery, it would limit its 
ability to replicate programmes.
There is by now no doubt that any real attempt at 
economic planning should incorporate comprehensive 
recognition of regional imbalances and should make a 
serious effort to reduce them.
The revolutionary go v e r n m e n t ’s economic strategy, 
however, has important implications for settlement 
development. Firstly, the government stressed that the 
provision of housing by the private sector was to be 
maintained or increased. In recent years, about 80 
percent of the new housing stock has been provided by 
private cooperative settlements or individuals (Bank-e
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Markazi 1981). Secondly there was particular emphasis on 
the full utilisation of the many partial development 
subdivisions within the legal city limits.
A third important feature of the projected economic 
d e v e l o p m e n t  s t r a t e g y  for p l a n n i n g  p u r p o s e s  is the 
continuation of the control over urban land management as 
well as the encouragement of utilisation of land. It was 
expected that the release of capital invested in land 
speculation would be channelled into the productive 
sectors such as agriculture, industry and national 
services (ULL, 1982).
After the 1979 revolution the construction of luxury 
offices and houses in major urban centres was ended. 
Although the decline in urban employment initially forced 
many casual workers to return to the countryside, the tide 
of rural-urban migration was not much affected. It was 
estimated that in the period of 1979-80, 800,000 people
m i g r a t e d  to Tehran, many in the hope of o b t a i n i n g  
interest-free loans and free land for housing (Afshar 
1985). In an attempt to reduce migration, the government 
announced that these loans would only be available for 
people willing to migrate to small towns and villages 
(Ettela-at, 1980). The government also raised the minimum 
agricultural wages.
The important points to be considered by national 
settlement policy are the issues of urban concentration 
and the declining population of some rural areas. The 
national population is expected to increase by 65 million
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between 1990 and the year 2000, internal rural-urban 
migration is expected to be at a slower rate over this 
period. Although the increase is quite low in comparison 
to the urban growth of most other developing countries, 
it still re s u l t s  in the need to create a d d i t i o n a l  
employment opportunities in the urban areas. Thus, the 
present settlement development strategy for Iran should be 
a new direction to accommodate the expected physical 
growth and to check the undesirable characteristics 
o b s e r v e d  in the past in the pa t t e r n  of p h y s i c a l  
development. This strategy basically should seek to 
rationalise the emerging linear urban corridor within 
w h i c h  v a r ious urban areas are i n t e g r a t e d  into one 
metropolitan area such as Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz and 
Ahwaz. At the same time, the strategy also must identify a 
balanced hierarchy of urban and suburban centres within 
the c o r r i d o r  as well as o p t i m u m  l o c a t i o n s  for 
manufacturing, housing, and recreational activities.
The revolutionary government by realising the role 
played by rural development have taken some steps in an 
attempt to avoid the problems experienced in the past. 
These steps have included efforts to improve and extend 
irrigation facilities, expand access to agricultural 
credit and subsidise agricultural inputs. The extension 
of rural services such as road, electricity, water supply 
and improving living standards in order to curb the large 
scale exodus to the urban centres was also pursued. 
These were c a r r i e d  out by the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of an 
organization locally called Jahad Sazandegy (construction 
crusade). This organization has employed huge numbers of
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skilled labour in addition to heavy machines in order to 
achieve the objectives that marked its creation. The 
Iranian Parliament passed a bill in 1987, which calls for 
the promotion of the Organization to the level of a 
Ministry. Other measures such as building up industrial 
estates in small towns, emphasis on low-cost housing in 
the construction programme in small urban areas encouraged 
by long-term loans and land allocation, and provision of 
special incentives to attract qualified personnel to small 
towns and rural areas, were initiated (FYDP, 1988).
5.6 Conclusion
Over time the economy has undergone major changes 
with specific reference to the decline of the agricultural 
sector and the growth of the industry and service sectors. 
It is worth noting that the key features such as the 
consumption- oriented policy and the role played by the 
private sector have grown in importance. These two 
features in particular are of importance to land use 
planning approaches. Firstly, the open-door economic 
policy will make it especially difficult to accurately 
predict changes in economic trends, since these will rely 
h e a v i l y  on c h a n g e s  in the world e c o n o m i c  climate. 
Secondly, given the usually limited resources of land use 
planning authorities, it is often quite difficult for 
these authorities to acquire the amount of data and 
knowledge necessary to predict and plan for an active 
private sector. These characteristics of the economy have 
a profound influence on the effectiveness of housing land 
policy approaches.
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The pre-revolutionary economic strategy; the 
prevailing free market forces; pressure of urbanisation; 
a change of socio-economic structure; and limited urban 
land use planning policies - particularly the lack of a 
comprehensive urban land use strategy - were the main 
factors which exacerbate the acute housing problems in 
Iran, and the main contributors to the formulation of the 
present urban land policy. The economic boom placed a 
tremendous strain on urban facilities which cannot be 
quickly or easily alleviated. The extreme disparities 
among the Iranian provinces, as well as between urban and 
rural areas, must be reduced if a balanced development is 
desired.
The cost of housing supplied by the market, as well as 
that rented was far above what the low-income groups could 
afford. The pre-revolutionary urban management policy in 
this regard was inefficient. The construction of urban 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  was r e f l e c t i n g  the o r i e n t a t i o n  of 
government attention to industry rather than agricultural 
pursuits; thus land in urban area played a significant 
role in urban dweller lives.
The pre- revolutionary government concepts of urban 
land management had reflected the roles land was expected 
to perform in the society. As a result, the direction of 
economic development has been opposite to the direction of 
social justice and equitable distribution of wealth 
including land. A few landlords owned the majority of land 
in the urban areas. In the light of these developments, 
one could explain the lack of adverse repercussions in
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response to the post- revolutionary change of the urban 
land tenure system in Iran. This is because it is only the 
urban elite and wealthier landlords who will be affected 
by such a reform, as they are the main beneficiaries of 
the ownership of land.
Nonetheless, post- revolutionary government rejects the 
past patterns of residential development, as they are not 
in a c c o r d a n c e  with their long- terra d e v e l o p m e n t  
strategies. As such the physical planning authorities in 
their attempts to direct future physical^and allocate 
patterns of residential development are focussing on the 
supply of urban land for different groups in areas of high 
demand. However, the current urban land policy measures 
used to fulfil these objectives with priority to the 
solution of low income housing problems.
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CHAPTER SIX
URBAN LAND POLICY AND HOUSING: THE CASE OF AHWAZ 
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the general context of urban 
land policy in Iran, and in particular Ahwaz. The policy 
measures adopted from 1979, the implementation and 
limitations of the policy are discussed.
Post-revolutionary urban land policy in Iran experienced 
three different stages including: the chaotic period
(1979-1980); the Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law 
(UWLOAL) (1980-1981); and the Urban Land Law (ULL) (1982-
1986).
Faced by the acute demand for housing in 1979, the 
Iranian government attempted to solve the problem of 
housing through acquisition, disposal and control of urban 
land by public authorities. In June 1979, in line with 
this concept and in response to hard political pressure 
for housing, the Revolutionary Council stated that the 
acquisition of land should be a necessary first step 
towards providing the urban poor with a plot of land for 
dwelling construction. In later years, different and more
complex programmes adopted.
A
6.2 Stage one: The chaotic period.
In the immediate post- revolutionary period, housing 
problems quickly mounted. Rural migrants poured into urban 
centres, under the belief that at the dawn of the
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revolutionary era the Islamic government would freely 
distribute land and housing to the deprived and deserving 
classes. However, due to the prevailing uncertainty and 
poor economic state of the nation private investment in 
large-scale housing construction virtually collapsed. For 
a long time after the revolution, the government remained 
incapable of planning and executing a sizable housing 
programme.
Further radical measures were attempted through the 
establishment of the Housing Foundation in January 1979. 
The foundation was created at Imam Khomaini’s behest, to 
p r o v i d e  h o u s i n g  for the poor t h r o u g h  p r i vate  
contributions. The foundation director used the call of 
Imam Khomaini as a platform to agitate for seizure and 
distribution of private land and dwellings. He boasted he 
could solve the housing pr o b l e m  o v e r n i g h t  if the 
government would only permit him to take over empty houses 
and apartment blocks, to exercise control over rents and 
real estate transactions. His proposals were popular 
among the urban masses, and resulted in the occupation of 
empty apartments, buildings and first-class hotels in the 
capital, utilised as dormitories. The movement spread to 
provincial cities.
In the first year of the revolution, the Bank Meli of 
Iran granted nearly $1 billion in loans for home purchases. 
This amount was three times the authorised amount, sending 
real estate prices soaring. Such was the crush that the 
loan programme had to be suspended for a time. The then 
mayor of Tehran asserted that the Housing Foundation
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director’s uncontrolled parcelling of land and his ill- 
considered policies and statements were encouraging rural 
migration to urban centres, aggravating housing and 
building materials shortages, and increasing pressure on 
municipal services. Recipients of free land often built 
without a building permit, and the Housing Foundation 
director encouraged them to do so (Katouzian, 1981).
The Housing Foundation policy continued to attract 
migrants to the capital and large cites with hopes of 
getting land and housing. When the Housing Foundation 
invited applicants from those who needed housing, over
400.000 applications were filed within a few weeks 
(Thabeti, 1985). This programme too, had to be suspended 
due to the lack of land supply (Thabeti, 1985).
Despite the fanfare, the Housing Foundation's concrete 
a c h i e v e m e n t s  were limited. A c c o r d i n g  to its own 
calculations, the Foundation had distributed 12,000 plots 
of land to low-income families in Tehran. This figure was
50.000 plots, according to Tehran’s Municipality. The 
magnitude of the uncertainty over these figures was itself 
an indication of the confusion governing the Foundation’s 
activities.
6.3 Stage Two: The Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition 
Lav (UWLOAL). (see Appendix 2 for details of the law)
M a i n l y  a c c o r d i n g  to the Islamic law of p roperty  
ownership, and partially in response to such development, 
in June, 1979, a law ’Urban Waste Land O w n e r s h i p
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Abolition Law* (UWLOAL), was passed. This Law made 
possible the nationalisation of all "lavat" (dead or 
unused) land in urban areas, to allow the authorities to 
acquire land quickly and free of charge or at low cost for 
public purposes.
This Law in the first place gives the government power 
of compulsory land acquisition in accordance with the 
Islamic law of property ownership. These measures were 
termed urban land policy in Iran. At a nationwide scale, 
this policy was a legislative instrument aimed to bring 
holdings of vacant land within existing urban areas into 
the public ownership for socially desirable purposes, 
particularly for low-income housing.
The Law allowed each owner without a dwelling of his own 
to keep a maximum of 1,000 square meters of such land, and 
to build on the land within a specified time limit. The 
nationalised land was to be made available for new housing 
construction, and official buildings. The Urban Land 
Development Organization (ULDO), was created to administer 
the nationalised land and arrange for its transfer to 
deserving families. Considerable controversy subsequently 
arose regarding implementation.
The nationalisation of vacant and undeveloped land plots 
i nside  the city limits were i n c l u d e d  in the law. 
Accordingly, each individual had the right of legal 
ownership to just one dwelling unit for his personal use. 
At the same time it ensures individual land use rights by 
introducing collective land ownership on plots of land
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which are larger than the given minimum. The law had not 
eliminated private land ownership altogether. Land could 
not be bought and sold by individuals or by the private 
s ector inside the legal city limit. Urban Land 
Development Organisations (ULDOs) were fully responsible 
for the implementation of the law throughout the country.
Two typeiof certificates were used by ULDOs to 
preserve the owners' rights: These are Development
Certificates and Contingent Development Certificate. 
"Development Certificates" are granted to the developed 
plots, such as d w e l l i n g  units or orchards. The 
"Contingent Development Certificates", are issued for 
undeveloped plots, which had to be developed within a 
period of three years from the date of issue otherwise, 
the plot of land would be subject to expropriation without 
c o m p e n s a t i o n .  Mavat (Waste) land was to be in the 
possession of the state. However, developed lands, 
allotments, parking lots, garages, swimming pools, sport 
centres and similar services as well as industrial units 
were excluded.
6.3.1 Implementation of the UWLOAL.
The ULDOs, which were established to implement the 
law, began to accumulate the nationalised Mavat land and 
arrange for its transfer to deserving families. Thousands 
of hectares of urban land were acquired and transferred to 
state ownership. Three thousand hectares of this land was 
divided and distributed between the homeless (Settlement & 
Planning, 1980). This was expected to be a very effective
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step by the revolutionary government to assist low-income 
f a m i l i e s  to a c q u i r e  low priced land for d w e l l i n g  
construction. The implementation of this law over nearly 
two years (1979-1980) provided a new opportunity for 
urban families to have access to urban land.
In addition to the supply of land for different uses, 
this new legislation could have provided grounds for the 
proper implementation of the c i t i e s ’ social service 
projects. Previously, municipalities had often been 
confronted by enormous obstacles in carrying out cities’ 
development projects, mainly due to the private ownership 
of land and the limited f i n a n c i a l  c a p a c i t y  of 
municipalities to buy the land required. On the basis of 
this law, whenever the municipalities were unable to issue 
an owner development permission due to Master plan codes 
and regulations, the ULDOs were authorised to grant a plot 
of land in its vicinity to the affected owner in exchange 
for the required plot. The transfer of land needed for 
urban growth from private to common ownership is the base 
for ensuring the future of human settlements (Darin- 
Drabkin, 1977).
6.3.2 Limitations of the UWLOAL.
The emergence of this law however, was not based upon 
adequate conceptualisation of the problems or a rational 
process of evaluating needs, rather it reflects the 
mobilisation of political demands- discussed in Chapter 
Five. Thus, ’problems' appear on the decision-making 
agenda, without having been adequately conceptualised or
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thought through. The previous regime was criticised for 
not giving enough attention on the provision of housing to 
its people and, in particular, for lower income urban 
residents. The revolutionary government was faced with the 
duty of providing housing to its people especially to the 
poor .
The implementation of the UWLOAL has done a lot in 
providing the state with an unprecedented amount of money 
from the sale of acquired urban land but ambiguity in the 
text of the law and its provisions has led to improper 
implementation of the law. The ULDOs* directors have acted 
in isolation, they do what they believe and not what is 
stated in the law. This has caused a range of social and 
political problems:
1. Decentralisation of the ULDOs and lack of coordination 
resulted in a sharp contrast in performance by ULDOs in 
different urban centres.
2. The criteria for land classification stated by the law 
were declared non-Islamic by scholars and therefore had 
to be abandoned. Article no. 2 of the provision for 
instance, describes developed land as ''orchards which 
have 6 trees in each 100 m , or 3/4 of its area tree
planted, are developed land; less planting shall be 
categorised as waste land" (provision of the law, 
Appendix 2). The argument is that, if the land has got 5
trees instead of 6 trees or 2/3 rather than 3/4 of its
area planted, it is still an orchard and not waste land.
According to the Islamic scholars' point of view, this type
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of land is regarded as fully developed land, (Thabeti, 
1985). By virtue of article no. 2, most of the orchards 
and agricultural lands in many provinces have been 
expropriated, divided and distributed. The ULDO office in 
the town of Izeh in Khuzistan province for example,
expropriated agricultural land by writing to its owner 
"collect the product (crops) of your land and leave it, 
because it is classified as waste land" (Letter archived 
in Urban Land Organization Office in Ahwaz 1980). This 
means ULDO not only nationalised waste lands but often 
developed lands, although in this case classified as waste 
land; the land had crops to be harvested first. This 
results from poor classification of waste lands by the
law.
3. The Housing Foundation executives whose main objective 
was rural housing construction (after the ratification of 
the UWLOAL), interfered in the take over and distribution 
of land during the implementation of the UWLOAL illegally. 
Privately - owned land was distributed between applicants 
by the Housing Foundation prior to acquisition. Therefore, 
people who paid for and spent a lot of money in
constructing their dwelling units could not get a legal
title.
4. P r o p a g a n d a  such as "a proper house for each 
individual" by the Housing Foundation and other bodies and 
institutions has attracted many people into the big cities 
generally and Tehran in particular, (Settlement & Planning 
1980). Many people sold their small houses and joined the 
land applicants’ queue in the hope of getting a proper
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piece of land at a low price. Owing to the mass 
migration, 75 percent of Tehran dwellings, during 1979- 
1982, were built beyond the ten years legal limit of the 
city (Thabeti, 1985).
5. The land distribution process was slow owing to the 
s h o r t a g e  of s k i lled staff. There was also unjust 
distribution, since anybody could claim to be homeless or 
poor to purchase a piece of land at a very low price. 
There was no possibility of checking the applicants' 
authenticity due to the lack of exact definition of the 
"poor" by the law.
6.4 Stage Three: The Urban Land Lav (ULL).
The main objectives of the Urban Land Law were: "to
meet the urban development and public need of housing and 
services; to curb land speculation; to promote desirable 
economic development by directing capital freed from land 
speculation towards the productive sectors of the economy" 
(ULL, 1981). The Urban Land Law of 1981, calls for all 
urban land to be controlled by the Urban Land Organization 
(ULO), by the virtue of articles 5 to 10 of the law which 
respectively declare that:
"All ’Mavat’ (waste), land within the urban areas shall 
be in the possession of the Islamic government;
The owners of ’Mavat’ land are obliged to turn in their 
land with the exception of 1,000, m which they shall 
retain and develop within a specific period of time. The
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land shall be r e t a i n e d  by the state in case of 
development failure;
Absentee owner property and property of unknown persons 
shall become the property of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
The owners of the urban Ba-yeer (undeveloped) land 
shall develop no more than 1,000 m of their land. They 
have no authority to allocate, transfer or let the 
remainder of their land except to the state;
The owners of Dayeer ( d e v e l o p e d )  and Bayeer 
(undeveloped), lands within the urban areas are obliged to 
sell their lands to the state and municipalities as 
required. The sale price shall be determined by the state.
S u b a r t i c l e s  2 and 3 of a r ticle 9 d e c l a r e  that 
disagreement or absence of the owners will not curtail the 
a c q u i s i t i o n  processes, and the ULO shall sign the 
transaction title on behalf of the owner(s). Non-Mavat 
land shall remain in Waqf. No one is authorised to 
transfer or allocate such land without the permission of 
the ULO;
All lands possessed by the s t a t e ’s institutions, 
revolutionary organisations, ministries, banks and all 
other state- related foundations shall give up their 
ownership in favour of the ULO, as the state’s single 
agency in dealing with urban land” (ULL, 1982).
By the virtue of article 55 of the provision of the 
ULL, the ULO is authorised to take possession of all
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’Mavat* Waqf land. This article was unique in its kind in 
regard to the development of Waqf land which normally lies 
idle and prevents any planning action to be taken in 
Muslim countries. This article was cancelled a year later.
In April 1982, in a major extension of the measures, the 
nationalisation order was expanded to cover all categories 
of unutilised urban land, including ’Bayer1 land holdings, 
that is, land with a previous history of development which 
may be currently unused. In this instance, some provision 
was made for the protection and compensation of owners at 
the i n s t i g a t i o n  of the G u a r d i a n s h i p  Council. The 
government, as a result of these measures, came into 
possession of substantial tracts of land lying idle around 
and in the major cities. By early 1983, the government 
had taken over 2,000 hectares of privately owned urban 
land, and another 20,000 hectares was earmarked for 
expropriation (Ettela-at, 1983).
The ULO expedited the process of taking possession of 
land and regulated compensation, which land owners could 
demand for their properties. This law has enabled the 
authorities to acquire land at affordable costs and by 
1983 a considerable amount (49,000 hectares), of land was 
acquired (Table VI-1).
The land acquisition legislation resulted in limits 
i m p o s e d  upon private rights of land o w n e r s h i p  for 
achieving various public purposes such as town planning, 
social ju s t i c e  and equity. P r i v a t e  o w n e r s h i p  was 
therefore subjected to the ’eminent domain ’ and ’public
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Table VI-1
Type of Land Acquired by the ULO in Iran 
1982-1984 
(area in hectares)
Mavat Bayeer State Owned
Year plots area plots area plots area
1982 297 1,142 74 2,277 53 3,028
1983 1,644 11,254 2,991 14,531 1,351 5,130
1984 3,169 6,140 2,214 1,097 693 6,360
Total 5,110 18,536 5,279 17,905 2,097 14,518
Mavat: Lands acquired (no compensation) under article5. 
Bayeer: Lands acquired (compensated) under article 9. 
State Land: Lands b e l o n g i n g  to the s t a t e ’s
departments, institutions and organizations, invested 
in the ULO under article 10.
Source: ULO’s report, 1985.
p o w e r ’ of the state, which implies that the rights of 
private ownership can be enjoyed only subject to such 
qualifications as the state may in the exercise of its 
sovereignty impose upon them. Theoretically, these are 
universally accepted facts. But this fact cannot be 
justified in the Islamic law of property ownership, as 
’’the private ownership is highly guaranteed’’ (Al-Ashkar,
1987).
In addition to taking land for public purposes, ULO 
could also acquire land for housing and other urban land
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development such as industrial or commercial schemes. In 
this respect, no distinction is made between public 
acquisition of land for public purposes and acquisition 
for residential developments.
The acquisition of land for 'public purposes' such as 
administration buildings, roads, schools, health centres, 
and so on, is carried out by the r e l e v a n t  state 
institution under approval from the ULO. This happens 
when the ULO cannot supply the required land for Public 
purposes at the right time and location. Non-public 
purposes, such as land needed for h o u s i n g  their 
employees, has to be dealt with through the ULO.
Owing to the deep attachment of Iranians to land, it can 
be a time-consuming process to acquire land through 
negotiation with the owner. Compulsory acquisition under 
Article 9 of the ULL of 1982 has therefore become the 
only potentially viable option for the government to 
ensure that it has access to land at the right time and 
the right place for public purposes. 'Public purposes', 
in the ideological context of the Iranian government, may 
include any land use for which the government is
responsible to benefit the nation.
The statutory powers of compulsory acquisition could not 
be invoked validly other than for public purposes, as 
defined by the law. But even then, the definition is so 
wide that it hardly excludes much, and most acquisitions 
could still be justified as for 'public purposes'. Unlike 
many other countries, compulsory acquisition in Iran does
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not seek the consent of the owner in terms of market 
price compensation. The state itself defines the purchase 
price of the targeted land, and regardless of the owners 
consent the land is transferred to the state’s ownership. 
Islam, which theoretically recognises private ownership, 
once again denies the basic right of ownership in practice 
in Iran.
Land acquisition under ULL and the ULO powers discussed, 
haS been assessed and criticised in the context of the 
Islamic concept of social justice. Scholars both within 
and outside government administration, differed in their 
philosophies and attitudes toward the land ownership 
question and, consequently, varied in their attitude 
toward direct government land acquisition for urban 
purposes. Many express the feeling that, given the 
complexity of the problem of land ownership and the deep- 
rooted emotional attachment to land of Iranians; coupled 
with the religious support to private ownership, the 
attempt to fully implement the sweeping expropriatory 
l e g i s l a t i o n  in many political s t r u c t u r e s  could be 
explosive. This may spark off uncontrollable social 
unrest, as was the case of Iran in^l963 land reform, 
which led to the exile of Imam Khomaini.
Many scholars not only did not support such legislation 
but opposed it strongly. One of these "religious bodies” , 
when it was chosen by the Board of Executive of the ULO in 
1982 as the general director of the ULO of Ahwaz, refused 
to take over the office. He stated, this law is not an 
Islamic Law, therefore I cannot implement a law which is
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not in line with our belief." The opposition was even 
stronger with regard to rural land reform of 1980 which 
resulted in social disorder and bloodshed (Lahsaiezadeh, 
1989). The rural land reform had thus to be abandoned.
6.5 The Establishnent of the ULO.
The ULO was originally created in 1979 under the name 
of ULDOs in order to implement UWLOAL. The immediate 
circumstances that occasioned its creation, were the chaos 
in property take- over and the land invasions, which broke 
out in Iran in 1979, leading to il l e g a l  h o u s i n g 
construction in most large urban centres.
The immediate objective of the ULDOs at that time, was 
to save urban land for better management and to provide 
enough land for housing construction. The ULDOs were much 
more powerful than municipalities in the normal sense. 
All powers and duties exercised by municipalities in the 
arena of urban land affairs were transferred to and 
vested in the new established ULDOs. The work of the 
O r g a n i z a t i o n  was started with a grant from the 
Revolutionary Government, with a promise of further funds 
when these were exhausted.
After the abandonment of the UWLOAL and ratification of 
the Urban Land Law in 1981, the ULDOs* duties were 
transferred to the newly established ULO. Although, the 
activity and operations of the ULO were extended, the 
number of employees remained small in comparison to the 
scale of the duties to be handled. The work of the
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Organization was underway, but soon after, the revenues of 
the government were exhausted by the Iran-Iraq war and 
economic depression and no further funds were available 
for it, even the revenues from its land sales. The war 
further interrupted work and manpower (10% of each 
government institution's employees had to serve in the 
battle field for six months), and money was channelled to 
the war effort.
Although capital expenditures increased considerably, 
revenue incomes were also comparatively higher. The ULO 
had little access to its income revenue, as it was 
channelled into the war effort (Table VI-2). The work of 
^Organization continued, but at a reduced pace (Table VI-
3).
Table VI-2
Capital Expenditure and Revenue Incomes of 
the ULO in Ahwaz, 1983-1986 (in rials).
year expenditure revenues
1985
1984
1983 103,452,115 
94,641,840 
113,875,591 
356,071,648
1,122,120,313 
21,766,970,310 
1 ,628,479,416
1986 950,464,475
Source: ULO in Ahwaz 1987.
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Table VI-3
Urban Land Distributed by ULO in Ahwaz, 1984-1987.
Individuals Cooperatives^
Year plots m 2 plots m 2
1984 3,208 750,432 7,567 1,866,151
1985 2,999 717,032 2,310 559,770
1986 1,225 307,153 714 178,731
1^87 906 256,375 420 104,672
Source: ULO's office in Ahwaz, 1987.
The Organization was given very wide powers at national, 
regional and local levels, some of these powers declined 
with subsequent amendments to the original act. The Urban 
Land Law implicitly broadened the definition of public 
rights in the acquisition and use of land. It marked the 
beginning of the Organ i z a t i o n ’s entry into major and 
direct industrial and commercial site preparation, in 
addition to residential development and as well as the 
general control in land use planning in accordance with 
master plans. It had the power to lease, sell, exchange 
or otherwise dispose of any land vested in or acquired by 
it, ensuring that the private developers or individuals to 
whom it sells, or even on their own land, build according 
to approved city plans and standards.
The O r g a n i z a t i o n  is r e q u i r e d  to pay r e a s o n a b l e  
compensation for replacement of acquired (non-Mavat) land 
for damages sustained by individuals or groups by reason 
of the exercise of any of these powers vested in it by the 
act. The Organization was also required to compensate or 
* See appendix ( V) for differences among individuals and
cooperatives* 147
replace those lands involved in the projects for town 
planning, and acquired by municipalities.
The O r g a n i z a t i o n  was almost a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  
institution, completing all arrangements necessary to 
carry out site preparation projects- its architects and 
planners prepared the necessary site designs, plans and 
specifications. The design of sites with less than 100 
r e s i d e n t i a l  plots could be d e c ided locally; those 
exceeding one hundred plots had to be approved by the 
Board of Executives of the ULO in Tehran. Prior to land 
disposal, the Organization enters into arrangements with 
the servicing institutions such as the Sewage and Water 
Organization, Electricity Organization, Municipality and 
other relevant departments for the final execution of the 
proj ects.
6.5.1 Limitations Faced by the ULO.
The controversy over land and property saw the emergence 
of the G u a r d i a n s  C o uncil (see C h a p t e r  3), as an 
institution of a considerable influence in the new 
Constitutional order. In May 1982, the Guardians Council 
forced Parliament to revise the bill on urban land giving 
more protection to private owners, requiring them to be 
compensated properly for expropriated land, and limiting 
government freedom to take over property. It also ruled 
that the government could not apply the urban land law 
indiscriminately to all cities where the housing shortage 
was critical and could be resolved only through the buying 
up of private property. The Council further reduced the
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ULO' s acquisitory power by cancelling article 55, which 
authorised the Organization to take over all Mavat Waqf 
land .
By ratification of the ULL and endowing the ULO with 
powers of compulsory land acquisition and disposal of 
land, the policy makers presumed that public control 
ensured the most desirable use and equitable distribution 
of urban land resources for the benefit of the majority of 
people of the public. It was assumed that the ULO would 
use the acquired lands in the most equitable way to 
be n e f i t  all groups in society. In effect, the 
accessibility to urban land resources and facilities 
would be maximised under such public agency control. It 
a s s u m e d  also that what the g o v e r n m e n t  or the ULO 
considered 'public purposes' or 'national importance' 
would also be understood as such by the affected land 
owners, who, on that basis, would be better disposed to 
make the necessary sacrifices in the public interest. The 
weakness and failures of the ULO as a public agency hinged 
on the precarious foundation of these assumptions. By far 
the most classic example of this is the Organization's 
experience with the urban 'Mavat' land acquisition. It 
attempted to acquire all vacant land within urban areas, 
including Waqf land, under the pretext of the 'Mavat' 
criterion for development and redevelopment purposes. 
Although this was against what is socially believed; land 
and its ownership in the society has such a profound 
sentimental and social value as an expression of group 
cohesion, that it was unlikely that such a provision could 
be implemented without any opposition from the affected
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land owners or without social unrest.
Although the Organization had faith in its Islamic 
justifications and legal powers, it under— estimated the 
strength of the resistance by land owners and scholars 
that it was facing. It was the scholars' opposition to the 
law - on the basis of Islamic principles- that forced the 
government to modify the provision of the law more than 
once. This modification had caused the ULO to wait months 
and, in a few cases, years, to acquire the targeted land. 
The applicants for residential land, in effect, had to 
suffer from the daily i nflated prices of b u i l d i n g  
materials and labour wages.
6.5.2 The Funding and Financing of the ULO.
One of the implicit assumptions of the powers and scope 
of the ULO function, was that enough funds would be 
a v a i l a b l e  to enable it to carry out c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
programmes, which would make a substantial impact on the 
country's urban land and housing problems. This assumption 
proved tenuous. The ULO1s operational effectiveness was 
often seriously undermined by the frequent shortage of 
ready capital from land sales, vested in the government's 
treasury.
The efficiency and effectiveness of direct public 
intervention in the land market as part of urban land 
policy, very much depends on the f i n a n c i a l  and 
administrative strength of the relevant authority or 
agency charged with such policy (UN, Paris, 1965). ULO had
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se r i o u s  l i m i t a t i o n s  in respect to each of these 
prerequisites. Being a quasi- government agency, ULO was 
financed from land sales and state loans. The ULO’s most 
active years of land acquisition and residential land 
distribution, took place during the Iran-Iraq war (Table 
VI-4).
Table VI-4
Land Acquired and Distributed by the ULO in Ahwaz, 
1984-1987 (in hectares).
year land acquired land distributed
1984 1,118.0 262.0
1985 98.5 128.0
1986 335.5 48.0
1987 138.5 37.0
Total 16,905 475.0
Source: ULO's annual reports, Ahwaz 1984-1987.
In addition to residential land, nearly one hundred 
hectares land were distributed for non-residential 
p u r p o s e s  i n c l u d i n g  land for public s e r v i c e s  
establishments, industry, and government installations.
ULO acquired some 16,905 hectares of urban land in the 
span of four years. From this it produced approximately
o
20,000 housing plots of various size, ranging from 120 m^ 
in Koyea Enghlab to 350 m^ in Keyan Pars. In addition, 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  127 plots for small i n d u s t r i e s  and
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commercial estates of about seven hectares in area were 
allocated, (ULO, 1987).
Since 1984, a substantial proportion of the revenue 
incomes of the ULO were spent on land preparations.
In fact, one of the most magnificent steps which 
lately have been taken by the ULO, were land preparations. 
Prior to that, hills, swamps and low lands were sold to 
the beneficiaries for residential use. This resulted in a 
heavy burden of expenditure to the user, for developing 
the land for dwelling construction.
The ULO, for example, was unable to protect the Mavat 
land within the cities which QoOH&d it (Plate^l). It 
was even unable to collect a substantial amount of rent 
owed by its commercial and industrial tenants for leased 
or rented land. This inability could be attributed to the 
weakness of its management mechanism, to the incompetence 
of its personnel, to the lack of coordination among its 
officials and to the reluctance of people to pay for the 
g o v e r n m e n t -  produced goods. C o n s i d e r a b l e  sums of 
potential revenue due from rents on the ULO ' s lands 
remained uncollected from the start. The principal cause 
of this was attributed to the lack of a specific unit 
responsible for rent collection.
Such was the financial weakness of the ULO, that it 
could not pay compensation properly to land owners as 
required by the law, even at the state's defined prices. 
This was mainly due to the lack of direct access to its 
funds, coupled with time consuming procedures to obtain
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Plate VI-1
ULO's Land Invaded by Migrants in Akher Asfalt, Ahwaz
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them from the government treasury. ULO was still not in a 
position to pay compensation to many of the owners in 
1986, while the ULO distributed and sold their land. The 
same problem arose with private land owners whose excess 
undeveloped land was not subject to expropriation, but the 
owners had no right to develop it, or benefit from its 
rent. These owners were severely handicapped with regard 
to selling, mortgaging or leasing such properties. Such 
non f*ay men t and undefined condition of property freezing 
after the law contributed to the shortage of land supply 
to the market; in addition to the resistance by the land 
owners whose property was acquired, to be acquired or 
already frozen by the law.
On the other hand, even where the ULO had acquired and 
paid for the lands, they remained undeveloped for a long 
time owing to lack of s u f f i c i e n t  funds for land 
preparation (Plate 2). This resulted in further losses to 
the ULO, as the little capital it had became tied up in 
such lands which, in many cases, were invaded and occupied 
by the poor (Plate 3). This not only affected the ULO's 
lands, but private frozen lands; 360 cases of invasion of 
such lands were reported officially to the court in Ahwaz 
in 1986.
ULO’s financial weakness meant that it could not afford 
to embark on massive land acquisition, except in the case 
of ’Mavat’ land. Thus it was unable to create the urban 
land banks or land reserves normally used to control land 
value and land use. ReliTiCJ on its eminence power, ULO 
acquires land only for short terms, but not for future
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Plate VI-2
ULO's Vacant Land Lying Idle in Koyeh- Enghelab, Ahwaz.
Plate VI-3
ULO's Land Invaded by Squatters in Se- Rah Ahwaz.
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needs. This isolated and uncoordinated pattern of land 
acquisitions has affected land values and land prices 
around the areas adjoining ULO's schemes. Although the 
price of land is fixed, there are still annual increases 
in official land prices.
Table VI-5 shows that the purchase of land is becoming 
more expensive, as less land is being acquired. This
fact is more crucial when we consider the increasing 
financial limitations on ULO, which has forced those 
denied land by ULO to buy their d w e l l i n g  plots 
illegally at a very high market price. The price for 
ULO's land was increasing on a day-to-day basis, but still 
it was seven times lower than the prices of real estate 
in the city. The increase in price of the ULO's land was 
due to the expenditures of land preparation and had to 
reflect this in the sale price. These higher prices were 
brought about by the ULO's policies, which originally 
intended to give the urban poor access to land. This 
process was particularly obvious in the ULO's land in 
Golestan, Korosh and Padad. If the ULO had the financial
Table VI-5
Land Acquired and the Amount of Money Paid for, 
in a Period of Three years 1984-1986.
Years (rials) (m^)
1984 94,641,840 UlSOjOoo
1985 113,875,591 985,ooo
1986 356,071,648 3,355, ooO_
Source: ULO in Ahwaz 1987.
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strength and active personnel to acquire land in a more 
comprehensive and coordinated fashion, it would not have 
to demand higher prices brought about by its own 
mechanisms.
6.6 The Impact of the ULO's Activities on Urban Land 
Development in Ahwaz.
Despite the many problems experienced by ULO in its 
activities, such as land tenure pattern, shortage of funds 
and management skills, the ULO made some noticeable and 
commendable impacts on urban land development in Ahwaz. 
Various residential and industrial/ commercial estates 
(schemes) were developed on the ULO's lands. Its role in 
the development of housing and basic urban infrastructure 
had been outstanding. Programmes of housing improvements 
have reached a much broader base of the population than 
was possible under the pre- revolutionary government. 
During a period of eight years (1979-1987) it acquired 
some 400 hectares of swamp and hill land, and by so doing, 
added to the city of Ahwaz a stock of land with 
substantial building potential. It acquired 860 hectares 
of undeveloped land, it prepared and sold 21,700 plots of 
land, comprising 540 hectares in area, to households and
private developers (individuals, cooperatives and Article
to
6 7 ’s contractors), but principally / owner-occupiers.
Meu) p  •
^According to the report issued by the Statistics Centre of 
Iran in 1985, 3,860 cooperative settlements with nearly
700,000 members were established in the country since 
1979. Fifty percent of these cooperatives acquired 7 40 
hectares of residential land from the ULO. Fifteen percent
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of them obtained loans from state banks (Bank-e- Markazi,
1985). An amount of 4,223 hectares of housing land was 
a c q u i r e d  by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  which r e s u l t e d  in the 
construction of 160,000 dwelling units (Ibid, 1985). 
According to the 1986 census of Iran, from the total 
existing urban dwellings in the country, 55.4 percent were 
completed between 1980 and 1986 (PB0, 1986). As a
c o r o l l a r y  to these, it had been i n s t r u m e n t a l  in 
individualising urban land ownership to a significant 
extent through registration of title to lands that came 
under its management and distribution of such land to 
individuals. All UL0's operational areas or schemes are 
within what is classified as the legal limit of the 
cities .
In addition to the allocation of residential land, 4,205 
plots of commercial and industrial land, covering 870 
hectares, had been developed in Iran between 1982-1984. 
The presence of the UL0 in the Iran urban areas was very 
prominent because of the volume of work which the UL0 had 
u n d e r t a k e n ,  and, more certa i n l y ,  be c a u s e  of the 
controversies it had evoked in the process.
6.7 Urban Land Law and its Implication for the ULO.
The ULO is best characterised as a policy - implementing 
agency for the supply of land - particularly residential
t
land. Thus it is subject to the overall direction of 
Iranian land policy. Consequently the basic direction of 
Urban Land Organization’s land policy is derived from the 
Constitutional housing policy.
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6.8 Conclusion.
The main immediate legacy of urban land reform in Iran 
from 1979, was confusion and uncertainty. The doctrinal 
and constitutional disputes over land and property 
remained unsolved. Because of unauthorised seizures, laws 
were approved and then struck down, and distribution 
programmes begun and then suspended. A very large amount 
of land remained in dispute between landowners, private 
citizens and the government. Many who received land , 
often without title deed, could not be certain they would 
be permitted to keep it.
The overriding powers of the ULO over practically 
everything and everybody in the arena of urban land, 
including the municipality, could have resolved the land 
question, or at least made the rationalisation of the land 
use and tenure problem much easier. This is more likely 
considering the provision of articles 5 to 10 of the ULL, 
which gives blanket powers to the Organization, in the 
name of public interests, to take control of any land 
required for public purposes. But all too often, the 
potential capabilities of legal powers are very different 
from the realisation of the interests and objectives of 
those powers.
The legislative powers of the Organization over urban 
land was not an exception to this. Despite its sweeping 
powers of compulsory acquisition, the Organization did not 
seem to find it any easier acquiring land, than did any 
other i n d i v i d u a l s  or illegal p r ivate d e v e l o p e r s .
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According to the Islamic concept, public and private 
bodies can enter the market on an equal footing; in 
practice there was no legal land market at all in Iran. 
The Islamic Republic has banned any urban land sales 
except by or to the government. Furthermore, the ULL gave 
private owners a time-span of three years from 1981 (the 
ratification date of the law), to develop their land. The 
undeveloped (Bayeer) land shall be expropriated by the 
state^ after the expiration of that time.
T h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  by the end of the given period  
therefore, all lands within urban a r e a s e i t h e r  developed 
or owned by state. In practice, up until recently, the 
O r g a n i z a t i o n  had to go th r o u g h  all e x p r o p r i a t i o n  
p r o c e d u r e s  for a c q u i r i n g  a piece of land, which 
theoretically was supposed to be in its possession. This 
could be another sign of the failure of the Organization 
in a c h i e v i n g  what it calls urban land m a n a g e m e n t  
objectives.
One of the central themes of this thesis is that the 
simple exercise of public legislation or legal powers, no 
matter what ideology is behind it, does not as such 
necessarily solve the objective problems, or by itself 
necessarily bring about desired goals and objectives. 
Taking the experience in developed socialist countries 
into consideration, appropriate, stable, and lasting 
changes in the land management would seem to come about 
essentially by evolutionary methods and processes, carried 
out with the cooperation of the people, rather than by 
authoritarian methods imposed from above.
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In brief, the impact of ULO's sources of urban land in 
Iran accounted for about 50 per cent of annual land supply 
during the relevant period, the bulk of the individuals' 
excess land was still in private hands. This chapter also 
noted that, while the prices for ULO lands were getting 
higher on a day-to-day basis, they were still many times 
lower than the market prices. Site preparation costs made 
up on average 50-70 per cent of ULO land costs/prices, as 
the ULO is required to reflect all those costs in its sale 
prices. ULO takes into account the costs of all works, 
development and overhead expenses for the land sold. This 
explains the U L O ’s pricing principle, in cases where 
government subsidies are applied as a matter of policy. 
It is too early to judge whether the law and its machinery 
have been well used to accomplish the intended long term 
goals. Despite the many problems experienced by the ULO, 
nevertheless, existing evidence indicates that the impact 
of the ULO a c t i v i t i e s  on land d e v e l o p m e n t  was 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  and the q u a n t i t a t i v e  goals in land 
acquisition, distribution and development of housing and 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  have been met s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .  This 
d e m o n s t r a t e s  that the ULO is b a s i c a l l y  c a p a b l e  of 
attaining its most essential objective. However, there are 
two additional issues that must be investigated to gauge 
the successful or otherwise operation of the ULL as 
implemented by the ULO. The first is the distributional 
aspects of the policy and its implications for low-income 
families. The second is a careful examination of the 
e f f i c i e n c y  or o t h e r w i s e  of the U L O ’s form of land 
development as well as provision of basic services. These 
would reveal the equity and efficiency aspects of the
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ULL, which are fundamental in any given policy.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND LAND DEVELOPMENT BY THE ULO
7.1 Introduction
The distributional aspects of the ULO's land resources, 
the efficiency and equity of this distribution and its 
land development practices are considered in this chapter. 
This will involve examination of the ULO’s outputs of land 
and housing, the process of allocation to beneficiaries 
and the implications of these to the resolution of the 
urban land and housing problem. It is concluded that the 
ULO ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n  of its land r e s o u r c e s  was 
significantly regressive in terms of the resources of 
beneficiaries and that the forms of development involved 
were inefficient in the use of urban land.
7.2 Ahwaz: Employment and Income Distribution Structure.
Ahwaz had grown up as both the provincial administrative 
centre and industrial and commercial hub of the southwest 
region of the country. Owing to its employment potential 
it attracted many in-migrants (13% of total population). 
Unfortunately this increased pressure on housing and 
other social problems. Its employment structure consists 
broadly of civil servants, industrial and commercial 
workers (Table VII-1).
Over half of the labour force in 1986 was employed by 
government or quasi-government establishments while over 
one- quarter were employed in industry and commerce. The
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self-employed were the next largest group, with about 12 
percent of the employees. These were composed mainly of 
traders and other services-workers (Iran National Census
1986). Only 28 percent of the labour forces were in the
Table VII-1
Employed Population by Sector in Ahwaz, 1976 and 1986
Sector No. of Employees Percentage
1976 1986 1976 1986
Agriculture 1045 5384 1.4 5.2
Mining 7933 8076 10.4 7.8
Industry 10313 16358 13.5 15.8
Construction 8533 4763 11.2 4.6
Water and Electricity 3082 5694 4.0 5.5
Commercial & Trades 8418 9007 11.0 8.7
Storage 7735 7351 10.2 7.1
Services 27892 34477 36.6 33.3
Undetermined 1275 12424 1.7 12.0
Source: National Censuses of Population and Housing 1976
and 1986.
'professional and technical' group which received 
between 700,000 rials and 1,100,000 rials per annum in the 
early 1980s. A relatively small middle class earned 
between 550,000 and 849,000 rials per annum, and the much 
larger class of low paid (low-income) workers earned below
550,000 rials per year (1 pound = 220 rials in 1979).
Given these facts, if a maximum of 550,000 rials per 
annum f$ assumed to be the upper limit of a low income at 
the time, it meant that nearly 48 percent of the total
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(102,466) households of Ahwaz were in the low-income 
group. The middle-income group were people who earned 
between 530,000 and 1,000,000 rials from regular wages and 
salaries. Only 42 percent of households fell into this 
group. Moreover, only ten percent of Ahwaz's households 
earned more than 1,200,000 rials per year (Table VII-2).
Table VII-2
Ahwaz Income Distribution (per annum) in 1984
Income (1000 rials) No. of H .H. Percent
less than 250,000 9325 9.1
250-399 12910 12.6
400-549 26744 26.1
550-699 20186 19.7
700-849 13833 13.5
850-1000 9222 9.0
Over 1000 10246 10.0
Total 102466 100.0
H. H. = Household •
Source: A Sample Survey of Population and
Housing in Ahwaz. A report by
Pezhuhesh Consulting Engineers
Group, 1984.
The distribution was extremely skewed with the modal 
income group being the 400-550 income group. The median 
income was 580 which implies that there were as many 
people below this income as were above it at tha-t time; 
the median income is lower than the mean income.
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To gain a full appreciation of their implications for 
accessibility to the ULO's lands under discussion, these 
income levels and their distribution structure have to be 
seen in relation to the cost of living as indicated by the 
consumer price indices for Iran from 1979-1981. In 
addition to a consistent annual increase, the weighted 
irti£& for expenditure on accommodation was 
clearly and consistently above the weighted (JLnrtfWUlb 
average for total expenditures throughout the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (Table VII-3). The same persistent annual 
increases in the cost of housing continued through the 
1980s (Table VII-4), with no less than 4 percent points 
annual increase throughout the period. In Ahwaz, despite 
the generally low quality of housing, the monthly rent 
rate increased from 50.4 percent to 119.2 percent over 
the eight years from 1970 to 1978. Rent as a proportion 
of income of the residents of Ahwaz had risen from between 
13-19 percent in the late 1970s to between 30-40 percent 
for all income groups in mid-1980s (MHUD, 1980) .
The 1985 report of the Central Bank noted that rents had 
moved in step with the general government price level, if 
not faster. However, it has been observed that, ’’what has 
made rent such a sensitive issue is not so much its rate 
of increase, but rather the fact that it accounts for a 
substantial proportion of total consumer spen d i n g ” , 
(Central Bank, 1985). This, of course, is due to the fact 
that there was and still is an acute housing shortage.
1 6 6
Table VII-3 
Average Annual Growth Rates of the
Consumer Price Index by Major Groups
(1974 = 100)
year 1 979 1980 1981
Food 207.4 267.5 344.8
Housing 224.3 211 .9 227.3
Clothing 163.6 187.2 232.1
H.H. furnishing 171 .8 219.8 290.4
Communication & transport 193.4 249.4 328.4
Health & medical care 113.4 127.0 1 44.7
Recreation & education 196.3 242.5 297.9
Total index
Source: Bank-e Markazi, Economic Report &_ Balance
Sheet, 1979-81, Tehran, Iran. _______________
Table VII-4 
Housing Price Index in Iran 1979-1983
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Housing & Energy 205.5 220.4 241.9 271.7 224.0
Building Materials 141.7 173.5 197.5 192.6 224.2
Labour Wages 337.3 450.5 523.6 631.0 861.4
Price index in 1973= 100
Source: MHUD, Housing Condition in Iran, 1983.
A l t h o u g h  for various reasons the g o v e r n m e n t ’s 
institutions in general, and the oil company in particular 
are often a high cost purchaser as well as a high price 
renter, the rents would still be considered exceedingly 
high, even when the additional cost arising from the
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g o v e r n m e n t ' s  "bad b a rgain" has been taken into 
consideration. The oil company, for instance, pays its 
employee 5 million rials (1 pound = 220 rials, in 1979) to 
purchase a house, while the maximum loan given by the 
banks was three million rials. The relevant point, 
however, is that what the g o v e r n m e n t  pays for 
accommodation affects the general rent level, as builders 
and developers take the cue and prefer to rent or sell 
only to the government rather than to private individuals. 
Supplies too are channelled by builders and developers to 
the type of houses or accommodation that the middle and 
high income groups prefer. The resulting reduction or 
withdrawal of investment from low-cost housing, that the 
majority of people demand, means that the government is 
pushing the ordinary citizen out of the housing market and 
.thereby further exacerbating the problem. This is much 
more serious because of the magnitude of housing demanded 
and rented by the government to meet its present extended 
insti t u t i o n s ’ building needs for accommodating their 
employees.
This situation is similar to earlier reports by the 
World Bank about developing countries. The report noted 
that "private investors prefer to build for high income 
buyers or tenants who could afford to give them a good 
return on their investments. This inevitably led to a bias 
against low-income groups. In the context of a development 
plan, this had an undesirable effect, that is, it made the 
gap between rich and poor more obvious than it had been in 
the past. It also tended to increase the demand for 
imports" (WBRD, 1965).
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7.3 Criteria and Process of Allocation.
The Government's policy objective is the first factor 
determining the beneficiaries as the homeless population, 
giving priority to low-income families. Whether the 
actual distribution is allocated strictly to the intended 
beneficiary group is another matter. It is not surprising 
that there is always a wide gap between the official 
stated objective and the actual application of those 
objectives, particularly with respect to low-income 
housing beneficiaries. The ULO1s schemes or projects were 
not explicitly stated with respect to a particular 
beneficiary group instead, they became clear from the 
provision statements and actions of the ULO as each scheme 
was implemented. A careful examination of the Urban Land 
Law and its provision, along with the percentage of land 
plots allocated, gave a fairly good idea of benefit 
distribution among income groups, (Table VII-5).
Middle and high income families constitute between 40-50 
percent of the urban population of Ahwaz (Central Bank, 
1985), and they have acquired nearly 80% of the total land 
and housing distributed by the Urban Land Organization. 
Taking the land and housing distribution schemes after 
1979, and the Urban Land Law stated objectives, broadly
91.4 percent of houses and 74.2 percent of land schemes 
were allocated to middle and high-income families, people 
who can never be considered for any future subsidised 
schemes as they have the means to purchase a house. Only 
8.5 percent of houses and 23.0% of land were given to low- 
income families. As it can be seen, although the priority
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of the land and housing distribution policy aimed specially 
to serve the low-income people, in practice these were not 
the people who benefited.
Table VII-5 
Beneficiaries of ULO’s Land and Housing 
Allocation Schemes.
Ty$es of Plots distribution Completed total
Individual Cooperative % houses % sample
No. of Sample 300 300 100.0 100 100.0 100.0
Low-income* 69 84 25.5 08 08.0 23 .0
Middle-income 196 210 67.5 85 85.0 67.6
High-income 36 06 06.8 07 07.0
Sample survey carried out by the researcher in 1987.
* Income groups defined in chapter eight.
The second factor that influenced the beneficiary 
distribution of the ULO's land and housing resources was 
the criteria for allocation of such resources. While this 
factor is closely related to the first one, it could 
differ in actual application or implementation. The law 
for example stipulated that land and housing applicants 
should be subject to regulation of Article 65 which 
defines the group that should benefit, and ostensibly all 
persons not within that group should not benefit from the 
policy. Article 65 reads:
1. "The a p p l i c a n t  must have not less than 5 years 
continuous residence (10 years for Tehran), in the city-
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This would exclude recent migrants, and was meant possibly 
to discourage migration into the cities.
2. The applicant and his family should have no urban land 
or house within the country. Also, he should not have sold 
a house or urban land during the last 5 years (since 
1979).
3. The applicant must be financially able to pay for the 
cost of land and dwelling construction", (ULL, 1982).
The implications of these regulations is the exclusion 
of low-income families, as the. latter lack the finance 
to buy the land and pay for construction. As far as the 
law is concerned, no specific provisions for the poor were 
made.
The only designated schemes as 'low-cost houses for low- 
income people' were under Article 67, but in practice 
these were far beyond the reach of these group due to the 
high prices. The insufficient provision of houses under 
this article and the consequent subjectivity of the choice 
of beneficiaries provides a good illustration of how easy 
it is to s i d e t r a c k  o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a  in the 
implementation process, and thus cause divergence between 
intended policy goals and their final outcome in practice. 
Owing to the shortage of building plots relative to 
increasing demand, the ULO adopted a "points" priority 
system based on financial capability, length of residence 
in the city and size of family. A Ballot system was used 
for allocating plots.
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The result was that the income limit criterion was side­
tracked, presumably because too many people qualified 
under that criterion. Many more people became eligible 
theoretically under the revised criteria used in the 
’point' rating system. People not of low income could fit 
into the three rating criteria, including people with 
m i d d l e  and m o d e r a t e  income. Even the m e t h o d s  of 
determining the veracity and authenticity of those 
claiming to meet these criteria remained very much open to 
question. Because low-income land distribution was 
generally highly subsidised by means of capital grants 
from the government, there was always heated competition 
to get them even by high income persons. With the 
objective income criterion dispensed with, or at best 
relegated to the background, subjective criteria and the 
p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t  of those doing the a l l o c a t i o n s  
prevailed. As can be seen from the result in chapter 
eight, many of those who ultimately benefited from the 
so-called low-income land distribution or from housing 
officially set aside for low-income people were in fact 
not low-income.
The ULO, using the pretext of securing land development, 
denied access to land by low-income families in Ahwaz. 
Thus, it means that scarcity, c o m p e t i t i o n ,  and 
discrimination are inseparable and still prevailed and 
dominated ULO distribution system. The result in such 
cases is that the officially stated goals are ignored and 
lost.
The third set of factors that d e t e r m i n e  the
1 7 2
b e n e f i c i a r i e s  of the ULO's land and houses is the 
conditions for allocation and the terms of the covenant
that the prospective beneficiary is expected to fulfil. 
Ostensibly, any member of the public covered by Article 65 
can apply and be allocated a plot, but in practice the
c o n d i t i o n  and c r i t e r i a  of a l l o c a t i o n  e x c l u d e s  by
implication certain economic groups from getting land. 
Generally, the U L O ’s allocation office is principally 
guided by applicants' ability to pay for the plots or 
houses and ability to develop the land within a reasonable 
time (15 months). Many of these schemes had been financed 
by bank loans which have to be repaid within 10-15 years. 
The means of ensuring re-payments of the loans to banks 
within the stipulated periods therefore was the basis on
which to sell the plots of land or houses to applicants. 
The condition for obtaining a bank loan generally included 
among other things:
a) The ability to deposit 20% of the total costs of the 
dwelling construction and to make a regular monthly 
payment of between 25-50 per cent of monthly income. 
This curtails low-income families1 access to credit. In 
Ahwaz, for instance, the low-income families’ share of the 
total loan granted was 21 per cent, compared to 79 per 
cent for middle and high income people Thus low-income 
families had less access to banks’ loans, and so less 
chance of obtaining ULO’s land plots.
b) The applicant's monthly payment must be guaranteed 
by his employer or other official sponsor. In this respect 
the applicant should be preferably a wage or salary
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earner. It helps if the applicant is an employee of the 
government or its agencies, as these categories are more 
likely to be eligible for monthly payment. This implies 
that unemployed low-income families or non government low- 
income employees, were once again denied accessibility to 
housing credit. Consequently it would seem that housing 
policy implementation in Iran is catering for government 
employees who accounted for 77 percent of plots and nearly 
half the homes (Table VII-6). Furthermore, mortgage and 
other housing credit facilities in the country were 
designed for the benefit of those who could get their 
lands and houses from the ULO.
Table VII-6
Land and housing Beneficiaries by Occupation.
Jk ja H d. completed
Occupation Individual Cooperatives houses percent
Unemployed 50 — 17 9.6
Self-employed 43 2 29 10.5
Private employees 14 30 - 6.3
Government employees 193 268 54 73.6
Total sample 300 300 100 100.0
Source: Field work sample by the researcher.
c) The applicant must be under 50 years of age , since he
is required to be able to amortise the whole loan before 
the age of 65, the official retirement age in the country.
An applicant who is over 50 years of age, of low- 
income, or is not a wage or salary earner, requires a 
deposit and guarantor with collateral acceptable to the
banks. The very limited amount of credit available to 
would-be low- income land and housing purchasers or home 
builders therefore contributed powerfully to limiting 
their access to the urban and housing opportunities 
offered by the Urban Land Organization. The proportion of 
the distributed land and housing and loans to people over 
50 years of age was 10 percent and 6 percent
respectively, although this age group represented 16 
percept of the total population of 20 years of age and 
over in Ahwaz.
The criteria and conditions of allocation of plots or 
housing to prospective applicants is summed up in the 
declaration which the ULO requires applicants to sign. It 
reads: "I wish to purchase a freehold plot of land with
the details and conditions set out in this contract...I 
understand and undertake to apply for a building permit 
within three months of its being allocated to me and 
commence building on the plot and complete it within the 
time span of one year; I will not sell the land plot, or 
any part of it in less than 5 years after completion, 
therefore, without the written authority of the ULO. I 
understand that in the events of my not complying with 
these conditions, the allocation may be withdrawn from me 
by the ULO after notice. The withdrawal shall involve no 
legal action by the court, and it will be carried out by 
the ULO itself, (ULO's temporary contract, 1987).
From these conditions, it is clear that a prospective 
beneficiary has to have a fairly strong resource base to 
qualify for allocation. It seems the greater proportion of
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the ULO’s schemes were specifically designed for people
with the ability to pay. This sounds reasonable but
public lands are by definition subsidised and this class 
was very small in relation to the rest of the urban 
population. The middle and high income class for whom over 
75% of the ULO’s schemes were devoted constituted less
than 2/3 of the urban working population of Ahwaz. If the 
criteria for access in the Islamic way of public land 
management and ownership is that of the "highest bidder 
wins” or "ability to pay", then it is not better than
the capitalist market system that it seeks to correct or 
replace.
7.4 Pattern of Distribution.
Given the above conditions, specifications and criteria,
inferences could be made with respect to what type and
what proportion of people could benefit from the ULO’s
land resources. They would in all probability be those
who can afford to pay for them and can afford to develop
them as required- that is, 30-40 percent of the population
that could afford to meet these conditions. At first,
this sounds very reasonable. It makes sense to allocate
lands to those who can afford to pay for them and can
develop such land with a view to providing more housing to
the city, particularly freehold housing for all segments
CM*'
of the urban population. But it is^ inevitable conclusion 
to state that the ULO’s land and housing were not oriented 
in the direction of increasing housing supplies to all 
segments of the population, nor were they oriented to the 
segment where the need was greater. About 50 percent of
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the urban population could not possibly meet the ULO’s 
specifications and criteria for the allocation of most of 
its lands and houses.
Most of the freehold houses built in accordance with 
Article 67 of the Law were relatively high cost and only 
the high and middle income persons could afford to pay for 
them. The ULO explained that "the ULO is pursuing this 
policy in order to increase housing standards and meet 
the continuous housing demand in Iran for those who can 
never be considered for any further subsidised housing 
schemes" (ULO, 1987). Theoretically, poor people can 
apply for subsidised housing, under other government 
institutions', in practice, there was no such a housing 
scheme hitherto. This implies that the middle and upper- 
income groups would have to be provided for first and now, 
whilst the poor, who presumably were certain to be 
subsidised, had to wait. The underlying rationale for 
such reasoning is difficult to understand particularly in 
the Islamic context of social equity in which equity comes 
first and where "the poor have their share in the wealth 
of rich people", (Qur-an, 80:19). Moreover, 50 per cent 
of completed houses in each housing allocation project 
were granted to the contractor for free sale anyway.
The ULO had argued that the short-term (one year) loans 
for their land development (Article 67), were secured from 
the state’s banks and that it was in the interest of the 
contractor who acquired such a loan to dispose of these 
houses as quickly as possible, so as to reduce the 
document (interest), charge and to secure a further deal
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with the ULO (ULO, 1987). The conditions and model of 
payments, for the individual beneficiaries of these 
schemes, were also designed to achieve this quick recovery 
of costs, though within 5 years, which underscores the 
point made earlier that the freehold mode of public land 
distribution favours only the economically strong who are 
able to make heavy down payments.
Thus, during this period (1979-1986), the only housing 
projects designated for low-cost housing by the ULO 
(which is not necessarily synonymous with low-income 
housing) are the Article 67 schemes, or what was called 
'state-private schemes'. These constituted two per cent 
of the ULO's land development during 1982-1986. Although 
these schemes were designated for low-income residents, 
the conditions and criteria for their allocation ensured 
that many of the beneficiaries were not the low-income 
groups. Generally during extreme shortages of housing, 
(as have been perpetually experienced in Ahwaz where all 
economic groups except the very rich suffer from the lack 
of housing), subsidised houses seldom go to those for whom 
they are intended. In this case many middle-class families 
repurchased houses from poorer families who lacked the 
resources to make regular payments on their plots or 
houses or to pay for urban services, even though most of 
these property transfers were illegal under government (the 
ULO regulations).
The ULO outlined in the first years of implementation a 
set of g u i d e l i n e s  for tack l i n g  the close i n t e r ­
relatedness of housing and land as follows:
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a) "it is intended to prepare land for housing the 
homeless population, giving priority to those in lower 
income. Land will be allocated free of charge to those 
who cannot afford to pay the land cost, (this was 
cancelled within the early months of its issue).
b) Private individuals and companies were encouraged to 
invest their excess land or capital for low-cost housing 
construction, (Article 67). It was assumed that this 
scheme would help to provide low-income families with 
access to low-cost housing" (ULO, 1982).
These policies, despite the good intentions, served more 
the upper and middle-income groups with little help to the 
low-income people, which is not surprising because these 
are the groups that make and implement the policies. The 
ULO management seemed therefore, by use of public legal 
instruments, to have been assembling land for the elite 
which they could not assemble for themselves.
The U L O ’s plots, backed as they were by government
instruments, had the best titles in a context where legal
titles to purchased lands are hard to attain. Coupled 
with this is the fact that they sold at less than the 
private real estate market (illegal) prices- the stated 
government policy being ".... to sell government-owned 
building plots at a reserve price of less than 60 percent 
the present market value being fixed" (MHUD, 1980). The
result was a lot of trafficking in ULO' s land, as these 
professionals used their power and influence to obtain 
such lands and re-sell them at enormous profits to
179
themselves. The ULO itself acknowledged that 40 per cent 
of the plots were changing hands before development. Yet 
there is no official record of such land transfer as it 
is illegal.
Table VII-7 shows the sharp difference between the 
prices of land in both public and private markets. Such 
racketeering certainly underscores the criticism of land 
b a n k i n g , to the effect that, "the existence of public 
corporations with broad powers of land acquisition 
r e q u i r e s  a high level of public c o n f i d e n c e  in the
integrity of the civil servants concerned...... And that,
for developing countries, land banking raises serious 
question on civil service incorruptibility on the disposal 
as well as the acquisition side of the process" (Doebele, 
1974: 111). These sales, and these official privileges
that p e r m i t t e d  them, were on lands that had been 
compulsorily (and often forcibly) acquired from their 
owners by the invocation of 'public purpose1 instruments. 
The ULO, appeared helpless in handling such situations, 
even though specific clauses in the covenants stipulated 
that lands received from the ULO could not be transferred 
or sold without the written permission of the ULO.
The ULO was not enthusiastic to investigate the matter 
or to prevent such transfer when plots were not recorded 
officially. After all, the ULO had the power of compulsory 
acquisition: "These facts tend to underscore the point
often made by the opponents of public ownership or 
management of land, to the effect that public ownership or 
management simply personifies the state in a few fallible
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human beings who often use such state powers to enrich 
themselves, leaving the government public interest the 
loser in many cases" (Walters, 1974).
Table VII-7
Price of Land by zone in the ULO and Real Estate market
in Ahwaz 1987. (in rial)
zone Market Price(a) ULO’ s price(b) difference
1 70,000 25,000 45,000
2 40,000 3,500 36,500
3 50,000 3,500 46,500
4 25,000 1 .200 23,800
5 15,000 950 14,050
6 12,000 1150 10,850
7 10.000 850 9,150
8 25,000 2,200 22,800
9 15,000 1,500 13,500
10 1,000 85 915
11 18,000 2,500 15,500
12 2,500 500 2,000
Source: (a) Real Estate Survey by the researcher,
1987. (b) The ULO,s Price Booklet, 1987.
The equity of the process and criteria that exclude a 
great number of people from access to land, simply on the 
grounds of inadequate incomes or imposed standards, 
remained very questionable. This is more so when the 
eventual beneficiaries make fortunes out of the plots by 
manipulation of public instruments or by taking undue 
advantages of the loop-holes in the letter of the law.
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It was not certain that the state had the interests of 
the 'common man' in its urban land and housing policies 
during this period. According to a government statement 
"the government has tended to leave the housing field 
almost wholly to private effort, restricting itself to the 
provision of a limited number of land plots for those who 
can afford them" (MHUD, 1983). Owing to the failure of the 
private sector in providing low and middle class -housing, 
1983 saw i n c r e a s e d ,  though still rather l imited, 
intervention by government in the provision of housing. 
This took the form of the development of fully subsidised 
low-income houses, and a number of middle class housing 
estates, using banks and other government institution 
investment and participation, as well as the introduction 
of interest free bank loans for contractors and builders. 
The government employees1 housing loan scheme was also 
designed to promote owner— occupation by allocating council 
houses to them. Although the government in theory accepted 
social responsibility for providing houses for the masses, 
in practice it did not participate actively in mass 
housing programmes, apart from residential plots schemes 
and Article 67 houses scheme.
Seen, therefore, in the light of the privileges which 
the majority of government employees had for purchasing 
plots at reduced rates, it was not surprising that those 
who had no need for these plots found it possible to 
purchase them nevertheless at a low price and sell or 
transfer them to a member of the public at prices much 
higher than they paid for them. The loans used for 
purchase and constructing, as a matter of policy, cost
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only four per cent (document charge), with no deposit 
requirement, although the latter was vital for non­
government era-p To y-ees to acquire a loan. It is worth 
not i‘n:g t ha t banks in Iran charge different rates on loans 
•grant'e'd t'o di:f:f-eren t -socio-economic groups. The full rate 
-cTiange 'of I'Panian -banking loans' at the time was four per 
-c'ertt f'or :g'Overn-ient - employees, seven per cent for 'martyr' 
d-airt-i-T-ir-e-s, t-en -per -cent for deposit holders and twelve per 
-Ce~n:t .‘fro r 'O' tber --socio-economic groups. This means that 
;g‘o ife'rniire'irt ^employees : and - martyr families' access to ULO 
-Lands *was ^subsidised.
~1 .:5 ULO T_s Land :Bevelopment Programme .
-"Closely rrelated .t o - the question of land supply is the 
-.density ;df housiog ; dev elppmen t .* The lower the density, the 
igreater -.the la.moun t : of _ 1 and needed for a given quantity of 
-housing; iconversely, .the higher the density, the smaller 
-.the iamo.unt -. o‘f land needed. Given the fact that land 
-Eeso-urQes :£or -housing . construction are limited in urban 
^areas, -higher-residential .densities mean more efficient 
use :o‘f .land =as more houses can be constructed. The 
.criteria -.and -conditions for obtaining land from the ULO 
^emphasise -development of owner-occupied single family 
houses. .Apartment development was not encouraged.
Ostensibly , the ULO,was pursuing a policy of improving the 
quality of housing in the densely populated urban areas.
As - oyercrgwding ,was the most serious housing problem, the
ULO might have thought that low density development and 
putting restrictions on occupancy rates was an effective
way to improve housing quality. In a situation of acute
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housing shortage however, improvements in housing standards 
are generally only possible when the production of new
housing has caught up with the housing deficit. Moreover, 
in addition to the physical shortage of housing as such, 
the housing problem is often essentially an income
problem, and one of the major goals of public urban land 
management policy has been to facilitate access to urban 
land and housing for those with income problems.
The U L O ?s conception of land development and its 
appreciation of the problems is best demonstrated in its
land development and houses constructed under Article 67. 
In most of these developments, as already pointed out, the 
middle and high income were the major target groups, by 
virtue of the prices of the land and houses in relation to 
the general income levels. A careful examination of the
type of houses built on the ULO's land under its freehold 
housing schemes, reveals that all the developments were 
semi- detached single- family bungalows, (Plate VII-1). 
These represented about 98 percent of all houses built by 
cooperative settlements and individuals during 1979-1986 
in Ahwaz as well. The cost of houses built by the ULO 
was too high to be afforded by nearly half of the city's 
population- the low-income group.
Public urban land policy is said to make for efficiency 
in land use and management- efficiency in this context 
implying maximum use of the land available without 
increasing environmental dangers. Higher residential 
d e n s i t i e s  could be m i n i m i s e d  w i t h o u t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
endangering the environment. Low densities are not
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Plate VII-1
Type of Houses Built on the ULO's Land Under its Freehold 
Housing Schemes, Keyan Pars, Ahwaz.
185
necessarily synonymous with a good quality environment. 
Greater efficiency in land development and housing units 
production could have been achieved by devoting more land 
to higher density development.
The degree of efficiency involved in ULO’s forms and 
types of development can be inferred from a comparison of 
the ULO1s adopted housing types and residential densities, 
and t#e standard densities (that are obtainable from other 
h o u s i n g  types and c h a r a c t e r s )  for c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  
acceptable aesthetic and environmental qualities. The ULO 
confirms that their freehold houses were developed at low 
densities of 11-16 units per hectare. In the low-cost 
housing blocks constructed by Russia in Ahwaz in 1975, for 
example, each contain four housing units and at about 12 
blocks per hectare, providing about 48 houses units per 
hectare- a difference of at least 30 more housing units 
per hectare in freehold housing schemes. On the basis of 
these comparisons it is possible to calculate the land 
waste or i n e f f i c i e n c y  of the ULO ’ s forms of land 
development which is rendered more poignant by the fact 
that 41 per cent of households in Ahwaz occupied only one 
room in 1986. With the right priorities, one would have 
expected the ULO to emphasise apartment housing rather 
than semi-detached housing types, where such needs and 
demands existed, particularly with the very high average 
room occupancy rate of 3.1 persons per room in the city.
While it is true that s e t ting high c o n s t r u c t i o n  
standards for the housing of the poor in cities may be 
excusable and some time even desirable on human grounds,
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it will inevitably turn out to be mistaken and counter­
productive because the resources do not exist to bring 
those high standards to enough people. The policy would 
succeed only in keeping a high proportion of people from 
even the most basic form of shelter, and ultimately would 
encourage overcrowding and slums. The paradox in the 
housing situation is that quality has been rising at the 
expense of quantity, and, in this situation, the low- 
income people are at a considerable disadvantage.
Land is a scarce resource, argue proponents of public 
ownership of urban land, "whose management should be 
subject to public surveillance or control in the interest 
of the nation” (UN, 1976:62). This, then, should imply 
that public management itself should be economical and 
more efficient in the use or collection of this scarce 
resource. The ULO or any other public agencies' sense of 
priority and appreciation of the prevailing problems in 
developing low density, single-family semi-detached forms 
of housing in a densely populated urban centre such as 
Ahwaz, should therefore, be seriously questioned. In 
order to cope with the situation, public purpose action 
would have been expected to aim at measures to ensure the 
accommodation of the greatest number possible in its land 
and housing distribution programme. This would have 
called for emphasis on apartment type housing in multi­
buildings rather than on low density single family housing 
that tended to waste a great deal of the scarce urban 
land.
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7.6 The ULO * s Land Development and its Implications for 
the Solution of Housing Problems.
The low-density development policy, concentration placed 
on semi-detached houses, coupled with the "home ownership" 
policy, which implied lands and houses should necessarily 
be owned by beneficiaries, were counter-productive for the 
ULO's land management goals and objectives.
This policy was a mis-orientation of priorities and was
wasteful of land for many reasons. Firstly, it inhibited
and minimised the development of multi-family storey
blocks of apartments because the land was divided in such
a way that it did not permit any other alternative house
building. Although multi-family share of a plot of land 
for
was prodUc ed^by the Urban Land Law, it was not practised 
by the ULO at all. By a predominant use of this type of 
land development, the ULO wasted a lot of the lands its 
obtained. Secondly, the policy of "home ownership" was a 
misorientation of priorities because the average Iranian 
urbanite has rural roots and does not consider the city as 
a permanent "home", but rather a place of work which he 
would leave on retirement for his town or village which he 
considers as home. Most people then are satisfied with 
decent rental housing for the period of time they live in 
the city. This is evident from the fact that most migrant 
city dwellers when they have money to build a house, they 
invest such money in building a house in their birth place 
to which they ultimately return. Even then, neither the 
ULO nor the government itself can ever be in the financial 
position to help everyone or even most of the citizens in
188
cities to own a house in the city. It becomes then very 
questionable whether the general tax payers' money should 
be used to help a relatively few people to own houses.
The third reason was that there are always more people 
who require houses for rent and can rent them, than those 
who require them to own and are able to own them. Even 
then, a great majority of the people who needed housing in 
the city could not be in the financial position to fulfil 
the conditions required by the ULO for purchase of its 
houses or plots of land.
The corollary policy of low-density development had the 
effect of making such housing development more costly than 
they would be with alternative (high density) forms of 
development, because low-density development has the 
tendency to be relatively lavish with land, and therefore 
involves spending more for land. Unlike low- density 
developments, in apartment type, for example, more units 
are produced on a given piece of land than otherwise would 
have been occupied by only one family on one housing unit. 
This would distribute the costs of land over many more 
housing units, thus reducing the per unit cost of land, at 
the same time accommodating more families.
The low-density mode of development unnecessarily 
spreads the city over a wider area with consequent dis­
e c o n o m i e s  in the p r o v i s i o n  of n e c e s s a r y  m u n i c i p a l  
services. Such a low density approach would usually call 
for more money to be spent on the construction and 
maintenance of more miles of roads and streets, more miles
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of pipes for water and sewage, larger number of poles and 
greater length of cable for electricity and telephone, 
thus making it more expensive to provide necessary 
services to all the areas as discussed in chapter eight.
7.7 Conclusion
The conditions and criteria of the ULO ' s land and 
housing allocations restricted accessibility to the 
general population. They did not encourage substantial 
production of housing which the situation called for at 
the time. The U L O 1s emphasis was unduly oriented in 
favour of the ’middle and upper income groups’, who could 
afford to pay the ULO' s prices, and meet the development 
requirements. Considering the very high cost of the land 
preparation and servicing which had to be reflected in 
the sale price of the U L O 's land, and considering the 
general income levels and distribution structure, the 
ULO ’ s land management and development practices were not 
favourable to the overwhelming majority of the urban 
population who were low-income and had limited access, if 
any, to credit facilities.
Although the ULO had made some important contributions, 
it was, however, not w i thout s u b s t a n t i a l  costs in 
resources, efficiency and equity. The unintended negative 
effects of its activities, sometimes to a great extent 
adversely affected the very goals it was striving to 
achieve. Where the ULO directly constructed housing, the 
emphasis, was on very low density sing1e- fami 1y type 
houses. Obviously, these low density developments under
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the acute urban land and housing shortages in the urban 
centres are considered uneconomical and limiting to the 
policy of providing housing to those in greater need.
In this respect, therefore, one could say that the ULOTs 
management of urban land curtailed the supply of urban 
land as much, if not more, than the private land market, 
and if public authorities acquire most of the attractive 
land, and do not offer land to all groups which 
desperately need them, the Islamic management of land may 
tend to create an extra pressure of demand in the context 
of the lack of a legal land market. This implies that 
public authorities could create or exacerbate urban land 
problems by such actions rather than solve them.
It could also be said that the U L O 1 s mode of land 
development and housing production aided congestion and 
environmental deterioration. This resulted from the ULO 
acquiring large tracts of land, but producing a very 
limited number of housing units from them. This meant 
withdrawing housing land from the already tight urban land 
market and thereby forestalling whatever might have been 
produced by the private market system, if such lands were 
not pre-empted by the ULO.
Furthermore, given the condition of qualifying for land 
purchase and its development or article 67 houses and 
their high costs, land and housing were only accessible to 
a very small proportion of the population, and this small 
proportion was not the strata of the population where the 
quantitative demand was most acute. The result was that
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many more people crowded into existing units, thus 
i n c r e a s i n g  the p o t e n t i a l s  for " s l u m i f i c a t i o n "  and 
environmental deterioration of the city - the "evils" 
which the policy and the ULO itself was initially created 
to remedy. In this sense, the paradox that "the best can 
be an enemy of the good" could be said to have been true 
with the U L O ’s predominant form and standard of land 
development.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ACCESS TO ULO's LAND AND HOUSING IN AHWAZ
8.1 Introduction
T here are many ways and means by which housing 
facilities are made accessible to people. In this study, 
particular attention is given to the accessibility of 
urban land for h o u s i n g  the lower income groups. 
Accessibility to housing is here considered in terms of 
a c c e s s i b i l i t y  to land plots, funding and dwel l i n g  
construction components such as building materials, 
technical help and overall services.
In this study housing and its surrounding environment 
provide the best evidence of whether an urban land policy 
is working. In fact, "it (housing) provides the best 
evidence of whether a society is working.", (McAuslan, 
1987:124). In the other words, the prime objective of any 
effective policy to support low-income families is a land 
policy which ensure that their land needs and community 
requirements are met. As such, it is considered important 
that the people have access not only to housing, but 
housing with the necessary amenities such as water, 
electricity, and community services. Access to housing is 
related to questions of location of dwellings, tenureship 
and amenities available for the people living in that 
particular area. It is thus against this background that 
the impact of urban land policy in Iran is evaluated.
This chapter is divided into three major sections: 
household’s composition and socio-economic characteristics
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and their effects on accessibility to land and housing; 
method of housing constructions; and neighbourhood 
characteristics and effects on beneficiaries' level of 
satisfaction.
The first section is concerned with the socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics of the households and 
implications for the accessibility to land and housing 
distribution. This includes respondents' period of 
residence in the city, household size and structure, 
occupation and income. The respondents' accessibility
to land and houses in terms of price, time and location 
are also studied. The second section considers the method 
used by respondents in constructing dwellings and the role 
of the g o v e r n m e n t  in e n c o u r a g i n g  such a housing 
construction strategy. This includes funding, provision of 
building materials, services and technical help. The 
final section deals with availability of facilities, 
access to essential services and the conditions and 
characteristics of the immediate neighbourhood surrounding 
the respondent's dwelling. This section will be followed 
by the overall levels of satisfaction.
8.2 Beneficiaries* Demographic, Socio-economic Characte­
ristics and Length of Residence in the City.
Theoretically, ULO1s lands are accessible to all groups 
of society. In practice however, many qualifications (such 
as demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
respondents), affected accessibility to land. The land 
distribution and housing policy was aimed at providing
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re c e i v i n g  C o o p e r a t i v e  form and the r e m a i n i n g  100 
households received completed houses. The individual 
method served the greatest population (50.7%), over a 
third lived on Cooperatives, but only a few (9.4%) were 
accommodated by article 57. Thus, only a few houses 
serving a very small section of the population were 
provided, although they represented a high proportion of 
the available funds. Government housing construction 
(under article 57), does not seem a viable solution to 
housing problems.
The relatively low proportion of people in cooperatives 
means that they gave more access to salary earners of 
public and private institutions regardless of their family 
size. This is contrary to the U L O 's distribution policy 
which emphasises serving greater number of people, and 
shows that it clearly undermined its own procedures to 
favour small families by stating that
Table VIII-1 
Household Size by Subsample
Individs. Coops. Art. 67 1  o t a_ 1.
H.H No % No % No % S. No % Ahz . * %
- 5 93 31.0 173 57.3 25 25 290 41 .5 37,564 36.6
5-10 178 59.3 120 40.3 75 75 374 53.4 57 ,897 56.5
10 + 29. ±.J_ 7. 2.4 - 36 5.1 7,005 6.9
Total 300 100 300 100 100 100 700 100 102,466 100
% 42.9 42.9 14.2
Pop . 1722 135 317 3393 580728
% 50.7 39.9 9.4 100 100
* Ahz = Actual number of households in Ahwaz
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building plots and houses to reach a greater section of 
the population. The intended beneficiaries were people 
with large families of lower income and who had a long 
period of residence (more than 5 years). It will thus be 
important to find out if the ULO has been able to reach 
the targeted groups of population.
8.2.1 Household Size and Structure
Nearly three-quarters of our study population are 
nuclear families; the remainder are extended families. 
Larger families have priority in access to land and 
housing. In theory applicants with a large number of 
family members have quicker access to land. In reality, 
however, 42% of households were small (1-4 persons, while 
the national average size is 5 persons); and they made up 
57% of cooperatives' beneficiaries (Table VIII- 1). In 
general individuals receiving land were found to have a 
larger average household size than the other two types of 
land distribution. This may be explained by the fact that 
more family resources are required for the acquisition of 
land and to construct a house, which is easier for larger 
families.
Land and housing were distributed by three methods, 
the Individual, Cooperative and under Article 67. The 
number of plots and houses distributed as well as the 
number and size of households served differed between the 
three. All sample households got one plot regardless of 
the size of the household. Of the total sample (700), 300 
households received land by Individual method, 300
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r e c e i v i n g  C o o p e r a t i v e  form and the r e m a i n i n g  100 
households received completed houses. The individual 
method served the greatest population (50.7%), over a 
third lived on Cooperatives, but only a few (9.4%) were 
accommodated by article 67. Thus, only a few houses 
serving a very small section of the population were 
provided, although they represented a high proportion of 
the available funds. Government housing construction 
(under article 67), does not seem a viable solution to 
housing problems.
The relatively low proportion of people in cooperatives 
means that they gave more access to salary earners of 
public and private institutions regardless of their family 
size. This is contrary to the ULO's distribution policy 
which emphasises serving greater number of people, and 
shows that it clearly undermined its own procedures to 
favour small families by stating that
Table VIII-1 
Household Size by Subsample
Individs. Coops. Art. 67 I o t a_ .1
H.H No % No % No % S. No % Ahz . * %
- 5 93 31.0 173 57.3 25 25 290 41.5 37,564 36.6
5-10 178 59.3 120 40.3 75 75 374 53.4 57,897 56.5
10 + 29_ 1_ 2.4 - 36 5.1 7,005 6.9
Total 300 100 300 100 100 100 700 100 102,466 10 0
% 42.9 42.9 14.2
Pop. 1722 135 317 3393 580728
% 50.7 39.9 9.4 100 100
* Ahz = Actual number of households in Ahwaz «
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the cooperative settlements are more eligible for land 
development and service provision.
Nearly two-thirds of the respondents were middle-aged, 
between 30 and 49 years of age; with 10 percent being over 
50 years old; less than a fifth were under 29 years. The 
relatively low proportion of comparatively elderly people 
in the sample reflects the banks' criteria for granting 
loans which discriminate against them and in effect 
curtails their accessibility to urban land, (Fig. VIII-1).
Fig. VIII-1 
Loan Distribution by Age Groups in Ahwaz
17.40
■  20-29 
E2 30-39 
M  40-49 
E2 50+
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There are major differences between the distribution of 
the beneficiaries' ages and that of the local and 
national total population (Table VIII-2).
Table VIII-2
Beneficiaries' Access to Loan by Age Groups in Ahwaz.
Age Groups National(%) Local(%) Sample(%) Loans(no,■ ) (%)
20-29 20.30 24.45 16.4 98 17.4
30-39 28.91 29.53 60.0 344 61.3
40-49 17.96 18.10 13.4 74 13.1
50+ 32.82 27.92 10.2 45. 8.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 561 100.0
The concentration of beneficiaries between 30-39 years 
(60%), in the sample can be explained by the fact that the 
majority were government employees. These age groups which 
are more likely to struggle to get their own houses. Those 
below 30 years, are relatively young and under not so much 
pressure to look for housing. The size of their family is 
likely to be sm a l l e r  and with less ca p i t a l  for 
investments. In this aspect then, the ULO can be said to 
have achieved its aim of aiding a target population, 
those of middle age with larger families and with higher 
need for shelter.
8.2.2 Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents.
Education levels are likely to correspond with income 
groups, higher education levels linked with higher
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income groups. If this is true for Iran, the study area and 
the sample population, then there is a danger that the 
poor people as a target group will be missed.
Cross tabulation of education levels by income of the 
ULO ' s beneficiaries revealed that the poor are more 
heavily represented among those with no education and low 
levels of formal education, more than two thirds (69.5%) 
of the poor are those with jUtfle- formal or no education 
(Table VIII-3). Those with a greater level of education 
have higher income, thus, if the ULO is going to favour 
those with education, the poor people are likely to be at 
a disadvantage as many of them have no education, and 
those with education, their levels are very low. The 
results of the survey show that more than two third of 
those who got land or housing were those with formal or 
higher education, the remainder of beneficiaries having 
only informal education or no education at all. This 
further confirms the fact that those with education and 
higher incomes are the ones who benefited from the land 
and housing policy, and only to some extent those with 
lower education and incomes.
As already stated, the majority of the respondents 
(73.5%) were government employees. Only a few (9.6%) of 
the respondents were unemployed with the remainder (16.9) 
were non- government employees (Table_4). Beneficiaries' 
accessibility to ULO’s land and housing distribution was 
different between those employed and non-employed, as well 
as between the different groups of working population. 
People in employment had most access. While 90 percent of
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the sample were employed and had access to land and 
housing, the actual city's employed population was less 
than fifty percent of all working classes. The remaining 
unemployed respondents were highly disadvantaged by the 
land and housing distribution. It is clear that the land
Table VIII-3 
Education Levels by Income (%)
Income Level T £ t £  1
Education: Low Middle High NA No. (%)
Illiterate 32.9 15.4 2.0 130 18.6
Formal Ed. 36.6 37.6 12.5 246 35.1
High Ed. 29.8 46.5 85.4 313 44.7
N_A 0.6 0.4 0.0 45 11 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 700 100.0
N o . (161) (473) 1481 .(18)
and housing distribution serves the employed population 
more, and only to a minor degree the unemployed. This 
arises from the fact that access to land and housing is 
facilitated by accessibility to bank credit. The employed 
people have greater accessibility to such credits, giving 
them a correspondingly higher level of accessibility to 
land and housing (Table VIII-4).
The land and housing distribution policy aimed at 
serving low-income groups more. So far, supplementary 
measures such as education and occupation have been used 
to evaluate whether this goal has been achieved. In this 
study, income groups have been divided into three: low-
income, consisting of individuals earning below 50,000
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Table VIII-4 
Access to Resources by Occupational Status 
Actual (%) Sample Access (%)
Sectors: Ahwaz Land + House Loan
Government 26.0 73.5 82.2
Private 11.8 6.3 5.8
Self-employed 29.7 10.6 7.5
Unemployed 32.5 9.6 4.5
Total No. 260651 700 561
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.
rials, the middle-income group earning between 50,000-
100.000 rials, and the high-income group earning above
100.000 rials per month. Of the total respondents, 23 
percent were in the low-income group, 67.6 percent in the 
middle income group and 6.9 percent in the high-income 
group. As the sample of respondents is taken from those
who had b e n e f i t e d  from the U L O ’s land and housing 
distribution, it is very obvious that the middle-income 
group benefited from this policy much more than any of the 
other groups. This was due to the fact that the 
government employees were mostly of the middle-income 
group, they had more accessible to information on land
and housing distribution, and could qualify easily for 
bank credit. They could use their status as a government 
employee in the organization and acquisition of land and 
houses. It is thus not surprising that the government 
employees who mostly fall in the middle income group were 
dominant recipients of the land and housing policy in 
Iran, and in particular the study area of Ahwaz. Those of 
low-income were the most disadvantaged in this land and
2 0 1
housing distribution policy, a policy intended to serve
them to the greater degree. The low-income category
constitute a majority (47.8%) of the total population of 
fficy rcpirSt-vi-kd
Ahwaz, but .only 23 percent of them had access to the land
, m This
and housing distributed^. Thus, the intended target group
to benefit from the land and housing policy in Iran was 
missed. The same trend also prevailed in all types of 
land and housing distribution systems, all favouring the 
middle-class, while this class represents only 42 percent 
of the actual population of (twenty years of age and over)
in the city (Table VIII-5).
Table VIII-5
Land Accessibility by Income Groups in Ahwaz
Income Groups: Individuals Coops. Art. 67 Total Ahz (%)
Low 23.0 28.0 8.0 161 47.8
Middle 61.0 70.3 79.0 473 42.2
High 12.0 1.7 7.0 48 10.0
Na 4.0 0.0 6.0 18 _
Total No. 300 300 100 700 102466
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
Although the high-income group seems to be the most
disadvantaged as regards accessibility to land and housing 
distribution, in reality this is not the case. This group 
consisting only a very minor section of the population. 
In addition to this, the high-income group, had several 
other options of obtaining land and housing informally, 
besides the legal ways. They can use their money to 
purchase land or houses from the poorer section of the
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population who may be able to acquire the land legally but 
may not have the ability to develop it. They thus 
exchange the land unofficially. During 1982-86, forty 
percent of the distributed land plots in Ahwaz changed 
hands illegally before being developed (ULO, 1986). The 
people with high-income can also use their wealth to 
corrupt the whole system in acquiring land and housing, or 
to purchase houses from contractors.
8.2.3 Length of Residence in the City.
In theory, ULO's land and housing are accessible only 
to applicants who have resided more than five years in the 
particular city. In practice, however, while it was found 
that the majority of responses (78.4%), were from people 
who have resided in the city for more than 5 years, it was 
noted that more recent migrants have not totally been 
excluded as the policy stipulated, as a relatively high 
percent (21.6%), of the recipients were recent migrants. 
This possibly arises from the fact that, for example, 
government employees qualify after only one year's 
residence. This, encouraged some government employees who 
were not in urgent need of land or housing to migrate and 
apply for help as they sought to benefit from the policy 
(Table VIII-6).
The high proportion of state employees is reflected in 
the levels of education attained. People with education 
have greater access to information and opportunities and 
have higher expectations of housing. Such people could 
quickly see the alternative opportunities available in
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Table VIII-6 
Length of Residence
Sectors: 1-5 years 5 years+ Total (%)
Government
Private
Self-Employed
Unemployed
No.
(%)
21.9 (113/515)
15.9 (7/44)
23.0 (17/74)
20.9 (14/67)
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21.6
78.1 (402/515) 100.0
84.1 (37/44) 100.0
77.0 (57/74) 100.0
79. 1 (53/67) 100.0
549 700
78.4 100.0
other places. They can also move easily to places where 
new opportunities are found. There was no significant 
relationship between employment and migration, although 
the latter was related to literacy and migrants as a whole 
had lower degrees of literacy.
It is known that recent m i g r a n t s  are 
disproportionately poor. They work in the 'informal 
sector' while waiting for a prize job in the organised or 
formal sector. Among the poor population in Ahwaz, only 15 
percent have been there for less than five years. The 
majority of the poor in the city have been there long 
enough to qualify for land allocation. Poverty is clearly 
not a characteristic of only recent migrants; it is truer 
to say that it is widespread among the population, and is 
even greater amongst those who have lived in Ahwaz for 
many years. Only a sixth of short term residents were 
classified as such compared to a quarter of the rest.
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Migration into Ahwaz corresponds to three periods: 
first natural migration promoted by the economic boom of 
the country in 1973-77; then the revolutionary movement of 
1978-79 which has resulted in the victory of the Islamic 
revolution in 1979 . The gap between the collapse of the 
old regime and the takeover of power by the revolutionary 
government was dominated by a very chaotic situation 
whereby many people flocked to the urban centres. There 
was use of propaganda indicating that people could obtain 
decent houses in urban centres. Finally there was an 
exodus of migrants fleeing from the Iran-Iraq war during 
1980-1988. The p r o p o r t i o n  of war m i g r a n t s  was 
considerable. According to those who designated urban 
land policy, this policy was not meant to encourage 
m i g r a t i o n  to urban centres, rather s t a b i l i s e  the 
population movements. However, housing research in Iran 
has indicated that recent migrants constitute a high 
proportion of land and housing applicants in urban areas. 
Their main motive for migrating to such urban areas was to 
get cheap land or access to shelter and employment after 
the war (Thabeti, 1985).
8.3 Accessibility to Land in Terms of Time Span
The period of land acquisition in this study is 
defined as that spanning from the date first contact was 
made with the ULO to the date when a temporary land title 
was o b t a ined. The o v e r w h e l m i n g  m a j o r i t y  of the 
beneficiaries spent more than six months, of whom a third 
waited more than 18 months before receiving land. Only 
four percent of the beneficiaries waited less than six
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months for the land acquisition process. The results 
reveal that a high proportion of these quick receivers of 
land had acquired their land prior to 1982. This short 
period of acquisition is explained partly by two factors: 
the first factor is the non-existence of the bureaucratic 
practices that normally accompany land acquisition (prior 
to 1982), and that the Housing Foundation and the ULDOs 
began distribution of land immediately after acquisition, 
regardless of the transition of the legal title. This 
quick release of land led to a sufficient supply of land 
in 1979-80. A further factor which may have shortened 
the period of acquisition was that government employees 
could easily and quickly provide the ULO with the required 
documents. These documents may not be available for other 
occupational groups, which caused a longer waiting time 
while ULO checked the applicants’ authenticity through 
direct local investigations.
After about 1980, the demand for land exceeded the 
amount of a v a i l a b l e  land mai n l y  be c a u s e  of the 
a b a n d o n m e n t  of the UWLOAL. Mor e o v e r ,  there were 
significant increases in land prices in Ahwaz after 1982. 
This arose because of government influence on compulsory 
acquisitions, which restricted the possibilities of the 
ULO to provide land at cheap prices. The implication of 
these increased prices for low-income families was lower 
access to land under ULO management. They were also 
further disadvantaged in obtaining loans from financial 
institutions to finance their building operations. Even 
though there are no ’official' rules making an applicants’ 
occupation a vital factor in determining his eligibility
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to own a public plot, examination of information on 
beneficiaries' occupation shows that senior civil 
servants and other government employees, such as senior 
army personnel, medical and university staff, stood a 
better chance of securing loans from the financial 
institutions than any other group of people. It is 
obvious that under the management of the ULO accessibility 
is heavily weighted in favour of the rich and influential 
government bodies.
The results of this study do not suggest that there were 
any conscious efforts on the part of the ULO or the 
policy-maker to ensure accessibility to land, housing and 
loan for its targeted population the low-income group. The 
dominating presence of government employees is evidence 
that this group, which could obtain financial support, was 
more successful than the targeted group, the poor, who 
failed due to their limited access to finance and credit.
8.4 Evaluation of the Method of Housing Development
This s e c t i o n  will focus on an e v a l u a t i o n  of 
beneficiaries' housing construction generated by the 
urban land policy. In order to assess to what extent this 
approach which, is typical of self-help, met the needs, 
expectations and preferences of the persons involved, a 
comparison of the cost of a completed unit and its value 
on the free market is attempted.
The construction cost of a dwelling on the ULO' s land 
was relatively low. Exact figures are hard to find owing
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to the fact that few beneficiaries kept account of 
e x p e n d i t u r e  on their house c o n s t r u c t i o n .  Figures 
representing their outlays are therefore not very 
accurate. However, a quantity survey check on a sample of 
35 dwelling units showed that the quoted values are 
reliable approximations. The results revealed that two 
thirds of the houses cost less than four million rials to 
construct, while 42% were less than two million rials. 
Very few (5.5%) of the houses cost more than eight million 
rials.
These prices differ substantially from the real value 
of the houses after construction (Fig. VIII-2). These 
difference in prices reflected the fact that the building 
plots and building materials were obtained at much below 
market prices from the government. This means that the 
beneficiaries of the policy have benefited in real 
monetary returns as well as from the social satisfaction 
of ownership.
Costs (and relative costs) should be seen in the light 
of the differences in taste, building design and access to 
ca p i t a l  which all i n f l u e n c e  the final and actual 
construction costs incurred by self-help construetion. 
One important issue therefore, is the extent to which 
variation in these factors influences attitudes towards 
the self- help approach. Land and housing in Ahwaz has 
been d i s t r i b u t e d  in 12 main areas, a l t h o u g h  most 
beneficiaries (45.5%) were located in Golestan. There is 
a considerable range in the costs of construction at
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Fig. V III-2  
C om parison  of C onstruction  Cos ts and  
M arket Va lue o f  D w ellings  in A hw az.
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different areas as well as within one area. For example 
in Golestan, more than one-third of constructed houses 
cost less than two million rials, less than the market 
price of a plot of land. High cost houses were found and 
accounted for over one-third of the houses built. The 
variation of' costs in this particular site could be 
attributed to its physical characteristics and location. 
Unlike many others, Golestan was designated by the 
Ahwaz' s Master Plan of 1976 as a preservation area for 
future urban development, particularly industry. Major
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heavy industries such as pipe construction and iron and 
steel, the main hospital in the city and the University 
of Ahwaz, as well as other major government institutions 
are located here. Prior to the urban land policy of 1979, 
few people could afford to buy land for housing 
construction in this area. In the process of policy 
implementation and acquisition of land, the demand for
Golestan land has increased due to proximity to the
workplace, a factor which has attracted government
e m p l o y e e s .  The high p r o p o r t i o n  of cheap houses in 
juxtaposition with more expensive housing reflects the
presence of industrial labourers and government clerks.
In Ahwaz as a whole, the m a j o r i t y  (70.4%) of 
beneficiaries expressed a preference for the self-managed 
construction approach over purchasing a completed unit. 
The preference among income groups varied. Respondents 
with more access to financial resources and able to build 
more e l a b o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e s  were s k e p t i c a l  of s e l f ­
management and preferred to buy a completed unit. The 
reverse was true for those with less access to financial 
resources. The data confirmed a feature that is quite 
evident from the pattern of housing demand in Iranian 
urban areas. The very poor are more often willing to 
build their own houses when the opportunity arises, while 
those with better incomes are less inclined to do so. 
Thus high preference among low-income groups might be due 
to the fact that with little savings or less access to 
institutional finance they could purchase a limited 
amount of b u i l d i n g  m a t e r i a l s  from the g o v e r n m e n t .  
Nevertheless, after the basic unit was constructed and the
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'completion certificate" (which is not necessarily 
associated with final completion of the dwelling), had 
been issued by the municipality, the beneficiary could 
receive the legal title of the developed land. The owner 
may extend his dwelling over a long period of time as 
money becomes available. While this method of construction 
aids the beneficiaries and compensates for their lack of 
capital, it also means that the land is developed and a 
house is erected, although it is difficult to tell when a 
house has actually been completed.
The data also confirm that the selection process 
involved in land distribution has failed to exclude 
p e rsons with r e s o u r c e s  e x c e e d i n g  the e l i g i b i l i t y  
stipulation. The fact that these individuals with more 
access to financial resources entered the schemes is 
itself an indication of the inadequate market supply of 
moderate income housing in Iran and of the high market 
prices of housing in comparison to that constructed on 
the ULO’s land.
The results point clearly to the fact that the majority 
of the beneficiaries either had or developed a positive 
approach to developing low-cost housing through self- help 
construction. There were significant differences found 
among the stated reasons for these positive opinions 
according to income. In the case of the low-income group, 
the cost factor was predominant (90.7%), for the middle- 
income group this factor was also dominant (67.0%) but the 
high-income group considered the factor of flexibility in 
adjusting the construction design to individual tastes
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more important.
8.4.1 Provision of Technical Services
In order to achieve an acceptable level of housing in 
terms of the building code, self-managed construction 
might demand a substantial level of technical assistance, 
particularly since many of the beneficiaries had neither 
building nor related skills, nor building experience, and 
lacked adequate resources in most cases to hire skilled 
labour. Despite this, 57.9 percent of the beneficiaries 
r e s p o n d e d  that they did not r e c eive any tec h n i c a l  
assistance from the housing authorities. The remainder 
felt that the assistance given was not adequate. Nearly 14 
percent (13.7%) of these beneficiaries acknowledged that 
they had received only a ready made site-plan from the 
Housing Foundation, which they had adopted to the size of 
the land plots obtained from the Urban Land Organization.
These findings reflected both poor overall contribution 
by land and housing authorities to site management and a 
breakdown of communication between beneficiaries and the 
ULO that often r e s u l t e d  in open c o n f l i c t  between 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s .  This was due to the fact that 
beneficiaries began construction on each others plots as 
they had no knowledge of map reading.
Beneficiaries were also asked to indicate what problems 
they experienced in completing the construction of their 
houses, which was used to determine the degree to which 
it may i n d i c a t e  or s u g gest d e f i c i e n c i e s  in site
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management. Most beneficiaries indicated more than one 
problem. Although the appearance and finish of houses in 
Keyan Pars, Koyeh Mellat and Korush sites (Fig. VIIX-3), 
are superior to those at other sites, the beneficiaries in 
these sites have complained more about poor workmanship. 
This was partly due to the fact that their standards of 
acceptable workmanship were much higher, judging from the 
more sophisticated building designs attempted.
Financing is usually a problem for low-income families 
with a taste for elaborate housing designs modelled on 
middle class housing. Some beneficiaries spent beyond 
their means while others had cash flow problem due to 
unstable, uncertain and unpredictable incomes. Others were 
simply victims of poor financial planning and management 
due to limited experience and lack of access to expertise. 
Most beneficiaries (63.0%) experienced construction delays 
on all sites due to different difficulties in addition to 
finance problems.
Finance for house construction in Ahwaz was principally 
acquired from state banks in the form of loans. The 
majority (80.6%) of the beneficiaries have acquired a loan 
from the state banks, the remainder have no loan at all. 
Of this eighty percent, the majority (57.1%) are of middle 
income, as the majority of those who got land were from 
this group. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the data 
it is not possible to clarify whether the 19.4 percent who 
did not have loan were rejected or did not apply. The 
non-salaried are normally excluded from loans possibly 
because the bank has no records of their incomes.
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Nevertheless, income is not the only criterion, a person's 
position in job and his influence play a part.
Another implication of the low proportion of loans among 
the low-income beneficiaries could be attributed to the 
fact that having a title of land secure enough to enable 
them to proceed with the construction of their houses at 
their own pace meant that they did not feel the need to 
take the risk of high loan charges. Theoretically, Iranian 
banks, according to interest-free banking policy do not 
charge loan-interest. However in practice the charges on 
housing loans are very high and at times exceed the 
original loan, only that they do not indicate this charge 
as interest but as the civil partnership (Musharekatt 
Madani).
House ownership gives beneficiaries a sense of 
f i n a n c i a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  Nearly 12 percent of the 
beneficiaries sub-let part of their dwellings in order to 
overcome family budget deficits. The sense of independence 
was also evident from their reasons given for building 
their houses. Home ownership was considered as the main 
motive for house building as reported by more than two- 
thirds (67.7%) of the respondents. Other motives such as 
privacy and space were rather less frequently reported and 
comprised 17.2 and 10.9 percent respectively.
Given the high degree of hired labour used during the 
self-managed construction process, and the financial 
problems experienced by nearly one-quarter of respondents, 
there is a need to provide both training and adequate
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advisory services in the areas of building and financial 
planning and management to assist the prospective home­
owners in the self- management process.
TK*
Lack of water supply for^ construction process was 
another dominant factor curtailing housing construction. 
This affected 15.1 percent of the beneficiaries. The 
beneficiaries had no alternative but to buy a water tank 
and pay for an expensive supply sold by car tankers (Plate 
VIII-1).
Theft of building materials was a common problem 
particularly in the early stages of construction before 
many beneficiaries moved into their dwellings, (reported 
by 11.6% of the sample). This phenomenon prevailed more 
in the areas where the majority of beneficiaries were of 
upper income (Keyan Pars, Karun, Kurush, Deghagheleh and 
Golestan sites). These people could provide themselves 
with materials quickly by means of influence or purchase, 
and the poor may have found it as a good source for their 
urgent needs. Theft can be explained by the shortage of 
materials which forms the major complaint reported by one 
third of respondents. Some materials, such as iron 
girders which are scarce, expensive and fundamental for 
roofing, are imported due to the destruction of iron and 
steel mills during the war. Constructors have to wait 
m o n t h s  in queue to qu a l i f y  for the p u r c h a s e  of a 
government defined amount of iron. This would seem to 
suggest the need for tighter security on the sites in 
order to reduce the theft problem.
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Plate VIII-1
Water Tanks Erected on Top of Dwellings to Overcome the 
Lack of Water Supply, Padad, Ahwaz.
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The methodology developed for the self-help approach to 
low-cost housing in Iran gave beneficiaries the freedom to 
occupy their dwelling before construction was completed in 
order to reduce the amount spent on rental of alternative 
accommodation while costs were being incurred for 
construction. Over sixty percent of the beneficiaries 
actually moved into their dwellings before construction 
was completed. The housing development methodology in 
Iran, had also e n c o u r a g e d  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  to work 
collectively on construction tasks on a co-operatives 
basis.
The development methodology provided for a flexible plan 
of building design which allowed beneficiaries to develop 
their own styles within a standard building layout. The 
majority of the beneficiaries (68.2% of Individuals and 
C o o p e r a t i v e s )  a d m i t t e d  that they have built their 
dwellings according to their own tastes, while a majority 
of the beneficiaries of article 67 expressed contrary 
views. The government’s approach to completed houses was 
not flexible enough to allow for individual preferences, 
being planned more on the basis of cost factors than in 
relation to the dwellers' culture and taste, though the 
cost was also high.
Most beneficiaries hired masons and unskilled labour for 
carrying out the labour tasks in the building process 
rather than build for themselves. Only a very small 
proportion of the beneficiaries were able to carry on the 
construction with a mason but without hired labour. This 
can be e x p l a i n e d  partly by a much lower level of
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unemployment than expected among beneficiaries.
Most beneficiaries did not have building or related 
skills. Thus, the building operations were usually 
entrusted to small scale builders (locally called Ban-na - 
masons), rather than incorporated building construction
firms. A majority of masons are illiterate or, at best
have only primary school education, and learned their 
skills of building construction on the job as apprentices. 
They have no machinery of their own, and in many cases, do 
not use any form of mechanisation in their work. Their
lack of education means that they have little knowledge of 
the t e c h n o l o g y  of b u i l d i n g  c o n s t r u c t i o n  (such as 
calculation of stress in buildings etc.). This may 
explain the high levels of destruction caused by the 
recent e a r t h q u a k e  in Iran. N e v e r t h e 1 e s s , they can 
c o n s t r u c t  simple bu i l d i n g s ,  such as single storey 
residential premises where there is no need for high 
technology, very successfully. They are widely employed 
for residential building operations throughout the country 
be c a u s e  of the c o m p e t i t i v e  prices they offer. 
Incorporated building construction firms' activities are 
devoted to government buildings, state's large scale
projects and to some extent to the construction of 
private cooperative settlements' houses.
As expected, the majority of the dwellings were 
constructed comparatively cheaply with 76 percent consting 
less than 4 million rials. This was undoubtedly 
influenced by the high proportion of family labour 
utilised, wither in conjunction with a traditional mason 
(44 percent) or hired labour (34 percent). Surprisingly,
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contractors were equally likely to be hired for cheaper or 
more expensive dwellings but only 15 percent of the sample 
used their services. There was a significant difference 
between the type of labour used according to the cost of 
the dwelling. Masons were involved in half the cheaper 
houses as opposed to less than a quarter of the more 
expensive (Table VIII-7), a far greater proportion of 
contractors and rather more hired labourers were utilised 
in the latter.
Table VIII-7 
Cost of Construction by Type of Labour
Cost
(million) 
rials
Contrac- Mason+ 
tor Family
Hired Labour 
Family Alone n
-4 mill. 
4 mill.+
10. 1
32.2
50.5
23.0
32.4
39.9
7.0
4.9
457 
1 43
1 00  
100
Total (92) (264) (205) (39) (600)
An explanation for these differences was sought in the 
levels of education and occupations of the households but 
there w as no significant relationship between either 
education or occupation and the choice of class of 
builder. This might be due to the fact that a number of 
residents spent more on housing construction than their 
regular income would suggest. Less than half of the 
respondents stated that the loan constituted more than 75 
percent of their dwellings' construcruction costs.
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majority (53%) have reported that the acquired loan 
constituted either 25-75 percent (32.9%), or less than 25 
percent (19.7%) of the dwelling construction costs.
The rate of inflation in the country had an impact on 
the construction industry, as the labour rate charged was 
in most cases higher than that prescribed by the Labour 
Ministry. In a more vibrant economic climate with a higher 
market demand for building skills, labour supply and 
labour costs may have posed some p r o b l e m s  for the 
beneficiaries.
Most of the beneficiaries also contributed their own 
labour to the construction process, but this labour was in 
all instances supplemented by the hiring of skilled 
artisan labour such as carpenters, masons, plumbers, 
electricians and in a few instances, contractors. The 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r ocess was t h e r e f o r e  s e l f - m a n a g e d  
construction, rather than self-built. This would seem to 
correspond closely to the viewpoint held by Perlman (1976) 
who has pointed out in much of her work on the informal 
sector, that self-help is a survival strategy based on the 
widest possible freedom of choice to allocate scarce time 
and resources.
A num b e r  of p r o b l e m s  r e l ated to the i m m e d i a t e  
environment surrounding the respondents’ residence were 
observed. In most of the sites there was no paved street. 
More than half of the beneficiaries (54%) perceived the 
streets in their neighbourhoods to be in poor condition 
and c o v e r e d  with mud and waste water. S i g n i f i c a n t
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differences were found between different neighbourhoods. 
Nearly three quarter of the respondents in Padad, Akher 
Asfalt, Shelang Abad, and Se-rah indicated that the 
neighbourhood condition were poor, compared to Keyan Pars, 
Koyeh Mellat, Kurusk and Koyek Enghelab. This might be 
attributed to the bad location (out of the city serviced 
limit), which affected the provision of services in the 
light of their high cost.
Some residents park their cars or tie their animals in a 
reckless manner, regardless of the width or importance of 
the street. It is not uncommon to see "trUcKs blocking the 
street. Consequently the streets in these areas are 
appropriated by individuals and their property (t^ ttcks and 
animals) rather than being public space (Plates 2 & 3).
At the time of our inspection in the study areas most of 
the children's activities occurred on the street or on 
vacant lots in the neighbourhood. Most of these areas are 
unsuitable due to the fact that they are prone to 
accidents, or are unhealthy places. The survey revealed 
that one of the major complains was the lack of school, 
recreational facilities and playgrounds for children. 
A n o t h e r  c o m p l a i n t  m e n t i o n e d  by 19 p e rcent of the 
beneficiaries was that not enough school or clinic 
services are provided for the neighbourhoods, while the 
other services such as retailing, police station etc. are 
absent in a majority of the sites (Table VIII-8).
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Plate VIII-2
Street Blocked by Cars and Animals, Koyeh- Enghelab, Ahwaz.
Plate VIII-3
Street Blocked by Cars, Keyan Pars, Ahwaz.
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Table VIII-8 
Services Available in ULO's sites in Ahwaz 
Sites: School Clinic Park Police Retailers*
Padad — — + - -
Sharak Naft + + - - -
Keyan Pars + + - + -
Koyeh Mellat + + + - +
Kar un + + + - +
Zi ton + - - + +
Kurush + + + - -
Akher Asfalt X - - + +
Deghagheleh X + - - +
Golestan X - + - +
Se Rah X - + - +
Koyeh Enghelab + + _ + +
- = not available 
+ = have access 
x = access insufficient 
* = retailers in this study arei small local shops
established by the residents thems e l v e s , which
barely can meet their daily needs.
8.4.2 Satisfaction with the Present Dwelling.
Measuring the respondents' levels of satisfaction with 
their present accommodation has been of considerable value 
to this work. The beneficiaries were asked to designate 
their overall level of satisfaction regarding the dwelling 
in general as a place to live. In general, the results 
appears to show a high level (70.8%) of satisfaction,
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although a few (10.7%) of the respondents were critical of 
the services available at their present dwelling.
The policy beneficiaries expressed a generally positive 
feeling of satisfaction with the physical development of 
their houses. This related both to the completed houses 
and overall site development (housing construction). The 
beneficiaries from the Individual method felt fully 
satisfied with their houses, while the beneficiaries of 
the Cooperative and article 67 respectively were of 
similar sentiments.
An interesting point revealed through the survey 
however, was that nearly 18.3 percent of the respondents 
seemed indifferent about their housing conditions. This 
might reflect the point made earlier that upper-income 
groups are profiteering from the acquired land rather than 
really needing it for dwelling. They are waiting to 
acquire the title so as to sell it at high price and will 
then leave this temporary accommodation.
Significant differences were found between the various 
sites. Respondents in poorly serviced sites indicated 
their d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  at higher levels than the 
respondents in average and well serviced sites. A number 
of fa c t o r s  were a s s u m e d  to be a s s o c i a t e d  with the 
respondents' ratings. Firstly the location of the site 
had a strong effect on the respondents' satisfaction with 
their dwelling; respondents living in sites in the 
proximity of the old settlements were found to be more 
satisfied than respondents living in remote ones.
2 2 5
Secondly, length of residence had some impact upon
respondents' ratings. The human tendency is that once an
individual has accomplished a significant act in his life,
such as moving to better housing, he tends to look on the
brighter side and ignore the problems. Usually this
tendency is overcome by reality. Changes in lifestyle
over time will require a d d i t i o n s  that the present
accommodation cannot offer. Those who were living in
these neighbourhoods for a short period were likely to be
less critical about the physical condition of their areas,
while those who had resided longer had a greater chance
to observe more difficulties in their neighbourhoods*
Most of the respondents who had lived in their new
residence for a longer time tended to discover problems
not only in their neighbourhoods but in their dwellings as
well, even in the case of completed houses and to become
more critical. Respondents who built their dwellings
themselves complain less about their dwellings' condition,
possibly because they had met their expectations by choice
of design and standards of living space. There were
significant differences between the levels of satisfaction
among beneficiaries. Higher level of satisfaction (87.9%)
found among respondents who acquired land, in comparison
to those who purchased completed houses (12.1%) suggesting
that self-managed housing development is a more reliable
way of achieving satisfaction. The relatively low level
of satisfaction among the article 67 (completed houses)
beneficiaries centred on the size and location of the
dwelling and the construction faults such as size and
location of the kitchen and bathroom. Dissatisfaction
might result from the traditional life style of the
* of course the total period of residence for even the
oldest beneficiaries was only 6 years.
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beneficiaries who were more interested in sufficient land 
space that would permit them to build an oven for bread 
baking, keep an animal (most often a cow), and maintain a 
vegetable garden. The dwellings in self-managed houses 
were designed by the beneficiaries in such a way that 
males and females had separate access within the dwelling. 
There was no such possibility in the government completed 
houses.
The economic conditions of the respondents have a 
strong association with the level of satisfaction, which 
decreased with increased income (Fig. VIII-4). Wealthier 
groups usually demand greater access to amenities and 
social services. The number of respondents in the sample 
are overwhelmingly (67%) from the middle-income group, 
seven percent high-income and 23 percent low-income. 
Nevertheless, significant differences in the levels of 
satisfaction were found among income groups.
Type and condition of the previous accommodation had 
some effect on individual attitudes to their present 
living conditions. Cooper (1975) pointed out that most 
respondents tend to reply in terms of comparisons with 
what they have known before. Moreover, Schorr (1970) 
argued that previous housing influences satisfaction, and 
a relationship between where a person has lived and his 
current housing does exist. Unfortunately it is not 
p o s s i b l e  in this study to e v a l u a t e  this view as 
information on where respondents lived before they moved 
to the new sites is not sufficient.
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8.4.3 Respondents' Attitudes and Evaluation of their 
Neighbourhood.
Housing is really a package of services, land, public 
facilities, access to social services as well as the 
housing structure itself. The ultimate objective of 
government policy is to provide housing conditions with 
which people are satisfied. Satisfaction may depend at 
least as much on such i n t a n g i b l e s  as the physical  
characteristics of the immediate neighbourhood and the 
condition and availability of services. Information on
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where respondents lived before they moved to the new sites 
was not sufficient to judge whether their previous 
residence has had any influence on their attitudes.
These settlements were sited in different parts of the 
city (Fig. VIII- 5), some being located in remote areas 
(in regards to their proximity to the city centre or city 
serviced limit), such as New Padad or Deghaghleh, while 
others were built within or near to this limit. The 
location of the sites has a strong influence on provision 
of services and infrastructure which would improve the 
neighbourhood quality. The settlements in Keyan Pars or 
Korosh and Koyeh Mellat for example, have the advantage of 
being built in the vicinity of old settlements where most 
services were nearby. Overall, only 20% of the residents 
had accessibility to primary services such as schools, 
clinics, local mosques and shopping centres within walking 
distance. Half of the residents had access through use of 
private transportation. The new sites were not established 
in locations to increase the residents' accessibility to 
services, neither was the public transportation network 
well integrated to compensate for service deficiencies. 
Unfortunately it is common for services to come after 
establishment of the neighbourhood.
It is quite common to find children playing in the 
streets or on vacant lots that they find close to their 
homes. Unfortunately, most of these areas are unsafe 
because they are dirty. The vast majority of the streets 
in front of the respondents' dwellings, in some sites, had 
pavements covered with mud and waste water or were not
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paved at all. The streets had the appearance of garbage 
tips rather than public paths. Frequently street lighting 
and surface water drainage does not exist (Plate V111-4) . 
T h i s  s e e m s  to be m o r e  p r e v a l e n t  in the r e m o t e  
neighbourhoods rather than those areas which are built 
within the city serviced limit.
Plate VIII-4
Lack of Water Drainage, Pavements, but Shops as Part of 
Dwellings, Akher Asfalt, Ahwaz.
A number of res idents in some n e i g h b o u r h o o d s  have 
devoted one of their dwellings' rooms to a small shop. 
This is contrary to the law, but the authorities could 
not enforce it due to the lack of grocery stores in these 
areas, (Plate VIII-4).
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It is not s u r p r i s i n g  that over a third of the 
respondents reported a low level of satisfaction with the 
surrounding environment although significant differences 
were found between the various settlements. Over one third 
of the respondents indicated a relatively low level of 
satisfaction with their neighbourhoods as a place to live. 
The respondents who were either dissatisfied or neutral 
with their neighbourhoods represented sixty percent, out 
of which 22.5 percent were those with the most negative 
view of their living environment (Table VIII-9).
Table VIII-9
Respondents' Satisfaction with their Neighbourhoods
by Income.
Income Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied N.I. Total
Low-income 28.5 23.0 16.5 - 161
Mid.-income 67.0 72.4 68.2 - 473
High-income 4.5 4.6 15.3 - 48
Not indicated 18 11
No. 263 261 157 18 700
Percent 37.7 37.3 22.5 2.5 100
About ten percent of the original potential participants 
withdrew from the scheme in its very early stages (ULO,
1986). It was felt that these 'dropouts’ constituted an
important category in so far as they represented for the
most part, a negative reaction to the policy. Interviews 
indicated that the two main reasons for withdrawal were a 
dissatisfaction with the location and the size of the plot 
offered, and in some cases, financial difficulties.
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Although it was not possible to reasonably determine what 
alternative arrangement these dropouts eventually made to 
obtain housing, it is likely that the severity of 
housing pressures were not as acute among this group as 
among the beneficiaries. Alternatively, it is possible 
that they were more willing to accept their existing 
living conditions, or presumably did not see the scheme as 
improving their existing housing conditions.
8.5 Effect of Moves to the New Neighbourhoods on 
Respondents and Their Families.
One of the objectives of this study was to assess how 
the move to the new housing sites affected residents and 
their families. The majority (81.3%) of the respondents 
reported that the move to new residence meant better 
living conditions for the family. Negative views drew 
attention to the lack of adequate school facilities in 
the vicinity to accommodate the children, which in long 
term may have adverse socio-economic effects on the 
future of these families. Two sites with a relatively 
high concentration of children, Golestan and Koyeh- 
Englab, were also critical of educational facilities, but 
reported positive results as a consequence of living in 
the new housing settlement. It appears that the effects 
on work were not particularly significant, as roughly the 
same proportion of households moved nearer to their work 
place, as had to travel further.
A frequent complaint has been that the sites did not 
bring any greatly enhanced recreational facilities for the
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residents. ThefS were no well constructed playing fields, 
although there existed sufficient vacant land adjacent to 
most neighbourhoods that could still be developed as 
playing fields, (Plate VIII-5). For the sample as a whole, 
60 percent stated that there were no r e c r e a t i o n a l  
facilities for them .0,t the new sites. It does seem that 
the inability of the relevant Government ministries to 
take over responsibilities for operating the community 
centres reduced their value to the sites' residents. Thus 
financing of all components required to construct and make 
operational community facilities and basic services should 
be included in the overall cost of the programme, in order 
to ensure their operation from the outset of the project.
Respondents were asked whether their social position in 
life was substantialy altered as a result of their move to 
the new sites. Answers varied appreciably but then can be 
grouped under three broad headings: whether the move meant 
better general conditions; whether it produced a feeling 
of pride in their achievement in securing a new home; and, 
whether the move brought them enhanced status. Just over 
half of the respondents reported that the move brought 
them better conditions, a fifth expressed a feeling of 
pride in securing a new home, and 28 percent answered that 
their status had increased.
Despite the many problems experienced by the residents 
of the sites - difficulties in completing their houses, 
the lack of security, unemployment etc.- there was genuine 
pleasure at being able to acquire their own home at a 
price that was affordable. In Koy- Enghelab, a 40 year
2 3 4
PLate VIII-5
The Availability of Land around New Sites that Could be 
Developed for Social Services, Padad, Ahwaz.
old man with 9 children, expressed his f eelings "I am 
better off in life, because I own a home for my children". 
Another stated, "I am now better off, I have my own home 
with a guest room and a kitchen". A g r a n d m o t h e r  of 45 
years, with 5 children and 3 grandchildren sharing her 
home, remarked, "I feel good to know that I am not in a 
tenant yard, nor am I exposed to strangers anymore, so I 
am really better off now". Even head of households who so 
far had been unable to complete their units were positive: 
as a man of 55 years claimed, "I am better off now, even
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Though it is half done." Even in Akher Asfalt which 
lacked electricity, the general feeling of pleasure of 
residents who owned their homes was unmistakable. An 
employed man of 39 with 4 children stated: "I am ten
thousand times better off now that I own a home; God bless 
the government and the people who organise it." Some were 
glad to be removed from a tenant environment; as a 
resident put it, "I feel much better, compared with tenant 
living, though I am in debt to the bank." In the words of 
a mother of a martyred son sharing a home with her 
widowed daughter-in-law and her three children, "Without 
the help of God manifested in this Government, I would 
not have been able to own a home."
8.6 Conclusion
The data analysis indicates that a relatively high 
percent (21.6%) of our respondents were recent migrants. 
This is inconsistent with the government assumption that 
the urban land policy would help to reduce the migration 
trend. Migration studies in Iran reveal that there is a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  and p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be t w e e n  the 
unemployment rate of the sending areas and migration rates 
(Hemasi 1984). This relationship might strengthen the 
general view that Ahwaz, by its role as a regional 
industrial centre, has great influence on the surrounding 
economically poor rural and small urban areas. Great 
numbers of migrants are attracted from urban areas in 
which the ULO either did not act effectively or had no 
action at all, regarding urban land distribution. Such 
migration patterns reflect unsuccessful efforts by the ULO
2 3 6
in deterring migration movement from big cities, as well as 
the existing regional disparities and especially the 
discrepancy between urban areas quite well.
The assumption made that low-income families would have 
access to land was not true. A large number of the 
respondents were from middle and upper-income groups. The 
majority of beneficiaries were from large families. Most 
respondents were government employees.
In the case of low-income people, it must be recognised 
that, although there are many positive features of this 
a p p r o a c h  to l o w - i n c o m e  housing, there are basic 
l i m i t a t i o n s  to the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of the policy in 
responding to the housing requirements of the poor; for 
in some instances, certain characteristics of the urban 
poor in Iran, lack of wealth, as the premises underlying 
the policies of land distribution, and the standards 
applied are far removed from the economic circumstances of 
these individuals.
The result of the housing development revealed that one 
way of helping low-income earners in shelter construction 
was through securing access to building materials through 
the housing authorities as part of housing policy such as 
self-help home construction. It was found that ability in 
purchasing building materials at cheap prices (monitored 
by the government) had contributed significantly to the 
stimulation of private housing investment. Indeed, the 
government programme in giving beneficiaries access to 
building materials was crucial to the success of the
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housing construction. Virtually all of the beneficiaries 
used this as one source of financing, as the purchase of 
building materials through government intervention had 
saved them a lot of money.
It would seem that the use of public resources to 
provide these complementary inputs to shelter construction 
is a more effective means of providing housing for low- 
income people than the direct construction of housing 
p r o j e c t s  by the public sector. The method of land 
distribution for self-help housing construction would seem 
less likely to give upper-income groups benefits from 
public subsidies, as it is based upon b e neficiaries’ 
savings. While in public housing projects, very often the 
units are p r e - e m p t e d  by high and m i d d 1 e - income 
households, who then also benefit from the subsidies 
generally provided with public housing. These subsidies 
further ’tie u p ’ scarce public funds that could otherwise 
be used for other purposes, such as the provision of 
’serviced’ land.
The provision of housing for the public's consumption is 
a difficult and expensive exercise for governments 
everywhere; the Iranian example and the case of Ahwaz, has 
shown how the government can aid the public to provide its 
own housing by making land available to all income (though 
with d i s a d v a n t a g e s  for l o w - i n c o m e )  groups. This 
experience can be used in countries with similar culture, 
such as Middle Eastern Muslim countries.
Many house owners let parts of their houses to tenants
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who were also low-income earners, at low rents. Thus the 
availability of cheap land for low-income people not only 
provides housing for the builder and his family, it also 
provides accommodation for other low-income earners who 
become his tenants.
Most of the respondents confronted several problems 
during construction, most important amongst these were 
theft and the lack of enough funds, building materials, 
water for the c o n s t r u c t i o n  process, a m e n i t i e s  and 
community services.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  most of the r e s i d e n t s  were having 
difficulties in gaining access to basic services. All of 
the study areas still lacked community facilities such as 
parks, play grounds, and schools for children. These 
facilities were either not available, or were far away 
from their homes. Lack of recreation facilities exposed 
children to the unhealthy and dangerous environments.
Except for those who bought completed houses, the 
m a j o r i t y  of the r e s i d e n t s  were happy about their 
dwellings, but less so with their neighbourhood. They 
suffered through the lack of basic services, including 
sanitation. Dwellings were surrounded by waste water due 
to the lack of sewerage systems or even surface water 
drainage networks, which was damaging to the dwelling as 
well as to health. However, these problems seem more 
prevalent in the new neighbourhoods, especially New Padad 
and Akher Asfalt which were remote from the city. 
Owners of completed houses complained about the limited
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space and unacceptable design with respec't to privacy, 
overcrowding and health hazards. This suggests inadequate 
preliminary studies and lack of understanding on the 
government side of the beneficiaries cultural and social 
backgrounds. It is totally unwise to impose a certain 
location and design of house on tenants as this causes 
frustration, rejection and dissatisfaction.
However, although the land management and services 
installation may occur at about the same time, there is no 
necessary connection between them, as these two operations
are carried out by different departments. As observed in
U) h/c In
the preceding chapter there was a number of sites^ had 
received basic services such as water before housing 
construction started or at the same time, while some other 
occupied sites were still waiting to receive services. 
The servicing departments do not attach great importance 
to coordination with ULO in servicing these sites. 
Nevertheless, services were installed partly by the 
m u n i c i p a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and partly by C o o p e r a t i v e s 1 
beneficiaries own efforts.
Differences in servicing levels among different sites 
can be e x p l a i n e d  by se v e r a l  factors. First, their 
locations: Golestan for example, is adjacent to the Ahwaz 
industrial area and major roads, while Padad is much 
farther from any area likely to be already serviced. 
Second, Golestan is older than Padad with a larger number 
of cooperative settlements. There are more possibilities 
in cooperatives to help in service installation, and often 
more disposable income available to spend on materials or
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financial contributions to servicing thanj individuals. 
Third, in contrast, to individuals, the cooperative 
s e t t l e m e n t s  had close links with their e mployer  
institutions and in turn with the servicing departments, 
who supported purchase of materials and provided technical 
assistance. As a result, most cooperatives’ sites enjoyed 
the provision of more services. Similar comparison can be 
made between other sites in^case study area.
Housing conditions suffered from many problems related 
to the surrounding environment. These problems are severe 
in all remote (far from the "serviced limit" of the city) 
settlements. There were also complaints about the 
dwellings in Article 67 schemes such as space and design. 
A more successful housing policy can be derived from 
solutions that provide a means by which the consumers can 
choose the type and location of accommodation which best 
serves their needs. Evidence from the study shows that 
most of the n e g a t i v e  a t t r i b u t e s  to s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  those p e r t a i n i n g  to the e n v i r o n m e n t  of 
neighbourhoods, were interrelated and cumulative in their 
effects and impacts. For example, the complaints about the 
location of the sites were not unrelated to the inadequacy 
and inefficiency of public transportation, lack of open 
space, playgrounds and other social services.
In this study, I have shown that low-income urban 
residents can build themselves a shelter if land was made 
accessible to them. But issues of urban land management 
in the context of Iranian land ownership, make land 
accessible mainly to the rich and the influential.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 Conclusions:
The main objective of this study was to evaluate the 
urban land policy in Iran, and its impact on urban housing 
in general, and low-income housing in particular. The 
study focused particularly on the assessment of state 
intervention in housing the urban poor under Islamic 
principles. To achieve this, the study made a detailed 
assessment of the effectiveness of the urban land policy 
implemented by the ULO in Iran with regard to the Islamic 
law of property ownership as a theoretical framework. The 
accessibility of low-income people to land and housing 
resources and the performance of the ULO in land and 
housing development were also evaluated.
Prior to the revolution of 1979, the pattern of land 
ownership in urban areas was following the situation 
prevailing in free- market economies, exercising the 
liberal concept of individual ownership of private 
property including land ownership. This type of land 
ownership was justified by the social norms that private 
ownership of land in Islamic societies is guaranteed. 
Howe v e r ,  it became clear that the g e n eral public, 
including government bodies believed the land management 
practices of the private sector operated to exclude the 
poor from residential urban land and sometimes thwarted
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ef f o r t s  by g o v e r n m e n t  to c o ntrol urban growth and 
development.
After the Iranian revolution of 1979, the new government 
found it necessary to intervene in alleviating housing 
problems and enabling low-income families to provide 
their own housing. Therefore, the main basis for the 
Islamic state intervention lies in the inability of the 
existing land ownership pattern to allocate land resources 
in an economically and socially desirable pattern. The 
state consideration took different measures which were 
ultimately manifested in the formulation of a new urban 
land policy. The main objectives of this policy were to 
provide housing and services for all, especially low- 
income people, and curbing land speculation.
Based on the results of this study, the Islamic state 
intervention has not managed to provide housing for low- 
income people. Nevertheless it has changed the urban land 
tenure p a ttern from m o n o p o l y  land o w n e r s h i p  by a 
relatively small number of wealthy people to individual 
ownership. This has been done by restricting the amount 
of urban land each individual can own and registering 
titles to lands that the ULO acquired and distributed to 
individuals. Furthermore, land speculation has been 
greatly reduced by banning land transactions except to or 
from the government. Therefore, investment in land that 
once had a windfall profit for speculators and land owners 
has become a risky business, as the land might be 
expropriated by the state.
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In the study area the implementation of the policy by 
the ULO made a c o n s i d e r a b l e  impact on urban land 
development by first of all, adding to the city of Ahwaz a 
stock of land through acquiring and preparing swampy and 
hilly land with building potential. Second, a substantial 
number of plots have been prepared and distributed for 
va r ious r e s i d e n t i a l ,  c o m m e r c i a l  and i n d u s t r i a l
developments. Third, the policy has encouraged the 
formation of cooperative settlements with high potential
of housing and service development without putting 
pressure on the government budget. Fourth, the ULO policy 
has also adopted a self- managed method of housing 
construction which is recommended by several experts 
(Abrams, 1964; Turner, 1982; Devas, 1983; Ward, 1981; and 
applied in various Third World countries such as Mexico 
City, Jakarta and Nairobi with different levels of 
success. This method was used as a means to reduce the
cost of construction and to meet personal taste in 
a d d i t i o n  to e x t r a c t i n g  p r i vate i n v e s t m e n t  wi t h o u t  
involving government subsidies. Securing access to urban 
land as the key resource for low- income housing and low 
price building materials was another encouragement to 
private individuals in constructing their dwellings.
Looking at the other side of the picture, the ULO has 
faced a number of management and administrative problems. 
One of the remarkable failures is that land could not be 
acquired in sufficient quantity to meet the demand. In
addition the piecemeal land acquisition by the ULO was 
also undesirable in the sense of creating high land prices 
reflected in the high housing costs. The high prices, of
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course, had further implications on accessibility to 
housing and other urban services for the different income 
groups in the city especially for the poor. Furthermore 
,the loan allocation procedures have in fact excluded the 
very poor from bank credit and in turn from access to 
land. By this weakness the ULO has limited accessibility 
to urban land to a small proportion of the population 
where the quantitative demand was not most acute. Thus, 
the policy failed to achieve an equitable distribution of 
land and housing among income groups as an Islamic goal 
and, stipulated by the policy. This seems to be the case 
with "site and services" and other low-income schemes in 
the developing world, which have been observed by several 
studies (cf. Soliman, 1988; Macoloo, 1988; Kabgambe and
Moughtin, 1983; Oncu, 1988; Elkadi, 1988; Johnston, 1983;
Acharya, 1987).
The adoption of low- density development policy and 
encouragement of semi- detached houses has unnecessarily 
spread the city over a wider area making it more expensive 
to provide necessary services to all remote areas from the 
c i t y ’s serviced limit. Recognising that the housing 
problem is essentially an economic problem a realistic 
approach even to the sanitary problems, would have 
emphasised more apartment housing. Those who u>on&
single - family houses can always build one themselves or 
buy with private funds.
Although Iranian urban land policy has changed the 
system of land tenure, the pattern of accessibility to 
urban land has not been changed vigorously in line with
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policy goals. Accessibility to land and housing has 
continued to be in favour of the middle and upper incomes, 
over low-income people. Consequently, the present urban 
land policy in Iran, and the study area Ahwaz, has not so 
far been able to bring about the much desired low-income 
housing development and equity in accessibility between 
income groups in Ahwaz. This would confirm the idea that a 
proper programme for housing the urban poor must be one of 
the major components of the national development process.
The pr o b l e m  of h o u s i n g  l o w - i n c o m e  group is not 
perpetuated by inefficient and poor management of the 
entrusted agencies alone. There are cases in which good 
management systems could not succeed in providing land and 
housing to the poor. With good management and skilled 
staff in Britain, for example, the allocation policies and 
practices of housing authorities is subject to all kinds 
of "foibles, prejudice, ignorance and incompetence" which 
often results in the needy going without (McAuslan, 
1987:33). This is explained by the economic status of the 
people. The majority of the poor fail to achieve housing 
needs due to their economic status and lack of any 
assistance for the purchase of land and its development. 
Therefore, this is not purely a management problem. Even 
in cases where the state land allocation involves subsidy 
such as in Egypt, Soliman ( 1988) indicates that the 
recipients usually sold their allocated plots. The same 
was noted by Oncu (1988) in Istanbul where she provides an 
example of the channel ing of subsidies via cheap land in 
low- density middle-class housing development. The houses 
in this case were initially consumed as use- value, but as
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land prices increased, after 1950s, house owners sold the 
land for high density development, "Thereby realising its 
exchange value with its original subsidy element. Soliman 
(1988) further observed that even in the "site and 
service" projects there is the difficulty of achieving 
"cost recovery" due to low and irregular income of the 
households involved. The need to pay regular instalments 
has proved to be a serious burden for poor families. This 
leads to the pressure on the allocatees to quit the 
project, by selling their plot and dwelling to high income 
households .
The urban land policy experience in Iran seems to have 
many similarities with those land reforms in Third World 
countries. Reforms were rendered ineffective by various 
obstacles such as the lack of financial support in Bolivia 
(Rivera, 1982); lack of p o l i t i c a l  s u p port in the 
Philippines (Ernesto, 1983); lack of decision- making 
power on the part of the Korean Land D e v e l o p m e n t  
Corporation (KLDC) in Korea (Lim, 1985); and lack of 
public agency to implement the Ceiling Act in India 
(McAuslan, 1987).
The provision of land for housing is only one of several 
measures that have been adopted in various Third World 
countries. Others include house building and marketing and 
the provision of subsidy. In all these cases however, 
There have been little success in housing low-income 
groups. Common to all these failures is the income factor 
on the part of the individuals. Thus, it is concluded that 
the root of housing problem stems from two basic sources,
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namely income and land distribution. The absence of a
regulation which puts a c e i 1i n g a n d  ownership has
encouraged a virtual monopoly on land and limited access 
to the moneyed few. Nevertheless, several factors such as 
the lack of political will, inadequate cost recovery, 
u n s u i t a b i l i t y  of site l ocation in terms of job
opportunities and social services, and the incorrect
implementation process could lead to the failure of a 
given policy (Soliman, 1988). However, in Iran, the mis­
management and lack of funds on the part of both the poor 
and the ULO were the most influential factors despite the 
strong political will.
The common point which can be made about Third World 
countries experiences regarding access to land is that 
government policies, whether a laisser-fair role or public 
control, tend to benefit the middle and upper income 
groups either deliberately or unintentionally. It is safe 
to say that the key issue of housing the urban poor in 
most third world countries is lack of funds. On the other 
hand, the amount of public money made available for 
housing the poor is a better indication of the government 
policies than any of its official policy statements.
While the theoretical potential of an Islamic ownership 
and control of urban land is immense, it can be deduced 
from the foregoing evaluation, that the realisation of any 
ownership potential, whether it is Islamic or non- 
Islamic, is not necessarily always a truism. Rather their 
realisation would depend not only "to the extent to which 
land is publicly owned” as Devandara (1985) believes, but,
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on the goals, objectives and priorities of public policy 
in respect, and above all, the administrative efficiency 
of the public agency involved. These factors would always 
have much to do with whether the potential benefits in an 
o w n e r s h i p  and m a n a g e m e n t  system are realised. 
Nevertheless, Islamic ownership and control of land, 
cannot be an end to the solution of the housing problem in 
itself, it is justified in so far as it is exercised in 
favour of the common good, rather than to protect the 
interests of the already privileged.
It can be concluded that the theoretical controversy in 
which different systems of land ownership are set against 
each other, has become divorced from practical realities. 
The border line between public, private or any other 
system of ownership and control has become increasingly 
vague, since any one of the many rights associated with 
non-public ownership may be pre - empted by the state for 
public purposes (or ostensibly so) and public ownership 
is often accompanied by considerable freedom in private 
use. Moreover, just as accessibility to land for example 
is not neutral in the private market system (because it 
favours those who enter the market with more money), so it 
is not neutral under Islamic management (because it 
f a vours the g o v e r n m e n t  e m p l o y e e s  and e c o n o m i c a l l y  
capable). The only differences, therefore, might be in the 
class of people that each system favours.
While there is no doubt that the Islamic system is in 
many ways ill- adapted to contemporary urban needs of 
Muslim societies, it (in theory) does have the virtue of
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certain equity (see Chapter 3), and assurance access to 
land to all members of society (though this was not fully 
achieved in recent Iranian practice).
The minor presence of the low-income groups in the 
Iranian policy Schemes has proved first, that the low- 
income groups are able to construct their dwellings if 
accessibility to land is secured. Second, that simple 
exercise of public legislation or legal powers, regardless 
of ideology behind it, does not as such necessarily bring 
about de s i r e d  goals and o b j e c t i v e s .  While these 
consequences were not inevitable, they did represent 
tendencies in bureaucratic behaviour which should surely 
be a warning to those who advance the proposition that the 
Islamic ownership and control of land automatically 
implies urban land policies that are more productive and 
just than any other s y s t e m s  of land c o ntrol and 
management. The relevant point, therefore, is not the mode 
of land o w n e r s h i p  and co n t r o l  as such but the 
implementation of the particular policy and the socio­
economic conditions of the people.
It is obviously dangerous to generalise about the 
situation in Third World countries. Each case is unique, 
however, we can say that the policy experiment in Iran is 
a viable method of providing housing and has at least 
established a model, albeit with limitations, which other 
Third World countries can follow in preparing an adequate 
response to the housing needs of low- income people. It is 
not suggesting that such an approach is universally 
applicable: indeed, it has yet to be put into effect in
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Iran, Nevertheless I think that the general principles 
would be worthy of consideration in relation to other 
Muslim countries, particularly those with less financial 
resources. Given all the variations, no standard set of 
policy or strategies can be formulated for all countries. 
Each country must review its own options, geared to its 
own resources.
9.2 Recommendations: Improving the Effectiveness of 
the ULO.
This thesis accepts, in principle, the need for public 
intervention or involvement in urban land management and 
development, and therefore accepts the concepts of the ULO 
or such similar agencies. It contends however, that the 
success of such intervention or involvement in realising 
its set goals, would generally depend on the processes and 
me chan ism employed in the involvement, as well as the 
"quality" of the administration and management charged 
with the implementation of the involvement. The thesis 
also recognises that the appropriate processes and 
mechanisms employed in a particular case or cases would 
vary with the goals and objectives in view. In any case, 
the realisation of the potential of Islamic ownership of 
land should not be taken for granted.
It is recalled that the ULO’s problems and weaknesses 
resulted from three major factors: (i) The social concept
of (highly guaranteed), private land ownership in Islamic 
societies, and the problems it created for the ULO in 
land acquisition resulted in high compensation and land
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o w n e r s ’ resistance; (± ± ) inadequate funding; (iii) 
problems arising from management skills and ability as 
well as the integrity of the personnel involved or charged 
with the administration of the agency and implementation 
of the schemes. The relevant question then becomes: How
could the ULO (or any similar agency in such a society 
context) have functioned "better” and more effectively? In 
what d i r e c t i o n  could the ULO go o p e r a t i o n a l l y  and 
structurally to improve its effectiveness in urban land 
management ?
Various alternatives are possible:
(1) The ULO continues along its present direct and massive 
involvement with urban land acquisition, distribution and 
development, but improves its administrative efficiency, 
and maintains the policy goal priorities- increasing 
accessibility to land by the low-income group. The 
problems of management, competence and administrative 
efficiency are essentially human problems, as opposed to 
t e c h n i c a l  ones and t h e r e f o r e  have no easy and 
straightforward solution. Any improvement in this area 
will inevitably be gradual and incremental. The raw 
materials or potential for competent management as such no 
doubt exist in the ULO. Perhaps a set of mechanisms and 
instruments to bring about periodic public accountability 
of the ULO and its key executive is necessary with the 
expectation that the awareness of such public accounting 
might help keep them and the operations of the ULO within 
lines of better efficiency and integrity.
(2) Other serious problems that the ULO experienced were 
the opposition and resistance of land owners against
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compulsory land acquisitions. It was also pointed out that 
this opposition was based not only on cultural values and 
norms attached to land, but the manner and conditions of 
the acquisition. This specifically refers to the
p r o c e s s e s  of land c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and c o m p e n s a t i o n  
assessment which determines the "government defined value" 
of such land at the time of acquisition - often to the 
dissatisfaction of the land owners.
If the objectives of public policy is a concern for the 
public good of the environment or to implement development 
schemes that are intended to benefit the larger society as 
a whole, one can make a case for "buying off" the private 
land o w n e r s ’ resistances. This would be possible by 
offering owners of land to be acquired "fair market 
value" prices for land - the sort of price offers "they 
cannot refuse". This would serve as an inducement or an 
incentive for conceptual change with respect to the 
release of land from private hands. This may not be too 
high a price for the government to pay if the long run 
benefits to the public are its overriding concern, and if 
the incidence of the costs of public acquisition actions 
on individual owners are considered relative to the 
incidence of the financial cost to the wider society. The 
wider public can better absorb the incidence of such 
financial costs than individual or small groups of 
individuals could. Another alternative to this "buying
off" approach would be to adopt the principle that
U)ut
.practised in India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia and
A
Canada under 'land pooling/ re a d j u s t m e n t ’ technique 
(Acharya, 1987 ) .
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(3) As a way of taking advantage of the existing land 
policy measures, credit could be made available to land 
owners to develop their lands themselves as required, and 
these loans could be recovered from the land owners after 
development. This strategy would also obviate the need for 
and the consequent problems of the ULO having to acquire 
lands itself and develop them directly; as well as also 
obviating the otherwise financial inability of many land 
owners to develop their lands themselves. This indirect 
incentives approach would enable more houses of different 
quality and price levels to be produced, and therefore 
made more a c c e s s i b l e  to all s e g m e n t s  of the urban 
population who need them. It is also likely to increase 
land supply (by the use of surplus privately owned lands 
lying idle), and to minimise wastes of land and other 
r e s o u r c e s  that are i n v o l v e d  in the U L O 's direct 
involvement. This approach would minimise demands on such 
public funds, which is needed for various National 
Development Plan Projects, and at the same time achieve 
the envisaged goals. Moreover, it would be likely to 
reduce the U L O 's needs for money for compensations and 
developments, which this study has shown to be a serious 
problem in its operations.
Jfa-
Another alternative for overcoming j finance problem 
might take form of indirect administration of land through 
positive encouragement and regulation. This would mean 
that housing land, the plan and standards for the 
required housing types and densities are prepared and laid 
down. The ULO would therefore, use its or banks credit as 
a leverage to ensure that these types of developments are
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followed. Preferential offers of loans for low-income and 
lower middle-class developments, for example, could be 
made to developers at incentive rates for such required 
developments.
In this sense, then, the U L O 1s f u n c t i o n  would 
essentially consist of administrative measures directed 
at: (i) facilitating the development of urban land through
the guaranteeing of finance to land owners and developers, 
(ii) regulating and encouraging the use of simple standard 
in housing. Finally, the ULO or any such other agency has 
to be adequately funded for the purposes assigned to it, 
if it is to function effectively. It is true to some 
degree that, "institutions are ineffectual unless they are 
given access to and control over the resources necessary 
for operating. The increasing gap between the mandate of 
many human settlement institutions and the resources 
effectively placed at their disposal is one of the 
principal causes for the widespread crisis in urban 
management in industrialised and developing countries 
alike." (UN, 1965). The ULO should be adequately financed 
and provided for, in the regular annual government 
budgeting process as its (ULO) revenues goes directly into 
the government treasury.
To aid the financing of private developers, as proposed, 
the ULO essentially has to act as an instrument for 
removing institutional obstacles to financing the needs of 
all people in urban land development by the administration 
of loan or mortgage guarantees. This would not involve a 
need for direct funds by the ULO, but only the
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credibility to be accepted as a guarantor of loans by 
commercial banks and other credit institutions for those 
wishing to borrow for urban land development. The merging 
into the ULO of the other government or quasi - government 
urban housing credit institutions like the Housing Bank 
will g r e atly im p r o v e  and f a c i l i t a t e  this p roposed 
financing function and improve urban land development 
goals and objectives in general.
Another possible source of finance for low income 
applicants is via 1Qard-alhassaneh'. Banks and funding 
institutions are allowed to make small loans from their 
deposits under this rubric to depositors, or those 
recommended by depositors, for such purposes as house 
maintenance, or on such occasions as marriage, or 
illness. Repayment terms are tailored to the means of 
the individual but the charges do not exceed the cost of 
servicing the loan. Qard-alhassaneh funds are made more 
'accessible to poorer clients and if they could be 
extended, would greatly aid them to provide decent 
shelter for themselves.
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APPENDIX I
Urbanisation in Iran
Urban settlement and an urban way of life are not new in 
Iran. Ruined land marks at Persepolis, Susa, Ecbatan and 
many other archeological sites are evidence of its past 
urbanisation. Since the arrival of Islam in 641, city life 
has become more important, and the Islamic religion has 
required the city to achieve social and religious goals, 
e.g. group prayers, (Planhol, 1959). However, at the turn 
of the 20th century Iran was basically an agricultural 
country, but the discovery of oil in 1901 has played a 
significant role in the development of the Iranian 
economy. In order to demonstrate the characteristics of 
the rapid urbanisation in Iran, it is importan to 
trace this phenomenon since 1900. A breakdown of the 
period 1900-1986 into component intervals (for which 
comparable data is available) is provided in Table I.
As shown in Table I, the urban population growth rate 
equalled the national growth rate of the total population 
until the mid-1930s; that is, prior to the mid~1930s, 
there was no considerable movement of population from 
rural to urban areas, and cities grew mostly by virtue of 
the natural growth in their population. It was actually 
during the period 1934-41 that for the first time, the 
growth rate in urban population exceeded that of the total 
population. Hyper-urbanisation or the excessively rapid
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Table I
Annual Grow t h  Rate of the P o p u l a t i o n  and 
its Rural and Urban Components:1900-1986.
Period Total Population Rural Urban
1900-1926(a) 0.75 0.75 0.75
1926-1934(a) 1 .37 1.36 1 .38
1934-1941(a) 1 .35 1.08 2.37
1941-1956(a) 2.30 1 .40 4.40
1956-1966(a) 3. 10 2.10 5.10
1966-1976(a) 2.70 1 . 10 4.90
1976-1986(b) 3.90 2.30 5.40
Sources: (a) Bharier, 1968; 1977. (b) Iran Statistical
Centre 1988.
growth of urban areas in the country occurred still later 
i.e. during the period 1941 to 1956, when the rate of 
growth in the urban population was almost doubled in 
comparison to the natural growth rate of the total 
population. This ratio between the growth rate of the 
urban population and the total population in the country 
has remained persistent from the early 1940s onwards.
Rapid increase in population of Iran in this century has 
been simultaneous with the growth of the old cities and 
the emergence of new cities (Bharier, 1968). The census of 
1956 shows 31.4% of the total population to be urban and 
the remaining 68.6% to be rural. In ten years (1956- 
1966), these proportions changed to 38% urban and 62% 
rural. By 1976, the pattern of urbanisation in Iran 
rapidly changed and the balance of spatial distribution of
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population shifted towards a higher concentration of 
population in the urban areas. The urban population had 
increased to 46.7 percent of the total population by this 
year. The number of urban centres increased from 249 in 
1966 to 365 centres in 1976 (census, 1976). The process of 
urbanisation was enhanced even further by 1986 when about 
27 million people were living in urban centres. That is, 
more than 11 million residents added to the 1976 urban 
population (Table II).
The process of urbanisation in Iran has been closely 
associated with three major factors: the improvement of
health conditions in urban areas; rural-urban migration 
caused by the uneven process of economic development 
( c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by rural poverty on one hand and 
industrialisation and commercial development in cities on 
the other); and reclassification of some rural areas as 
urban centres in the 1976 national census due to the 
increase in their population. According to the Iranian 
National Census of 1976 all areas with 5,000 population 
and over were c l a s s i f i e d  urban centres. A strong 
relationship between population growth and urbanisation 
was found to exist for Iran. In his study Toshtzar (1985) 
stated that for each unit of increase in the overall 
population (urban & rural), which embraces one million 
inhabitants, there will be 0.867 unit of increase in the 
rate of urbanisation (percentage of people living in the 
urban areas) .
In Iran as elsewhere, urban growth does not advance at a 
similar rate for all levels of urban hierarchy. Of
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particular interest are cities with population of 100,000 
inhabitants or greater and an annual growth rate of more 
than 5 percent. This size category of city increasggL in 
number during the last two decades, similar to results 
reported for India (Ahmad 1965). Total figures for the 
urban population of both 1966 and 1976 censuses show that 
more than 70% were concentrated in the 42 largest cities
Y ear
Table II
Rural and Urban Population Centres 
Annual Average Growth Rates
Urban Rural Total 
Population 1
Total%
1956(a
Population 5,^54,500
Percent
A .G . Rate 5.1
1966(b)
Population 9,795,000
Percent
A .G . Rate 4 .9
1976(b)
Population 
Percent
A .G . Rate 5 . 4
1986(c)
Population 26,991,543
Percent
Sources:(a) Bharier (1968)
13,001,000 18,955,500)
31.42 68.58 100.00
2.1 3.1
15,944,000 25,789,000
37.98 62.20 100.00
1.1 2.7
15,797,000 17,865,000 33,662,000
46.92
2.3
22,611,241 
54.65 
(1977). (b)
53.08
3.9
100.00
49,857,384
45.35 100.00
UN Demographic
Yearbook )1982-1984).(c ) Iran Statistic Centre 1987.
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in the country. One explanation of this being the strength 
of the "pull" of big cities in the country which caused 
a major problem in urban settlement in Iran. This has 
meant that the resources of the urban centres have not 
been able to cope with the r e q u i r e m e n t s  of this 
concentration of population. Government's efforts to 
increase these resources have not been successful and 
since urbanisation is still on the ascendancy, the 
situation continues to be a problem. For example, one such
h
resource that has been under strain^housing.
Perhaps no other element affects more people so directly 
as does housing. The collective impact of housing on 
people, on their growth, and on all aspects of their life 
demands that it received very careful attention in both 
urban and rural planning effort today (Abrams, 1964). The 
endeavour to provide housing is rendered even more complex 
due to the pre-revolutionary government's neglect. The 
1965 census of Iran revealed that 86% of the population 
of Iran were 'very poor', defined as people who were not 
able to meet their most basic needs. Housing for poor 
people is extremely inadequate, for example, in 1964 in 
Khayva, a town with a population of 8000 located in the 
west of Iran, one lavatory served an average of 10 to 15 
houses of poor people (Pirnia, 1971). With regard to 
tenure, 59.4% of the total Iranian households in 1965 
owned both the land and the building, 12.3% owned the 
building only, 16.2% lived in rented quarters while the 
remainder lived in rent free houses.
Up to 1978, the provision of housing in Iran had been
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the responsibility of the Sazman Maskan institution. Table 
III illustrates that this institution provided about
38,000 units in Tehran and the rest of the country during 
the years 1965 through 1978, while it was estimated that 
by 1988, it would be necessary to build as many as 600,000 
residential units to settle the homeless population. This 
estimate excludes the dwelling units destroyed or damaged 
during the Iraq-Iran war. This housing shortage does not 
affect all urban residents equally. The poor and low- 
income families have been the main victims of the housing 
crisis due to unequal distribution of land and housing
ownership amongst various social classes. The urban poor 
have generally been left to solve their own housing 
problems; many of them have had to enter the rented
housing sector where high rents have resulted in the
implementation of control regulations without much 
success. Those who cannot afford such rents have been
forced into poor accommodation in shanty towns.
A c c o r d i n g  to the M i n i s t r y  of Ho u s i n g  and Urban 
Development reports, 2.2 million dwelling units were 
needed to meet the needs of the new urban population
within the ten years period 1973-1983 (MHUD, 1974). This 
means a projected 220,000 units a year, though actual 
figures of completed dwellings in recent years have not 
exceeded 75,000 units a year. The Ministry's best hopes
were to build 1.8 million units during 1973-83 period 
(under the 5th and 6th Five Year Plans), but even that
would have left the country short of its target by 400,000
units. Moreover, these figures related only to the 
existing population, i.e. the increased population and the
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demand for better ho u s i n g  were not taken into 
consideration. The housing deficit in Iran has attained a 
critical level and a large number of people are presently 
living in inadequate conditions of shelter. It was 
estimated that in 1978 the cities were approximately
Table III
Sazman Maskan Developmental Activities 
in Housing Production, 1965-1978
(by year)
year units year units
1965 3,896 1972 754
1966 2,728 1973 3,367
1967 703 1974 5,298
1968 131 1975 2,640
1969 373 1976 3,714
1970 4,214 1977 3,613
1971 3,981 1978 3,020
Total 37, 834
Source: Sazman Maskan, Tehran 1979.
925,000 housing units short of the demand being made by 
the urban dwellers (Mashhoodee 1980). "It is important to 
note that during 1978-79 , the total number of urban 
residents throughout the country was 17 million people, 
and thus calculations show that the rate of homelessness 
in urban regions has been approximately between 27 and 54 
percent of all urban residents in the entire country" 
(Mashhoodee 1980). The consequences of such large housing 
deficits were increases in land values on a day to- day
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basis, land speculation and the creation of squatter 
settlements in the capital Tehran and other provincial 
centres such as Tabriz, Esfahan, and Ahwaz.
Most squatter settlements are formed by rural immigrants 
who are seeking better economic opportunities in the city 
than are available in their original place of residence. 
"Most of these groups are illiterate and unskilled, and as 
they cannot be absorbed in the urban labour market, the " 
push factor" of the city forces them into the peri-urban 
fringe areas. They cannot afford the cost of living in 
the city, because of their low wages in the unskilled jobs 
they take on", (Mashhoodl 1980). Owing to this 
situation, they have no alternative for meeting their 
housing needs than to build their own dwelling units. Low- 
income urban families who cannot afford the rising rent 
due to the shortage of housing stock and certain other 
factors also join them in the formation of squatter 
settlements. Payne (1977) observed a similar situation in 
India "the combination of high urban growth rates, 
inappropriate policies, and inequalities in distribution 
of resources, has created situations in which a large 
proportion of urban population are unable to afford the 
conventional minimum dwellings" (Payne, 1977).
More than ever before, the problem of housing the 
homeless urban families appeared critical during the last 
decade of the pre-revolutionary government (1968-1978), 
with about 50% of the cities' population living in 
substandard dwellings. The population growth rate of large 
cities, particularly provincial centres, has been steadily
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increasing, while the net addition to housing stock had 
been inadequate to stop the overcrowding and deterioration 
of the low-income housing conditions. However, housing 
p r o d u c t i o n  failed to catch up with the i n c r e a s i n g  
population needs in major urban centres.
The problems of housing deficit, apart from continuing 
r u r a l - u r b a n  m i g r a t i o n  and p o p u l a t i o n  growth, have 
originated due to the lack of:
-an overall policy for housing. The first step in dealing 
with the housing situation is existence of a comprehensive 
housing policy. Unfortunately this was neglected until the 
last day of the pre-revolutionary regime.
-urban land control policy during the last three decades. 
There has been a continuously popular argument concerning 
the rise of land prices in Iran, with several hundreds of 
articles written on this matter ( E ttela1 at , 1971).
H owever, there has been very little change in the 
situation. Due to this, the high price of land, the gap 
between incomes and shelter costs have increased.
- s u f f i c i e n t  g o v e r n m e n t  i n v e s t m e n t  in the Fou r t h  
Development Plan (1968-1972). The government investment 
for ho u s i n g  was only 7 b i l lion rials, e n t i r e l y  
insufficient. In fact, most of the funds were allocated 
for government buildings, and housing must compete with 
other government jobs for priority in funds, staff, and 
execution.
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-sufficient loans from financial institutions. There were 
too many restrictions which do not allow a low-income 
family to use the loans given by financial institutions. 
The situation is such that even middle-income families do 
not have enough financial support to build a house.
However, the most c r i t i c a l  pr o b l e m  of ho u s i n g  
development in Iran has been the lack of availability of 
urban land at a reasonable price. This is associated with 
vast increases in the price of land, not only in the major 
urban areas, but in all other parts of the country. Land 
speculation on urban land in the period 1974-1979 reached 
its peak position where even the Pre-revolutionary Iranian 
regime was afraid of the outcome of the situation. The 
price of land rose drastically and became nearly equal to 
the building cost. In 1975 the cost of land was 60 to 80 
percent of the construction expenses (Iran Almanac 1976). 
At some locations in Tehran, land costs could reach as 
high as 300,000 rials ($4200) per square meter. According 
to an official declaration, 60-80 percent of vacant plots 
in the major cities were owned by l a n d l o r d s  and 
speculators, (Ibid, 1977). The middle class and low-income 
f a m i l i e s  remai n e d  h o m e l e s s  and their p o verty and 
deprivation increased day by day. Such an impoverished 
life style can be observed in most of the provincial 
centres and the capital Tehran.
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APPENDIX II
The Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law (UWLOAL)
ratified on June 13, 1979
Declaration of the Law
According to Islamic law, 'undeveloped'’ land is not
considered to belong to anyone, and it belongs to the
Islamic state. The possession title and deeds registered 
by the previous regime have not been in the national 
interest and in contrary to Islamic law as well. For these 
reasons the UWLOAL is approved as the following:
Article no. I: The state has to inform the owner of any
land situated within cities’ legal (25 years) limit in 
urban areas where a legal limit is defined, to develop 
their own land ( in accordance with the detailed city 
master plan regulations), within a specified period of 
time. O t h e r w i s e ,  the land shall be subject to 
expropriation without compensation. The legal limit shall 
be determined by the Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development, for those urban areas lacking them.
Sub-article, the minimum time span of three years will 
be given by the state to those persons who are not 
homeowners but own a small plot of land to build their 
dwelling units.
Article no. II: The acquired lots of land must be
subdivided by the state in order to supply them to
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applicants who wish to build their dwelling units. The 
construction should be in accordance with the detailed 
Master Plans, building codes and regulations of each city.
Article no. Ill: The procedure of classifying land as
' u n d e v e l o p e d ’', a l l o c a t i o n  of the a c q u i r e d  plots, 
determining the area of land (mentioned in sub-article of 
article no.I) in each region, and the way by which the 
owner will be informed, shall be held in accordance to a 
regulation which will be proposed by the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Development, and ratified by the 
Ministers Cabinet.
Article no. IV: The ministry of Housing and Urban
Development is responsible for implementing this law.
Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law
(Regulations ratified on July 16, 1979)
Chapter 1. Announcement to Land Owners.
A r t i c l e  no. I: The M i n i s t r y  of Ho u s i n g  and Urban
Development (MHUD) is obliged to make a declaration 
through the national newspapers and other public media for 
the benefit of the land owners to which the sub-article of 
article no.I of this law applies.
They have to develop their land within the specified 
time period prescribed in article no. I of this law, 
otherwise at the end of the period the land shall be 
expropriated without any compensation.
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Chapter 2. Regulations for Land Classification 
and Developing the Waste Land.
According to this law, the "undeveloped" land is the 
land that has remained vacant, neglected, or has not 
undergone any type of development. The developed ' land 
may be subject to the following provisions of this section.
2.1 The land should be in the form of a dwelling unit 
and its development must have been recorded in the 
registered ownership document.
2.2 In case where a building has been demolished with 
some built area remaining, the ’’developed area" shall be 
equal to four times that of the undemolished area.
2.3 At least three- quarter of agricultural lands' 
areas should be under c u l t i v a t i o n -  in order to be 
classified as developed land.
2.4 Fieldgarden allotments in which six (3-years old or 
more), plants have been planted in each 100 square meter, 
given that at least three- quarters of their area is under 
cultivation.
2.5 The type of land-use, falling within subsection 3 
and 4, above, cannot be modified. But the owners can build 
a dwelling unit for their personal accommodation, provided 
that the floor- area shall not exceed 250 square metres.
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Article no. Ill: Those owners whose lands are included 
by the provision of sub-article of article no.l of this 
law, and there is no specific time prescribed in their 
building permit, have to consult the pertinent offices 
within two months of the issue date of this regulations, 
in order to be given specific time for completion of their 
dwelling units.
Article no. IV: Those who have been issued a building 
permit and have started developing their land before the 
approval of this law amendments, are obliged to develop 
their land within the time span of the building permit, 
and in accordance with the standards of these regulations. 
The owner should consult the municipalities in case of a 
building permit with no specific time limit.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of Land to which the Sub­
article of Article no. I of UWLOAL Applies.
Article no. V: The area of the small plot of land
prescribed in the above mentioned sub-article is 1000 
square meters for the urban areas with a population of 
more than 200,000 according to the 1976 census. In areas 
where the population is less than 200,000, the area shall 
be 1500 square meters.
Sub-article (a) In cases where the area of land is more 
than the area specified in article no. 5, and the excess 
cannot be subdivided or be useful in an independent plot, 
it will be disregarded.
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Sub-article (b) The ownership of a dwelling unit 
prescribed in sub-article of article I of the UWLOAL, 
means full ownership of the dwelling by one person.
A r t i c l e  no. VI: The s p e c i f i e d  time span for the
development of a small plot of land, to which the sub­
article of article one of the UWLOAL applies, may be 
subject to the provision of this article as follows:
a) in urban areas where the (1976 census) population is 
less than 50,000, the specified time span shall be six 
years from the issuing date of the building permit.
b) in urban areas where the (1976 census) population is 
more than 50,000, and less than 200,000, it will be five 
years from the issuing date of the building permit.
c) In urban areas where the (1976 census) population is 
more than 200,000, it will be four years from the issuing 
date of the building permit.
Article no. VII: Owners whose dwelling units (at the
date of the approval of the UWLOAL) are mortgaged to a 
bank for a d w e l l i n g  loan, are not c o n s i d e r e d  as 
homeowners. The sub-article of article no. I of this law 
is applied to them.
Article no. VIII: Equity owners of a plot of land to whom 
sub-article of article no.l is applied, can develop their 
shares individually, in accordance with the provision of 
this chapter.
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Chapter 4. Waste land determination.
Article no. IX: Owners of land to whom one or some of
the sub- articles of the article no. 2 of this regulations 
are applied, have to apply within three months for 
’'developed" land certification to an organisation which 
shall be established by the Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development.
Article no. X: Owners to whom the sub-article of
article no.l of this law applies have to apply to the 
organisation defined in article no.9 for a certificate of 
a "developed" or "to develop" their land.
Article no. XI: The waste land owned by ministries,
organisations, public sectors, and state companies shall 
be i n v e s t e d  in the M i n i s t r y  of Ho u s i n g  and Urban 
Development.
Sub-article, the public endowments or "Waqf" in which 
the certificate of title and Waqf statement implies that 
some type of development has been carried out on the land, 
are to be considered as "developed". However, in some 
ways they are subject to clauses b-f of article no.2 of 
this provision. In cases where alteration in the type of 
land-use (rather than what recorded in the Waqf statement) 
is necessary, it should be confirmed by the Ministry 
Cabinet.
Article no. XII: The Ministry of Housing and Urban
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Development shall determine the 25 years legal city limit.
Article no. XIII is cancelled.
Article no. XIV: When the municipalities are not able to
issue a building permit for an applicant in respect to 
the Master Plan or other limitations, the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Development shall be authorised to grant 
a plot of equal value to the applicant by means of a 
statement issued by the municipalities.
Article no. XV is cancelled.
Chapter 5. Land Allocation Procedures.
Article no. XVI: All land which is acquired by the state
and situated within the services limit of the city, shall
be allocated freely to the related organisations for 
public services establishment. In cases where the 
acquired land is more than that required for services, 
then the land shall be allocated to the private sector 
applicant according to the municipalities' proposal.
Article no. XVII: All land situated outside the city
services limit but inside the legal limit, should be 
divided on the basis of detailed Master Plan criteria. 
Land which will be provided for the development of urban 
public s e r v i c e s  shall be a l l o c a t e d  to the related 
organisations. The land which shall be allocated to the 
private sector should be sold for development with the 
consent of the municipalities and other responsible
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bodies.
Article no. XVIII: Land which is divided and laid out for 
the construction of single-unit residential buildings 
shall be sold to eligible applicants by ballot, in cases 
where the number of applicants excess the number of plots 
the priorities for allocation are as follows:
a) The applicant and his wife and children do not own any 
dwelling unit.
b) The date of residence and employment in the place of 
application should not be after March 1973, those who have 
a longer period of residence shall be given priority.
c) The a p p l i c a n t  should provide e v i d e n c e  of the 
availability of sources of finance for the construction 
costs.
Article no. XIX: The Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development shall determine the price of land based on the 
average cost of infra-structure provision, a percentage 
for other overhead costs and the type of land use.
Article no. XX: In cases where the construction of high 
rise buildings are in accordance with Master Plans 
criteria, the applicants can implement their project in 
one group selecting one person as their authorised 
representative subject to the special provisions of 
article no. 18 of this law.
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Article no. XXI: Companies specialised in housing
development can apply for land in order to construct 
single-unit or high rise residential complexes. The sale 
price of these dwelling units shall not be more than the 
price determined by the Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development .
Article no. XXII: The land certificate of title shall be 
submitted to the applicant after the completion of his 
dwelling unit.
Article no. XXIII: The implementation date of these
regulations shall be determined by the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Development in each individual city.
The legal bill of annexing 3 articles and 2 sub­
articles to the Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition 
Law (UWLOAL).
Article no. 1: The Urban Land Development Organisations 
are entitled to distribute the land which have been 
acquired by the virtue of sub-article of article no.l of 
UWLOAL, in order to ease land supply to the public for 
construction of housing or public services. An equal plot 
of land shall be given on compensation to the holders of a 
contingent "Developing Certificate", when their land is 
expropriated. The area of compensated land shall not be 
more than the expropriated one, and in any case should not 
exceed the quorum mentioned in article no. 5 of the UWLOAL 
implementation regulations.
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Ar t i c l e  no. 2: The state urban land prices are
calculated as follows:
a) 40% out of 30% of the retail values of land ( which 
determined by the Estate Evaluation Commission in 1966) 
are accepted as a base price.
b) Plots of land which are located within the legal city 
limit- 10% shall be added to their base price.
c) Plots which are included the Master Plan- 10% shall be 
added to their base price.
d) Plots subject to inclusion in the subdivision map- 10% 
shall be added to their base price.
e) Plots included on public road network map- 10% shall 
be added to their base price.
f) Plots having access to piped water- 10% shall be added 
to their base price.
g) Plots having access to electricity- 10% shall be added 
to their base price.
h) Plots having access to gas pipe or telephone cable- 10 
percent shall be added to their base price.
Sub-article, the benefit collected from items 1-4 shall 
be the municipalities funds.
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Article no. 3. General Assembly of Urban Land Development 
Organisation of Tehran and other ULDOs are authorised to 
adjust the land price of gratuitous land to the poor as 
needed .
Urban Land Law (ULL)
17 March 1982
Article no. I: In order to reach the goals of Articles
31, A3, 45, and 47, of the Constitution of Islamic
Republic of Iran, which obliged the government to provide 
housing and public services, and save the national economy 
by preventing any land speculation and leading capitals
investment towards the cornerstone productive sectors 
(agriculture & industry), by the virtue of Imam Khomini 
permission dated Sept. 28, 1981, which authorised the
Islamic Parliament to ratify and dispose the Urban Land 
Law and temporary implementation (5 years).
Article no. II: Urban land is the land located within
the legal limit of cities and towns.
Article no. Ill: The urban Mavat (waste) land is the
land which has never been developed (virgin land).
Article no. IV: The urban Ba-yer (undeveloped) land is 
the land which had been developed once and gradually 
degraded to Mavat (waste) land.
Article no. V: All the urban Mavat (waste) land shall 
be the possession of the Islamic state, and the previous
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documents are abolished, unless these documents were re­
issued by the Islamic state after Feb. 22, 1979.
sub-article, all estate deeds which have been acquired 
virtue of the UWLOAL shall be free from any mortgage or 
personal debt.
Article no. VI: A plot of urban land equal to the quorum 
of article no. VIII shall be given for development to 
those who officially own a plot of urban Mavat land but 
who do not have a proper dwelling unit. If the land remain 
undeveloped it shall be regained by the state.
Sub-article, those who conventionally possess a plot of 
urban Mavat land, before the ratification of the UWLOAL 
and have reported their ownership to the local authorities 
shall be given a contingent "Developing "certificate.
Article no. VII: The Islamic state shall be the right 
owner of all Ba-yer (undeveloped) land which has no 
specific ownership.
Article no. VIII: Owners of urban Ba-yeer (undeveloped) 
land are permitted to develop or sell to the state an area 
of less than double the subdivision quorum, not more than 
1000 ra^. The quorum shall be determined by the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Development in those areas which have no 
quorum.
Sub-article (a) Collective owners shall be subject to 
this article, unless they are under each o t h e r ’s
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obligation (members of one family unit), except as wife. In 
this case just only one 'Developing'' certificate shall be 
issued to them. The r e g u l a t i o n s  of this law shall 
determined the ways of subdivision and allocation of
collective shares.
Sub-article (b) Those whom are subject to articles VI 
and VIII of this law and own two plots of land (one Mavat 
& one Ba-yer), which collective areas are more than the
quorum of article no. VIII, can choose just one of these
plots. In any case just one Developing certificate shall 
be issued to a single family unit.
S u b - a r t i c l e  (c) t r a n s m i s s i o n  of shares b e t ween 
collective owners is permitted. After transmission, the
total area of each individual owner shall not exceed the 
quorum of this article (1000 m ).
Sub-article (d) Dwelling cooperative companies which 
prior to the ratification of this law have official 
p o s s e s s i o n  of land, by o b s e r v a t i o n  of the local 
subdivision quorum for each individual member, can develop 
the land. Land surplus to their needs, and undeveloped 
land shall be subject to this law, and shall be possessed 
by the state.
Sub-article (e) The transaction price of land shall be 
the base for the state land evaluation.
Ar t i c l e  no. IX: Urban Mavat (waste) and Ba-yer
(undeveloped) land owners are obliged to sell their land
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to the state and municipalities as needed. This sale price 
shall be determined by the state. Land exceeding 3000 m^ 
in area could be compensated from other state land which 
has equal value to the acquired land.
Sub-article (a) Land possessed previously by the state 
or banks, which all or part of its price has not been paid 
shall be subject to the provisions of this law.
Sub-article (b) The land shall be transmitted in the 
cases of refusal, absentee, or have no recourse of owner, 
even if the estate is in mortgage, or any other civil 
difficulties, after declaration of the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Development (MHUD). In this case the MHUD shall 
sign the transaction deed on behalf of the owner. If the 
owner has recourse later he/she will receive land or 
monetary compensation, after presentation of the required 
clearance.
Article no. X: Land owned by ministries, government
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  banks, g o v e r n m e n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  and 
revolutionary foundations shall be in the ownership of the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development., from the date 
of ratification of this law.
S u b - a r t i c l e  (a) M u n i c i p a l i t i e s  and p e r t i n e n t  
organisations and companies are exempted from this 
article, but have no right to transmit such land without 
the permission of the Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development. To supply public services needs or for 
replace compensation of land located in the urban design,
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permission is needed.
Sub-article (b) Mavat (waste) Waqf land shall remain in 
Waqf (endowment). Any case of land transaction by Owqaf 
(endowments office), or other response bodies shall be 
possible after the approval of the MHUD.
Sub-article (c) All lands invested in ULO, by the virtue 
of this article shall be allocated gratuitously, to 
ministries and organisations for establishment of their 
official installations, as required.
Article no. XI: In accordance to the general policy of
the state and the regulations of this law , the MHUD is 
obliged to allocate and develop Mavat and Ba-yer land. The 
city legal limit of Tehran shall be under the supervision 
of the municipality.
Sub-article (a) The government is exempted from paying 
any duties, such as tax, stamp, registration fees etc.
Sub-article (b) Land price for transaction should not 
exceed the regional price of land (transactional value), 
but if the expenditure of land acquisition and preparation 
exceed the transactional value, the sale price shall be 
equal to the expenditure.
Article no XII: Classification of land (Mavat, Ba-yer 
and Da-yer), shall be the responsibility of the Appraisal 
C o m m i s s i o n  (AC). This c o m m i s s i o n  c o m p o s e d  of 
representatives of the Ministries of Justice, Housing and
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Urban Development and the local mayor, in accordance of 
regulations of this law. The commission's verdict could be 
challenged at the local court within 10 days after the 
declaration of the MHUD. The local court shall give 
priority to the appeal for consideration. The sentence 
issued by the court is non-appealable.
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Appendix III
Years 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Urban Areas 3851 7114 8309 6611 3877
Tehran 11,519 18,783 19,505 16,176 5079
Major Cities 3934 6756 7378 6842 4431
O ther Cities 1353 2950 3969 4096 2816
Urban Areas 45.4 49.8 47.1 40.6 28.4
Tehran 49.9 55.4 50.8 41.0 25.2
Major Cities 43.9 47.0 46.9 41.3 31.2
Other Cities 38.8 43.4 41.5 40.2 29.1
Urban Areas 89 153 199 181 121
Tehran 49 80 92 63 39
Major Cities 22 39 58 54 43
Other Cities 18 34 49* 64 39
Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Development report 1985, Tehran, Iran.
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APPENDIX IV
Respondent's Age:
Marital Status:
Education Level
Place of Birth
How long have you
THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60 and more
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Illiterate 
Primary school 
Secondary school 
High school 
Higher education
Ahwaz
City in Khuzistan Province 
Rural in Khuzistan Province 
City Outside Khuzistan Province 
Rural Outside Khuzistan Province
been living in Ahwaz city? 
less than 5 years
5-9 years
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10-15 years 
15 years and over
Occupation
Unemployed 
Self- employed
Private Institution employee 
Government Employee
Main Occupation
Army
Academic
Civil servant
Educational
Medical
Technician
Unskilled worker
Housekeeper/ retired
Judicial
Which Category Does Your Monthly Income Fall in?
Less than 20,000 Rials
20.001-50,000 Rials
50.001-80,000 Rials
80.001-100,000 Rials 
100,000 Rials and over
How many children do you have?
How many members are there in your household including
2 8 5
yourself ?
Give exact number please.
The responses were grouped in:
Less than five member
5-10 members 
10 members and more
Type of household:
Nuclear Family 
Extended Family 
Other (specify)
Have you received banks’ loan for purchase of plot/house?
Yes
No
What proportion of your dwelling cost does the acquired 
loan constitute?
25 percent 
25-50 percent
51-75 percent 
75 percent and more
Is your income sufficient to cover the loan repayment and 
your daily needs?
Yes
No
If no, what alternative do you have in overcoming your 
budget deficit?
More working time 
Selling belonging
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Sub-let part of your dwelling 
Others
What was the main motive which attract you to the ULO1 s 
schemes ?
Cheaper than free market 
More privacy 
More space
Ownership of a house
How long did it take you to receive land or house from ULO?
Less than 6 months 
6-12 months 
1 year and more
Why did you prefer to buy land and build a dwelling 
rather than to buy a completed house from ULO?
Cheaper
Can ensure quality of construction 
Greater flexibility in design to 
fit your taste
What type of labour did you use in constructing your 
dwelling?
Contractor
Mason + family and hired labour 
hired labour + own labour 
hired labour only
Was the plot’s area sufficient to house your family?
Yes
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No
Did you get your land in the right location you applied 
for?
Yes
No
Where did you buy your building materials?
Government 
Black market 
Both
How long it took you to complete your dwelling?
Less than six months 
6-12 months 
13-18 months 
18 months and more
Have you faced any difficulties or delay in completing 
your house?
Yes
No
What difficulties have experienced and caused the delay 
of house construction?
Shortage of building materials 
Lack of enough funds 
Both of the above mentioned 
Lack of water supply 
Theft of Building materials 
How much have you spent on buying the land and building
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this house?
Less than 2 millions Rial 
2-4 millions Rial
4.1-5.99 millions Rial
6-8 millions Rials 
8 millions and more
For what price might you sell your house?
less than 2 millions Rial 
2-4 millions Rial
4.1-5.99 millions Rial
6-8 millions Rial 
8 millions Rial and over
Do you intended to develop more rooms in your dwelling?
Yes
No
Which one of these reasons was the most important in 
deciding to choose ULO’s land or housing?
Cheaper than free market 
More privacy 
More space
Ownership of a house
Why did you prefer buying a house?
No other quick alternative
Lack of easy access to building
-materials
Cheaper than free market 
When did you move to this house?
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Before completion 
After completion
Do you think your house fits your taste and expectation?
Yes
No
If no, which aspect of your house do you dislike more?
Design
Location
Space
Where did you live before you move to this house?
What was the reason for leaving your previous residence
Space shortage 
High rent 
Lack of privacy 
Distance from workplace 
Lack of public services
How long have you been living in this house?
less than one year 
1-3 years 
4-7 years 
7 years and more
Did you get any sort (specify) of technical help from 
government ?
2 9 0
Yes
No
Do you have access to c o m m u n i t y  s e r v i c e s  in your 
neighbourhood?
Yes
No
Which services do you enjoy in your house?
Water
Electricity 
Sewerage system 
None 
All
How satisfied are you about the condition of your house?
Satisfied
Indifferent
Dissatisfied
How satisfied are you generally living in this house?
Satisfied
Indifferent
Dissatisfied
How satisfied are you living in this neighbourhood?
Satisfied
Indifferent
Dissatisfied
What has the move to new residence meant to you and your
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fami1y :
Better living conditions 
Worse living conditions 
No difference
Is there any change in your social position as a result of 
the move to the new house? Responses were grouped in:
Better general conditions 
Feeling of pride in securing a 
-house
Enhanced status
Leer]
$QfS .your level of communication your relatives^ subject 
to any change after moving to this house?
Yes
No
If yes, is it:
Reduced 
Increased 
No difference
What means dp you use in getting to workplace or shopping?
Walk
Bicycle
Motor cycle
Public transportation
Private car
Service car
Do your children go to school?
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Yes
No
If no, why?
Lack of school 
Too far
Lack of transportation 
Cannot afford
y«*>ur distance to work place changed?
Yes 
No .
If yes, is it:
Increased
Reduced
Are the streets in your neighbourhood in poor condition?
Yes
No
293
Three types of land and housing distribution were 
practiced by the ULO in Ahwaz. These are: Individuals,
Cooperative Settlements, and Completed houses (Article 
67). There were 1 0,790 households who acquired land for 
dwelling construction in addition to 200 others receiving 
completed houses.
A master list containing the beneficiaries name, number 
of plot and district number was used in selecting the 
sample. Six hundred households were systematically 
selected, from the list choosing every 18th entry (300 out 
of 5 , 380 from Individuals and 300 out of 5,401 from 
Cooperatives). The procedures do not violate 
randomisation because the list v/as not compiled in any 
obvious order and consequently all members of the 
population had an equal chance of been selected. A number 
of households were chosen from the selected sample for a 
pilot survey, the rationale of which v/as to check the 
reliability of the questionnaire. Further more, half of 
the households benefiting from Article 67 were selected, 
bringing the total sample size to 700 households.
The decision to choose beneficiaries from the ULO1 s 
Master list rather than from developed sites was due to 
the relatively high presence of Government employees and 
v/ell-off groups. The possibility of sites being 
segregated along socio-economic lines v/as anticipated by 
choosing one site, the sample of residents would have been 
biased rather than representative of the parent 
population.
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Data Collection:
The sample survey was carried out by a team of four 
researchers between February 10th and May 3rd, 1 989. All 
interviews were conducted in either Arabic or Persian 
languages. The interviewers were instructed to go next 
door in case of no response or absence of the targeted 
interviewee. They were also instructed to call on 
interviewees' doors between 6-9 pm, although the 
interviews occasionally lasted until 11pm. Most of the 
interviews however were carried out between 6-10pm.
Official Interviews
This part represented the non-statistical portion of 
the study in which data was collected by means of personal 
interviews and open informal discussions with public 
authority employees and with personnel involved in 
decision-making issues as well as the management of policy 
programmes. The open-ended questions in the interviews 
covered a wide range of topics including the historical 
background to urban policies, housing policies and 
regulations and plans for future developments.
Site Observation:
For the present study, in addition to the outcome of 
the field survey, site observations were made to obtain 
fresh information, both qualitative and quantitative, 
about the housing development. These observations were a 
valuable means for supporting and interpreting the results 
of the residential survey. Photography v/as used as an 
essential instrument of field observation, as it 
demonstrates the physical conditions of the dwellings and 
development of site services.
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Data Analysis:
Immediately after collecting the information and 
returning to Glasgow, the data was coded, transferred to 
computer files and tabulated, using the SPSSX package on 
Glasgow University's main frame computing service. 
Presentation and analysis of the data involved the 
following:
1. One way tabulation to study the frequency and 
percentage distribution of responses, and to compare 
different groups responses.
2. Chi-square and cross tabulation techniques were mainly 
used to discover and test the relationships among 
variables.
The chi-square test is a non-parametric technique used 
in this research to determine whether associations between 
two or more variables are statistically significant. Given 
the subjectivity of many of the questions, it was 
considered unwise to employ parametric statistics.
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APPENDIX V
Characteristics of Beneficiaries in Ahwaz
Variables % of Sub Samples Total
Individuals Cooperatives Art. 67
Period:
1979 6.7 10.0 0.0 7.1
1980-81 24.0 13.0 0.0 15.9
1982-83 14.0 16.3 0.0 13.0
1984-85 40.0 40.0 50.0 41.4
1986-87 15.3 20.7 50.0 22.6
Personal:
Aged 40+ 29.0 22.3 11.0 23.5
Low Income 23.0 28.0 8.0 23.0
Above x Sized Family 47.7 28.7 32.0 37.2
16+ yrs in City 41.7 59.3 45.0 49.7
Primary Educ. or Less 48.3 40.0 24.0 37.4
Semi or Unskilled 26.7 49.0 42.0 47.5
Govt. Employees 52.0 76.0 51.0 73.6
Housing Process:
State Loan s q . l ( O G .  O 17.6 80.4
Used Contractor /*. 1 I Z - , 0 irrelevant 13.1
Only Govt. Materials 36.3 50.7 irrelevant 43 . S
Completed in 12 mths 28.6 24.3 irrelevant 26.5
Spent over 4m riales 34.4 13.3 irrelevant 24.3
Fully Serviced 24.0 6.3 17.0 15.4
Satisfied with House 75.3 75.7 67.0 74.3
No Difficulties .7 1.3 irrelevant .9
( n ) (300) (300) (100)
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